UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2461st MEETING: 2 AUGUST 1983

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Page

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2461) 1

Adoption of the agenda 1

The situation in the occupied Arab territories:

Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);

Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15483);

Letter dated 8 February 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15599);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15764);

Letter dated 27 July 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15890) 1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2461st MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 2 August 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2461)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the occupied Arab territories:
   - Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);
   - Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15483);
   - Letter dated 8 February 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a. i. of the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15599);
   - Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15764);
   - Letter dated 27 July 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15890).

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the occupied Arab territories:

Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);

Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15483);

Letter dated 8 February 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a. i. of the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15599);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15764);

Letter dated 27 July 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15890)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2401st, 2412th to 2414th, 2438th, 2457th, 2459th and 2460th meetings*], I invite the representative of Israel to take a place at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cuba, Djibouti, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, India, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, the Niger, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. I invite the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blum (Israel) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. Al-Sabbagh (Bahrain), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Caballero Rodríguez (Cuba), Mr. Houfane (Djibouti), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Hucke (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Dountas (Greece), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Mohammad (Iraq), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Fakhoury (Lebanon), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Ould Hamody (Mauritania), Mr. Lahlou (Morocco), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Ali (Oman), Mr. Al-Boainin (Qatar), Mr. Zowawi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Sarré (Senegal), Mr. Madar (Somalia), Mr. Elfaki (Sudan), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Lessir (Tunisia), Mr. Gökçe (Turkey), Mr. Al-Qasimi (United Arab Emirates), Mr. Sallam (Yemen) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber; Mr. Terzi (Palestine Liberation Organization) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Mauritania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

3. Mr. OULD HAMODY (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, it is certainly a personal pleasure for me to congratulate you on behalf of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. This is a well-deserved recognition for an ambassador of your great intellectual and moral stature. Another source of satisfaction for me and for my delegation is that this confidence has been placed in the representative of a country, France, with which my country has maintained constant and multi-faceted relations for more than three quarters of a century.

4. I should like also to congratulate most sincerely the representative of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Ling Qing, for the wise, competent and devoted work he did as President of the Council last month. The People's Republic of China, whose support for the Arab and African peoples in their liberation struggle has always been constant and consistent, has earned the trust and respect of Africa and of the Arab nation, of which my country is a perfect synthesis.

5. Truly, the Arab peoples of the Middle East have been spared nothing since the brutal introduction into their region of zionism and the gradual usurpation of their land since the creation of Israel in 1948 in conditions which are well known. Thus, the peoples of the Middle East will have suffered the full panoply of the terrors of Fascist régimes: unprovoked aggression, genocide, mass deportations, indiscriminate bombardment, terrorism, and all the other types of individual and collective punishment of evil memory.

6. Once again the Security Council has before it as a matter of urgency the problem of the Middle East and Israeli practices in violation of human rights and the rights of peoples. The overall picture always remains the same, even if the scene of the crime always changes. Today, it is a matter of new sufferings inflicted on the courageous martyred people of Palestine. The Council is also to pass judgement on criminal acts committed in the name of religious fanaticism and racial contempt by the usurper whom nothing seems to stop anymore. Finally, the Council is faced with an arrogant challenge to the Organization, the United Nations, and to its principal instrument for peace and security: the Council itself.

7. The premeditated and cold-blooded attack against the Islamic University of Al-Khalil and the savage repression at Bir Zeit, Jerusalem, Nablus and elsewhere is shocking in its gratuitous brutality, the dire consequences of which are ground for concern. But unfortunately these deeds are neither isolated nor surprising. This terrorism elevated to State philosophy—which we all condemn today—is part and parcel of the neo-Nazi logic of zionism. Worse still, this attack, whose goal is to terrorize the Palestinian Arab populations, is designed to help achieve a proudly and openly proclaimed objective of Israel: creeping colonization of the West Bank and Gaza in the name of a legitimacy going back thousands of years.

8. The usurpation of Palestinian lands in 1948 is no longer enough, no more than the unilateral and illegal annexation of Jerusalem or that of the Syrian Golan Heights. The whole land of Palestine must be delivered to the unrestrained and chauvinistic imagination of Zionist settlers before being annexed for all time. In order to facilitate this dream, the theocratic State of Israel must expel all Palestinians—in short, purify the land to make room for others.

9. It goes without saying that I am not telling the Council anything new. These broadly expanded and proclaimed theories are known to all its members. As Chairman Yasser Arafat said immediately after the crimes perpetrated in Sabra and Shatila—these barbarous acts that are yet another wrong inflicted on Palestine and on the Arab nation—these crimes are contrary to the humanism of Judaism and an insult to the sufferings and discrimination imposed on the Jewish people for more than 2,000 years. It goes without saying that such acts do ensure peace and security for the peoples of the region and, first and foremost, not for the Jewish populations in Palestine. Prospects for the Middle East and with it for the rest of the world are truly threatened if such practices continue with impunity. The fleeting military superiority accorded to the usurper by its allies—first and foremost the United States of America—offers no real guarantee for peace and a secure life in the Middle East for the populations brought from five continents to dispossess a people of its land and deny it its inalienable rights.

10. Just and lasting security can be achieved only by restoring the basic rights of the Arab peoples, and especially through the total and unconditional withdrawal from all our lands, including the Holy City of Al-Quds, the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State under the guidance of the PLO, the sole authentic representative of the Arab people of Palestine, and its participation in any comprehensive, definitive and just settlement of this issue.

11. For the immediate present, the Council must face up to the explosive situation in the occupied Arab territories in view of the events in Al-Khalil, and hence a repetition of similar acts must be prevented. First of all, there must be a thorough examination of the terrorism of which Palestinians are today victims; then the latest crimes committed in cold blood must be vigorously condemned—crimes for which the direct and active responsibility of the occupying authorities can be neither denied nor even limited.

12. The Council bears a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in an atmosphere of justice and legality in such an explosive and a sensitive region—which is so necessary for the stability of the world. Indeed, if international legality is not restored in Arab Palestine, it is the law of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" that will prevail. There can be no question that in that case the Arab nation will obtain justice—in

one year, 10 years or 100 years the balance of forces will shift in its favour.

13. Also, we have no doubt that the Security Council is aware of this awesome responsibility and that it will discharge it. That is one of the motivations and the genuine hope of the sponsors of the draft resolution S/15895 before the Council for its consideration.

14. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Morocco. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

15. Mr. LAHLOU (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, at the outset I should like most sincerely and warmly to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. This is a pleasure for us for many reasons: first of all, because you have many qualities of which we are all well aware—tact, courage, heart and clear thinking—and because you come from France, a country with which my own country, Morocco, has for centuries, and particularly since our independence, enjoyed very close ties of co-operation to the mutual benefit of both the Morrocan and the French peoples.

16. I should like also to tell the representative of China how grateful we are for the wisdom and competence with which he guided the work of the Council in July and to recall the obvious relations of friendship and co-operation existing between our two countries.

17. Also, I wish to thank the Council for allowing me to speak in this debate.

[*The speaker continued in Arabic.*]

18. The Council is once more seized of the question of the deteriorating situation in the occupied Arab territories. Its constant interest in this serious problem stems from grave events there and the ensuing deteriorating situation that is worsening day by day.

19. Israel's aggressive practices in the occupied Arab territories and its insistence on expanding, by force and terrorism, are ample evidence of its reliance on the logic of subjugation and domination. The painful events reported to the Council and to the international community, whose details provide irrefutable proof that the escalation of the Israeli aggression against the Arab inhabitants and, in particular against the Palestinians, in the occupied Arab territories indeed reflect an established policy that has clear-cut aims exceeding in ruthlessness and scope those of the dark ages of colonialism.

20. What is even worse and more painful is the fact that the Israeli leaders do not deny what is ascribed to them regarding their expansionist ambitions. Instead, they state them publicly and admit that they resort to repressive and oppressive acts as necessary collective reprisals against the Arabs.

21. The Israeli presence in the occupied territories, including the Palestinian territories and Jerusalem, is the result of military invasion. Following that invasion, Israel has repeatedly, arbitrarily and defiantly violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.[1] It also trampled upon The Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, of 18 October 1907.[2] All Israel's actions prove that its sole aim is to tighten its grip over all the Arab territories it has ravaged.

22. Provocations and all forms of invidious oppression that took place during the last few days in Bir Zeit, Nablus and Jerusalem, as well as the firing of automatic weapons and the hurling of grenades at the students of the Islamic University in the city of Al-Khalil, killing some and injuring many, are viewed within the clear-cut framework of persecution and harassment of the inhabitants so as to force those remaining in the occupied territories to leave their homes and take the path of displacement.

23. Our attention is drawn to the organic relationship between the oppression of Arabs and the establishment of illegal Israeli settlements, since the events in Al-Khalil have coincided with the Israeli decision to build settlements in the heart of that city.

24. The reality of the Israeli policy aimed at depopulating the Palestinian cities represents a new dimension in the Israeli practices where the inhabited cities have become fresh targets for illegal Israeli settlements. The tragedy will be repeated, because the inhabitants of these cities will be persecuted until they leave their homes and neighbourhoods and become refugees.

25. This premeditated and wilful violence can be seen as part of the design represented by Israel's continuing occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories in preparation for their assimilation and annexation and the replacement of their Arab populations by Israelis.

26. We all know that the Palestinian question is the crux of the conflict prevailing in the Middle East. It is a question of an uprooted people that has been displaced by intimidation and oppression. Year after year has gone by and this people is still waiting for the United Nations, especially the Security Council, to fulfil the obligations and pledges made to it. It yearns for its own country and homeland in which to find security and a State of its own, thus ending its Diaspora. It did not become a refugee people by choice; it did not struggle because it hated peace; it did not prefer banishment to its own homeland. It is high time now for Israel to realize that bloodshed and harassment of the Palestinian inhabitants in the lands it occupies will never achieve the peace to which it aspires.

27. The fundamental principles and the natural framework for the establishment of peace in the area can be found in the numerous relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions—those resolutions that are flouted by Israel because they are not in keeping with its expansionist greed.

28. The Arab States, as well as the PLO, as they look anew to the Council, reaffirm their adherence to their rights enshrined in international instruments and display their faith in the United Nations and its principles and noble aims. They have provided ample evidence of their desire to achieve permanent and just peace in the area. When the international community responded unanimously here in the Council, as well as in the General Assembly, to the Fez plan [*see S/15510, annex*], it endorsed this plan in its resolutions to resolve the Palestinian question and settle the Middle East conflict, committing itself to make every effort to ensure that the plan would bear fruit.

29. This plan was conveyed to the United Nations by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco. In the General Assembly he was the spokesman of all the Arabs when he addressed the Members of the United Nations, indicating they shared responsibility for putting an end to the tragic state of affairs in the area. He spoke as follows:

> "We wished to come to the Assembly, in this building dedicated to brotherhood, peace and security, to assure you that we depend on each one of you to be faithful apostles of our will and determination for peace and our desire to contribute to the building of a world community based on equality and the safeguarding of the rights of all . . .
>
> "There is no doubt that you, the representatives members of the Assembly, will again provide us, as in the past, with strong support. I am confident that, on being informed of our decisions and our plans, you will be even more determined in your support of our cause."[3]

30. Mr. ADJOYI (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, my delegation wishes to express its great satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the work of the Council during this month of August. You represent a country with which my own country is linked by deep ties of friendship and co-operation and a country for which freedom and fraternity are not empty words. Your skill at the helm, your human sensibilities, your great qualities as a diplomat and your outstanding knowledge of international issues guarantee the success of our work.

31. I should also like to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, for the moderation and wisdom with which he guided our work last month.

32. In speaking, my delegation would like once again to express the Togolese Government's deepest concern over the distressing problem of the Middle East in general and the Palestinian problem in particular.

33. The facts are in; they speak for themselves and each one is more edifying than the next; and there is no need for my delegation to recall them, especially since previous speakers have already provided sufficient information. However, it is fitting to emphasize that the latest events that have occurred at the Islamic University of Al-Khalil would have taken on the character of every-day events had they happened elsewhere and in other circumstances. But viewed in the socio-political context of the region, these fresh events emerge as a link in a series of acts all aimed towards the same goal, namely, to render permanent the occupation of invaded territories. These events involve the responsibility of Israel, the occupying Power, which should ensure the protection and security of the populations of the occupied areas. It follows from the lack of protection and security these events have shown that Israel's behaviour is in contravention of Article 47 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.[1]

34. We should once again recall here that by imposing its laws on the population of those occupied territories and establishing new settlements there Israel is also trampling underfoot that convention which forbids the occupying Power from modifying the legal status of populations of occupied territories. Furthermore, this behaviour is in contradiction with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Council resolutions on the subject.

35. These violations stem from the long occupation that followed the events of 1967, and the Palestinian people will not be able to exercise its basic rights as long as it is denied the right to self-determination. It is therefore quite correct that the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories says, in paragraph 287 of its report in document A/37/485, "that the violation of human rights in the occupied territories will cease only when the Palestinian people are allowed to enjoy their right to self-determination". That necessarily implies the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories.

36. The Israeli attitude in the occupied territories only increases tension in a region where the situation is already one of the greatest concern. It compromises in a dangerous manner the efforts undertaken by certain countries, groups of countries or organizations with a view to finding a negotiated settlement to the Middle East conflict.

37. The situation in Lebanon and the occupied territories, as well as the other problems in the region, all revolve around one basic problem, namely, the Palestinian problem which finds its origins and roots in the refusal of two peoples which were once brothers to live in peace.

38. Why cannot those two peoples no longer live together? Are the interests of those peoples so divergent? One finds it difficult to believe that that region which gave rise to two major revealed religions and to a large number of philosophical or spiritual movements the final objective of which is the fulfilment of man in peace might be turned into a powder keg and a battlefied. One finds it difficult to believe that the word "tolerance" has disappeared from the life of those peoples to the point where they are bent on destroying each other.

39. For its part, the Togolese Government has always supported Israel's claim of the right to a homeland. But the Togolese Government supports that same right for others, especially for Palestinians, led by their sole legitimate representative, the PLO. Any attempt to settle the

Middle East conflict and any negotiation that might lead to a positive peaceful result must necessarily involve the participation of the PLO. The PLO, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, is a party to the conflict and, as such, it must participate on an equal footing with all the other parties in all efforts to arrive at a comprehensive peace.

40. As has been stated by General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, the Founding President of the Rassemblement du peuple togolais and President of the Togolese Republic:

> "We remain absolutely convinced that there will be no lasting peace in the Middle East as long as the true parties to the conflict are not all involved in negotiations with a view to reaching mutual recognition and guarantee for peaceful coexistence as neighbouring peoples destined to live together."

41. It is with those words that the Togolese delegation would like to conclude and express the firm hope that the recent events will be an opportunity for new awareness on the part of all the parties concerned and that they will no longer delay in coming to the negotiation table finally to put an end to more than a quarter century of wars that have caused upheaval for the populations of that area which aspire only to live in peace.

42. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Djibouti. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

43. Mr. HOUFANE (Djibouti) (*interpretation from French*): May I be permitted to express our profound gratitude to a friendly country—France. My delegation is very happy to see you, Sir, presiding over the Council during the month of August, given your diplomatic experience and skills.

44. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, the representative of the People's Republic of China, with which my country has very close cordial relations, for the competent and wise manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last month.

45. I wish also to thank the members of the Council for allowing my delegation to take part in the debate.

46. Once again the Council is meeting to discuss the grave and distressing question of the occupied Arab territories. Male and female students of the Islamic University of Al-Khalil have died and more than 30 have been wounded. Those are premeditated criminal acts designed to intimidate the Arab population of the occupied territories. These are also the usual political practices of occupation of Israel, the occupying Power, whose goal is the building of a greater Israel in disregard of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

47. The Council has on many occasions condemned Israeli policies and practices aimed at establishing settler colonies in the occupied Arab territories and Israel's constant attempts to change the natural, political, cultural, religious and demographic character of those territories. The Council has in many resolutions affirmed that those policies constitute a major obstacle to the establishment of lasting peace in the region.

48. The whole world is aware of the impossibility of achieving just and lasting peace in the Middle East without full and complete recognition of the Palestinian people and achievement of its inalienable rights, including its right to return to its homeland and to the establishment of an independent State there. All attempts to find solutions of the crisis in the Middle East must include consideration and full acceptance of the participation of the PLO, the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

49. The arrogance of the State of Israel reveals its true face, which is that of an expansionist and a colonialist. Regrettably Israel has led us to relive the spectacle that history attempted to bury at Nuremburg, which we had thought would be erased forever from our memory. In the face of this situation, which is a threat to international peace and security, in the face of this genocide, in the face of this holocaust whose victims are the peoples of Palestine and of the occupied Arab territories, we reaffirm our staunch support for their just cause, which we embrace as our own.

50. The Palestinian people cannot relinquish its right to self-determination and independence. The Council, which is the guardian of peace and security, is the body that must take the necessary and relevant measures with respect to Israel so that it will cease these inhuman and barbaric practices against the Palestinian Arab peoples in the occupied territories.

51. The legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories against the Zionist occupier is clearly a just struggle. That people is entitled to freedom and the well-being enshrined in the Charter. Hence it is all the more up to the Council to take all necessary measures to restore those rights.

52. We hope that the Council will adopt the draft resolution [S/15895] of which my country is a sponsor.

53. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

54. Mr. HUCKE (German Democratic Republic): Let me first of all congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August and to wish you success in the discharge of the functions of that responsible office.

55. At the same time I should like on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to express appreciation to the representative of the People's Repub-

lic of China, Mr. Ling Qing, for the work he accomplished in his capacity as President of the Council in July.

56. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic thanks the members of the Council for giving us this opportunity to explain the views of my country on the important issues on the agenda.

57. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic fully understands that an immediate meeting of the Council was requested by the representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations for the month of July [*S/15890*] in view of the serious situation in the occupied Arab territories.

58. Indeed, the situation has further deteriorated in the illegal occupied Arab territories over the last few days and weeks. Day by day news is reaching us about acts of oppression and violence in the Israeli occupied West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. It very clearly shows that the Israeli policy of aggression and occupation towards the Arab peoples contradicts international law.

59. The esteemed representative of the PLO, Terzi, has impressively pointed out here before the Council the extent of and the background to the most recent Israeli measures of terror against the Palestinian population [*2457th meeting*].

60. Those brutal acts of violence against Palestinian students in Hebron demonstrate anew that the aggressive policy pursued by Israel and its accomplices is aimed at preventing the Palestinian people from exercising its inalienable rights, in particular its right to an independent State.

61. It is quite obvious that the ruling circles of Israel have to bear responsibility for the most recent excesses in Hebron. Characteristic of the escalation of the Israeli policy of occupation are new attacks against communal institutions, against the local economy, the national culture and the educational system of the Arab people of Palestine. By means of martial law, incarceration and brutal force, the ruling circles of Israel attempt to break the Palestinian people's legitimate will to resist.

62. The current acts of terror of the Israeli occupants are a continuation of the policy of aggression against the Palestinian people; the brutal character of such acts has shocked world public opinion, particularly during the aggression against Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and at the time of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila.

63. The dangers created by the stepped-up implementation of the settlement policy of the Israeli rulers have rightfully been pointed out by speakers in the Council. The nature of that policy is to drive the Palestinians out of their homeland by force and ultimately to bring about the annexation of Palestinian territories by Israel. This policy is in flagrant contradiction to the generally recognized norms of international law and to numerous United Nations decisions; it arouses the legitimate resistance of the Palestinian people.

64. Nobody can ignore the fact that the present escalation of Israel's policy of aggression and occupation is possible only with the unqualified support of the United States. The "strategic alliance" enables the ruling circles in Israel to disregard with impunity the decisions taken by the United Nations and to continue with their policy of aggression against the Arab peoples. The fateful collaboration between the rulling circles of the United States and Israel becomes ever more obvious in their striving to force the Arab peoples into a course of confrontation and super-armament and thereby to put a stop to the struggle of peoples for national independence.

65. It is with great sympathy and concern that the world is following the heroic struggle of the Arab people of Palestine. The German Democratic Republic would like to reaffirm in the Council its support for the just and courageous struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of its sole, legitimate representative, the PLO. It strongly condemns the criminal acts of terror and violence perpetrated by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and demands an immediate stop to such acts.

66. The German Democratic Republic holds the view that it is high time the Council rose to its responsibility for the preservation of peace and security according to the Charter of the United Nations and took resolute measures for the immediate cessation of the Israeli aggression and occupation.

67. The shocking events that occurred recently in the Israeli-occupied West Bank underscore the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, in compliance with the relevant United Nations decisions, and for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the Middle East conflict, at the core of which is the issue of Palestine.

68. The German Democratic Republic therefore continues resolutely to advocate the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to return to its homeland, achieve self-determination and establish an independent State of its own.

69. Proceeding from this principled position, the German Democratic Republic fully supports the proposals for a just, comprehensive and durable solution in the Middle East as put forward by the Soviet Union on 15 September 1982 [*see S/15403*] and by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in the political declaration adopted at Prague on 5 January 1983 [*see S/15556, annex*].

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Israel, upon whom I now call.

71. Mr. BLUM (Israel): At the outset, permit me to tell you, Sir, how pleased we are to see a diplomat of your experience and wisdom guide the business of the Council

in the month of August. In addition to your outstanding qualities we also salute in you a son of France, a country that has indelibly imprinted its name in the annals of mankind as a champion of the struggle for liberty and human dignity.

72. May I take this opportunity also to express our appreciation to the representative of China for the exemplary manner in which he conducted the Council's business last month.

73. At the 2427th meeting of the Council, held on 29 March 1983, the then President of the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom, stated:

> "Speaking as President of the Council, I must confess that I have had moments of considerable discomfort during the debate on this agenda item."

The Council was on that occasion dealing with a different matter.

> "It would have been embarrassing for me to have ruled speakers out of order, but equally I was embarrassed not to rule them out of order. As President I have been put in a difficult position by the way in which some speakers have taken advantage of the laxness which has crept into our procedures. Some have spoken on matters well outside the agenda item under discussion. Some have also used unhelpfully strong language which went beyond the bounds of civility. All this is bad for the Council's standing, whereas the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization[4] has stressed the urgency of enhancing its standing. This prospect is one which should give Council members pause and should set limits to their own conduct in the Council as well as the standards they would expect of others." [*2427th meeting, para. 75.*]

74. The representative of the United Kingdom has been mercifully spared this debate. I wonder what his comments would have been had he attended the deliberations of the Council in recent days and, in particular, yesterday. Two representatives in the Council have also remarked today on the tone and form of this debate. We appreciate their remarks for, as far as I can remember, they were the first to have objected in recent years to the kind of foul, abusive and offensive language which has become customary in reference to my country.

75. I will have something to say about the substance of this language a little bit later. But let me say right away that this kind of language is not being employed only by our Arab colleagues. Some of their supporters have in fact encouraged them over the years to use this kind of language rather than deterred them from it.

76. The representative of the United Kingdom, in his intervention on 18 July [*2456th meeting*], when the question of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was discussed, rightly saw fit to remark on what he termed "the extraordinarily unbalanced and unhelpful account of recent history in Lebanon that my Soviet colleague has chosen to give us". The sad truth is that one of the permanent members of the Council has been systematically engaging in this kind of foul and abusive language with reference to my country. In his intervention last Friday [*2458th meeting*], Mr. Ovinnikov repeatedly referred to the ruling clique of Israel, meaning, of course, the Government of my country. The Prime Minister of Israel did not deserve any reference to his official title; he was repeatedly referred to as "Begin". It was not even "Mr. Begin". The normal rules of courtesy do not apply to Israel and to its democratically elected Government. When the Soviet representative speaks, apparently certain atavistic impulses and instincts come to the fore and prevent him from using the normal procedures in referring to a head of Government of another country, of another Member State.

77. Nor was the Soviet representative alone. Other speakers followed him in this reference to the ruling circles or ruling clique. It would appear that they find it difficult to familiarize themselves with the workings of a parliamentary democracy and that they do not realize that it is not circles that rule a democratic country but the elected representatives of the majority unlike the situation in those countries which they are probably more familiar with.

78. So much for the tone and the form. I must, with all due respect, disagree with the representative of the United Kingdom that it is just the tone and the form that should be faulted. The tone and the form reflect the substance. These are wrappings that cover the merchandise, and we have known all these years what that merchandise is. This foul, abusive and offensive language reflects the inability or unwillingness, or both, of Israel's enemies to come to terms with the very existence of my country and its right to exist. This has been the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict all along, ever since 1948, since the establishment of Israel as an independent State, and before. Everything else, including the various pretexts for convening the Council on one or another aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict, is a pretext or subterfuge.

79. Sometimes Arab speakers are candid enough to admit this to the Council. Some of them have been brazen enough to tell the Council that the very existence of Israel is illegitimate, irrespective of the passage of time, and that even if it took 150 or 200 years to destroy Israel they could wait. Our Syrian colleague told the Council last year, on 2 April 1982 [*2348th meeting*]:

> "Our people, the Palestinians, Syrians and others, have lost tens of thousands of martyrs. But the population of the Arab nation is 120 or 130 million, and we can afford to lose 10, 20, 30 or 40 million to fight American imperialism and the United States and Israeli racist, Zionist, imported, synthetic occupation."

This is the philosophy, the substance, behind the foul language, even if some of the Arab speakers will not go so far as to spell it out in the way that the Syrian representative and some other representatives have done from time to time.

80. It has been suggested that Israel welcomes, as it were, this kind of language, because it makes it easier for us to ignore the proceedings of the Council. Nothing could be further from the truth. The sad fact is that the Council over the years has systematically disqualified itself on matters relating to the Arab-Israel conflict. Any impartial observer of the United Nations scene would have to admit that Israel simply cannot get a fair deal in the Council. I do not have to go into the reasons for that. But it is an obvious fact, and no objective and impartial observer of the United Nations scene would deny it.

81. Let us look at the record. Mr. Ovinnikov told us last Friday that these debates had become a permanent feature of the Council's agenda, and he also figured that about one fifth of the Council's time was devoted to debates on what is called here in Council parlance "The situation in the occupied Arab territories". Let me update these statistics. It is not one fifth of the Council's time that is being devoted to Arab obsession with Israel and to the exploitation of that obsession by some cynical supporters of the Arabs from outside the region. The figures speak for themselves. In 1979, the Security Council held 76 meetings. Of those, 29 to 38 per cent were devoted to Israel and the remainder to the rest of the world. In the year 1980, the Council again held 76 meetings. Of those, 37 to 49 per cent were devoted to Israel, and the remaining 51 per cent to the rest of the world. In the year 1981, the Council held 60 meetings. Of those, 21 to 35 per cent were devoted to Israel, and the remaining 65 per cent to the rest of the world. In the year 1982, last year, the Council held 88 meetings. Forty-five of them—that is, 51 per cent—were devoted to Israel, and the remaining 49 per cent to the rest of the world.

82. Is this a true reflection of what is happening around us? Should we forget that during those years we had, for instance, a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? We had a large-scale massacre of the people of Kampuchea by the Vietnamese forces. We have had a war between Iraq and Iran for the last three years, which rarely attracts the attention of the Council. We have had repeated petty and not so petty aggressions by Libya committed against various neighbours—immediate neighbours and more distant neighbours. We have had a rather critical situation in Poland, which we were told was an internal matter and had nothing to do with the international scene—so the Council was not aware of that situation.

83. So let us ask ourselves, how does one explain this situation? I hope I will be forgiven for devoting a few minutes to these questions; they touch directly on some of the remarks made by the various representatives in the course of this debate. There are, I believe, three main reasons for this lopsided approach.

84. The first is the well-known Arab obsession with Israel, and I have two or three examples to offer this Council to prove my point. I do not believe I have to belabour this point.

85. The second is the existence of a bloc of States which is always willing to exploit the Arab fixation with Israel in an attempt to fish in the troubled waters of the Middle East and, in the process, also to divert attention away from inconvenient trouble-spots around the world. The leader of this second category is the Soviet Union. Obviously, it is much more convenient for Mr. Ovinnikov to discuss the situation in the Middle East than for him to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The Council has not had even one meeting on Afghanistan since January 1980—for three and a half years. Eyewitnesses who have come out of that country since have told us about the large-scale killings that have been going on in that country. Tens of thousands of people have lost their lives; hundreds of villages have been razed to the ground; there have been allegations of the use of bacteriological weapons by the Soviet invaders against the people of Afghanistan. The Council is not interested, and obviously the situation is extremely convenient for Mr. Ovinnikov.

86. The last time the Council discussed Kampuchea was in January 1979—four and a half years ago. The Council does have occasional meetings devoted to the Iraq-Iran war; I believe the last one was held a year ago.

87. But that, of course, does not prevent such speakers as the representatives of Afghanistan and Libya and Poland from leaping into this debate. What could have been more grotesque than the participation of the representative of Afghanistan this morning in this debate [*2460th meeting*], denouncing the evils of occupation—not, heaven forbid, of the occupation of his country: he went to look for greener pastures.

88. And this brings me to the third reason: a group of States which fully understands what is happening in the Council, the travesty that is being played out here, but which at the same time, for a variety of reasons, primarily expediency, is not willing to stand up and object to this despicable performance. Instead, it is more expedient to rationalize their silence of inactivity or passivity.

89. The cumulative effect of all this is that every minor matter that affects my country is being inflated here, and becomes the subject of urgent meetings, emergency meetings and so on, whereas serious crises confronting the international community go unnoticed. Who in this building and in this chamber seriously cares about the massive violations of human rights in most of the States Members of the United Nations, including the mass expulsions of hundreds of thousands of people that occurred in recent months, which never reached the Council?

90. Racial violence: we all know it as newspaper-readers and as tele-viewers, but we have no official knowledge of those atrocities being perpetrated on a much larger scale than the crime in Hebron—and a crime it was; I shall come to it in a moment—perpetrated last week.

91. This brings me to the ostensible cause for these meetings: the crime committed in Hebron last week. I want this to be crystal-clear: the Government and people of Israel unreservedly condemn the murders perpetrated last week in the city of Hebron. We did so on the very day of

the perpetration of those crimes. The President of the State of Israel on 26 July stated:

"A crime was committed in Hebron today. The murder of members of the Islamic Academy is no less vicious than was that of Yeshiva student Aharon Gross. In both cases innocent blood was spilled for which there can be no atonement. The law of Israel does not make distinction between blood and blood. No man's blood runs redder than another's. I utterly condemn this repugnant crime and I am confident that the Security Forces will spare no effort to apprehend those responsible and bring them to justice.

"I must caution against hasty judgement or any accusatory allegations before the criminals are apprehended and identified. Let no man claim to know the identity of the dastardly killers before it has been authoritatively verified."

92. Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the same day termed the murders a loathesome crime and pledged the Government of Israel to do everything possible to apprehend the culprits so that they can answer for their crimes.

93. The Minister of Justice spoke in the same vein in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, last week. So did the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces and other officials of my Government.

94. But we, in contradistinction to many if not most seated around this table, are not selective in our condemnation of terrorism. We condemn terrorism irrespective of the identity of those who are involved in it. This unfortunately has not been the position of the Council. What galvanized the Council into action? The crime committed in Hebron last week. It was not the first one. Only two weeks before, I had informed the Secretary-General of the murder on 7 July of this year of Aharon Gross, a student at the Religious Seminary in Hebron who was brutally stabbed to death by a number of assailants in the town's market place [*S/15865*]. In the same letter I also made reference to the death on 12 February of this year of Esther Ochana, a 22-year-old woman who had been mortally wounded on 29 January when the car in which she was travelling was stoned south of Hebron. The Council was not interested. What is more, in the draft resolution before us [*S/15895*] the Council seeks to condemn "the recent attacks perpetrated against Arab civilian population in the occupied Arab territories, especially the killing and wounding of students at the Islamic university of the Arab city of Al-Khalil". Hebron is taboo. Even in English one has to make reference these days to Al-Khalil. The name Hebron, which has been the traditional name of this city for thousands of years is being systematically erased from United Nations documentation. But that is beside the point.

95. The point I wish to make is that the Council does not condemn the murder of Jews. Jewish blood apparently is cheaper in the eyes of the Council than is non-Jewish blood.

96. But this is not the first time. On 4 May 1980 [*S/13923*], I informed the Secretary-General of the murder of six Jews, including women and children, who were murdered on 2 May 1980 when returning from their Friday eve devotions at the Tomb of the Hebrew Patriarchs, the Cave of Machpela in Hebron. No emergency meeting of the Council was convened on that occasion either, just as the Council was not interested when on 5 February 1980 [*S/13781*], in my letter to the Secretary-General, I informed him—and through him the Security Council—of the cold-blooded murder of a 23-year-old resident of Kiryat Arba, a rabbinical student, on 31 January 1980, which murder also occurred in the city of Hebron.

97. When may I ask—and I ask this question with all due respect—has the Council ever evinced any serious concern over the murder of Jews? Was it when the school children of Avivim were murdered in 1970? I cannot recall any emergency meeting or special meeting of the Council or any condemnation. Was it when Israeli athletes were murdered in Munich? Was it when school children were murdered in Ma'alot in 1974, or when PLO terrorists murdered a two-year-old girl on the Nahariya beach in front of her father in 1979? Or when they seized the nursery of Kibbutz Misgav-Am in 1980? I challenge you: please show me. When did the Council ever express any concern over the murder of Jews? Why, may I ask the representative of the United Kingdom, are we supposed to believe in the impartiality of this body when it comes to Israel?

98. I would make one admission. The representative of the United Kingdom finds himself in a more comfortable position than I because, under the rules of the Charter of the United Nations, he can prevent the passage of Council resolutions which he deems inimical to his country. I do not quarrel with the provision itself. It is constitutional. But I would expect a higher degree of empathy from him when it comes to those Member States which find themselves in a less fortunate position.

99. And, as the representative of the United Kingdom very well knows, his country from time to time does resort to this constitutional device which is available to it—for instance, last year on 4 June 1982, when it prevented the adoption of a draft resolution on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) dispute.

100. But let me come to another example which, I think, fully illustrates the point I wish to make and which brings together the various elements of the malaise—and a malaise it is—which has gripped the Council in its dealings with any matter affecting Israel.

101. Last Thursday, the representative of Jordan in his statement made reference to the cases of mass poisoning which mysteriously occurred among schoolgirls in the West Bank last February [*2457th meeting, para. 23*]. The representative of Democratic Yemen in his statement at the same meeting also claimed that "Students in cities of the West Bank have been poisoned" [*ibid., para. 43*].

102. I believe all of us must view statements of this kind with the utmost gravity—not because the representative of Jordan was wrong with regard to the date, which he spoke of as last February whereas the episodes he was referring to occurred in March and early April. This is a minor inaccuracy and, as the ancient Romans have taught us, *de minimis non curat praetor*. I am not concerned with that. I am concerned with the fact that months after it has been established that there have been no poisonings a member of the Security Council should find it so difficult to face up to reality.

103. We all remember what preceded his statement. Last March—since the Council was involved in all this and, I think, since it has not finished its business, I shall, with your permission, Mr. President, detain it for several minutes—schoolgirls in a number of localities in Judea and Samaria complained of dizziness, headaches and so on. Thereupon the Israeli medical authorities immediately instituted inquiries. Those inquiries did not yield any organic cause, in the clinical sense, for those complaints.

104. Now, this was known at the time, but despite the information made available by the Israeli medical authorities, the representative of Iraq on 29 March 1983, in a letter to the President of the Council, stated:

> "Israeli terrorism has reached the point of the implementation of schemes for the collective poisoning of students and inhabitants" [*see S/15660*].

105. On the very same day the representative of Jordan, in a letter to the President of the Council, claimed that there had occurred

> "incidents of collective poisoning to which more than 1,000 Palestinian schoolgirls were exposed in the West Bank" [*see S/15659*].

106. The representative of Iraq, apparently thinking that he was having a field day, two days later came back with another letter. I had the feeling at the time that, since he was representing Baghdad, he thought that he had to add to the one thousand and one nights the one thousand and second night. In that letter he said:

> "These poisoning cases"—he knew already that these were poisonings—"were not coincidental. They were caused by a yellow substance containing sulphur concentrates which emitted poisonous gases with dangerous physical and psychological consequences as well as other possible consequences" [*see S/15673*].

107. Of course, the representative of Syria could not lag behind. For some reason he did not send a letter, but he used the Council debate [*2426th meeting*] on another matter—Nicaragua—in order to tell the Council that Israel

> "kills the Arabs, displaces them, desecrates their Holy Places and even poisons their schoolchildren . . . Poisonous gases are used on Arab schools in the West Bank . . . What is the use of murdering and poisoning our schoolchildren?"

108. Before I come to my own letter, I should add that the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People also fell in. He also reported to the Council that:

> "Local residents believe the illness to have been induced by some kind of poison, perhaps even gas poisoning, in the girls' classrooms" [*see S/15667*].

109. So, against this background, I sent my letter to the President of the Council on 3 April [*S/15674*], in which I informed her of the real state of facts and of the medical inquiries that had been started, adding that, since the Israel medical authorities could not determine the origins of this disease—if it was a disease—the Israel Ministry of Health decided to request also international health authorities to independently assess the causes of the phenomenon. I informed the President of the Council, and through her the members of the Council, that the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had already investigated that phenomenon and could not determine the existence of any organic cause and that, in addition to him, the Government of Israel also approached the United States Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, as well as the World Health Organization (WHO) and requested that both send experts to Israel to investigate the case.

110. Even before those experts had a chance to arrive in Israel, the Council convened in informal meeting and authorized its President to issue on 4 April a presidential statement, which I should like to read out to the Council—although I believe many of the members of the Council may still remember it:

> "The members of the Security Council have met in informal consultations with great concern on 4 April 1983 to discuss cases of mass poisoning in the occupied Arab territory of the West Bank as referred to in document S/15673.
>
> "The members of the Security Council request the Secretary-General to conduct independent inquiries concerning the causes and effects of the serious problem of the reported cases of poisoning and urgently to report on the findings" [*S/15680*].

111. Some three weeks later the experts of the Centers for Disease Control concluded:

> "that this epidemic of acute illness was induced by anxiety, may have been triggered initially either by psychological factors or by sub-toxic exposure to hydrogen sulfide. Its subsequent spread was mediated by phychogenic factors. Newspaper and radio reports may have contributed to this spread. We observed no evidence of reproductive impairment in affected patients."

112. Then two weeks later, WHO also reported and the Secretary-General submitted its report to the Security

Council. The salient passage is to be found in paragraph 26:

"the WHO inquiry has not been able to indicate any specific cause or causes of this ill-defined health emergency" [*S/15756*].

113. What has the Council done since to redress the wrong that has been done to my country, in maligning it? We have been waiting in vain for three months for the Council to meet again in informal consultations and to say it is very happy that no poisoning has taken place. Heaven forbid. I would not expect a statement by the Council to say: "We are sorry if the State of Israel found itself offended by what we did last April"—that would go too far—but at least to express happiness that no poisoning had taken place. Were you all not concerned about the reported cases of poisoning last April?

114. This is, incidentally, what one of the newspapers saw fit to do. *The New York Times* on 18 June apologized to its readers for the disparity in its reporting in that it gave much greater space to Arab accusations—which have been disproved—than to American and Israeli explanations. There was, the paper said, no journalistic justification for the disparity.

115. The Council did not take note of that. Instead, three months later two representatives—one of them a member of the Council—come back with this discredited story and refer again to "poisonings". How should one characterize such behaviour? I ask you, Mr. President, and members of the Council, in all candour and humility: please help me define it.

116. I should have thought that the least that could be expected, as far as moral and intellectual integrity is concerned, is to keep silent. Those letters of last March and April are on the record; they cannot be erased. If they could, I would suggest to the representative of Jordan and his other colleagues to withdraw those documents. But at least keep silent; do not come back with these inflammatory charges which have been disproved.

117. The World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control have been extremely cautious. The phenomenon apparently is known in the medical world. In an article published in the *British Medical Journal* of 26 November 1966 by Peter D. Moss and Colin P. McEvedy, on page 1295, the following case is reported:

"At mid-day on Thursday, 7 October 1965, the Blackburn Medical Officer of Health received a phone call from the Headmistress of a girls' secondary school. In the earlier part of the morning a few of the girls in the school had complained of feeling dizzy and peculiar and some had fainted; later in the morning the affection had become epidemic and the girls were going down like ninepins. A medical officer immediately went to the school, the girls looked not only frightened but shocked. Ambulances took 85 of the most severely affected girls to hospitals; the rest of the pupils were dismissed and told not to return until the following Monday. Of the girls taken to hospitals all but 34 recovered sufficiently in the course of the afternoon to be sent home. Six required readmission over the week-end and three new cases were taken in during this period, but there were no cases among the girls' families or from the community at large.

"On Monday the school reassembled, and in the course of the morning another epidemic broke out, almost identical to the first in character and consequence. Fifty-four girls were taken to hospitals; school was dismissed for the remainder of the week."

There was no report that Israeli authorities had closed the school.

"Many of the Monday cases had been affected on the first day and, as previously, the symptoms subsided quickly enough to allow the majority to be sent home by the evening."

And so it goes on. And what are the conclusions? The following is found on page 1299:

"What became epidemic was a piece of behaviour consequent on an emotional state: excitement or, in the latter stages, frank fear led to overbreathing, with its characteristic sequelae—faintness, dizziness, paraesthesiae, and tetany. Once learned, this self-reinforcing piece of behaviour restarted spontaneously whenever the school was assembled. By day 12"—because the episode lasted for 12 days—"however, the hysterical nature of the epidemic was generally accepted, and a firm line prevented the behaviour propagating as extensively as it had on the previous occasions.

"Clinically the symptoms are entirely explicable in terms of overbreathing due to emotional tension."

118. On 17 March 1983 another article was published, in *The New England Journal of Medicine*, entitled "Outbreak of illness in a school chorus". The following description is given on page 632:

"On the morning of May 20, 1981, 102 elementary-school students from East Templeton, Massachusetts, rode buses to their regional high school. They joined another 300 students from other schools to rehearse the chorus for their annual spring concert. After half an hour, illness suddenly interrupted the rehearsal. Several chorus members fell to the stage floor, grabbed their abdomens and throats and complained of nausea, abdominal pain and shortness of breath. Teachers escorted the stricken children outside, but every few minutes another chorus member began to have similar symptoms . . .".

And so it goes.

119. The conclusion?

"Mass hysteria is defined as the occurrence in a group of people of the constellation of physical symp-

toms suggesting an organic illness but resulting from a psychological cause, with each member of the group experiencing one or more of the symptoms. Several characteristic features of mass hysteria help differentiate such epidemics from those due to physical causes: the absence of laboratory results and physical findings confirming the specific organic cause; a preponderance of illness in girls or women, the apparent transmission of illness by sight or sound, or both; the presence of hyperventilation or syncope; a preponderance of illness in adolescents or preadolescents; benign morbidity, often with rapid spread followed by rapid remission of symptoms",

and so on.

120. The representative of Jordan was cautious enough in his statement last week [*2457th meeting*] to say that:

> "the mass anxiety that ensued among the civilian populations [as well as the poisoning] are considered a moral and political condemnation of Israel's oppressive policies and inhuman practices."

No poisoning, really, perhaps, but the fear of poisoning is a result of anxiety, and the anxiety of course stems from the presence of Israeli occupation.

121. I wonder whether Blackburn, in England, has also been occupied by the Israel Defence Forces, and if not what were the causes of anxiety there. Similarly I am not aware of the fact that the Israel Defence Forces have reached East Templeton, Massachusetts.

122. And I have more examples. *The Courier Post* of New Jersey reported on 23 June of this year that musical students from New Jersey and North Carolina had been taken ill at an award ceremony, complaining of nausea and stomach cramps. Two hundred high school musicians went to Riverside Hospital in Newport News, Virginia.

123. The Council did not issue a presidential statement about those cases, nor did WHO examine the latrines and toilets of those schools, as was the case in Judea and Samaria.

124. Let me ask you in all sincerity: given this dismal record, and dismal it is, why do you expect us to look for pretexts so as not to have to put our confidence in the Council? Who of you in similar circumstances would have any confidence in the impartiality and objectivity of the Council?

125. Let us leave it at that. Let us place it on record that the Council owes an apology to my country for having maligned it last April and for having refrained from redressing that wrong ever since.

126. As I said before, the real reason for these systematic rehearsals and rehashes of anti-Israel exercises in the Council is to be found elsewhere, primarily though not exclusively in Arab obsession with the very existence of the State of Israel. Our Arab friends are looking for all kinds of excuses. The issue of Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria is one of those excuses. It was rightly stated by Professor Fred Gottheil of the University of Illinois before the United States House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, on 12 September 1977, that:

> "Jewish settlements on the West Bank is an issue today only because the existence of Israel is an issue. The issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank today is simply one thin layer that emanates from and partially conceals the core of the conflict, namely the non-recognition by the Arab States of Israel's right to exist."

127. And, since the matter has been raised, I do wish to address myself also to the issue which ostensibly is the cause of these deliberations: the Jewish presence, the presence of Jewish civilians in Judea and Samaria.

128. Israel's position on the matter of the right of Jews to live in any part of the Land of Israel has been stated many times, both in this body and in other United Nations forums. I can be very brief. We do not regard ourselves as strangers in any part of the Land of Israel, as foreigners in Judea or Samaria or any other part of the Land of Israel. The Israeli villages are there as of right. We cannot accept that Jews should be prohibited from settling and living in areas which are the very heart of our homeland. Hebron specifically happens to be the cradle of the Jewish people. Hebron has had an uninterrupted Jewish presence over the millenia, until the massacre of 1929 occurred and in its wake the Jewish community of Hebron was liquidated. We shall not accept any attempt to perpetuate that massacre by barring Jews from Hebron. Jews as of right may live in Hebron, Nebraska; or in Bethel, Connecticut; or in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; or in Jericho, New York. We shall not accept that Jews *qua* Jews shall be barred from living in Hebron, Judea; or in Bethlehem, Judea; or Bethel, Samaria; or Jericho, Samaria.

129. At the same time it has never been the aim of Israel to exercise control over the lives and activities of the Arab inhabitants there. We have repeatedly stated, and I wish to state it here again, that we seek to live as equals with them, not to replace them. Furthermore, it has been the policy of the Government of Israel that no single Palestinian Arab resident of these areas legally holding claim to land should be made homeless by the establishment of these villages. Incidentally, many of the present-day Jewish villages in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district have been established on Jewish-owned land expropriated in 1948 by the Jordanian or Egyptian Government. Most of them have been set up on government and public land which had been barren for centuries.

130. The right of Jews to live in Judea and Samaria has also been challenged here by some on legal grounds. I should therefore like to dwell on this matter at some length. As is well known, with the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine on 14 May 1948 the armies of seven Arab States—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,

Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen—illegally crossed the international boundaries in clear violation of general international law and in breach of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the use or even threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The avowed purpose of that armed aggression by the seven Arab States which I mentioned was to crush the fledgling State of Israel, and the Governments which dispatched them had the effrontery to make formal announcements of their illegal action to the Council. Referring specifically to the communication sent by Transjordan to the Council, the representative of the United States stated to the Council on 22 May 1948 that the position of the King of Transjordan was characterized by

"a certain contumacy towards the United Nations and the Security Council.

" . . .

"The contumacy of that reply to the Security Council is the very best evidence of the illegal purpose of this Government in invading Palestine with armed forces and conducting the war which it is waging there. It is against the peace; it is . . . with a definite purpose.

" . . .

"Therefore, here we have the highest type of evidence of the international violation of the law: the admission by those who are committing this violation." [*302nd meeting, pp. 41, 42 and 43.*]

131. The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic said the following in the Council on 20 May of the same year:

"We are concerned with the plain fact that a number of Palestine's neighbour States have sent their troops into Palestine. Our knowledge of that fact is based not on rumours, or on newspaper reports, but on official documents signed by the Governments of those States informing the Security Council that their troops have entered Palestine . . .

"Nor can there be any doubt of the purpose for which those forces have entered Palestine. We may be sure they have not gone there for a summer camp vacation or for exercises. Those forces have a definite military and political purpose." [*297th meeting, pp. 4 and 5.*]

132. There was another speaker who, on behalf of his delegation, stated the following to the Council on 21 May:

"[*We*] cannot but express surprise at the position adopted by the Arab States in the Palestine question, and particularly at the fact that those States—or some of them, at least—have resorted to such action as sending their troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aimed at the suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine." [*299th meeting, p. 7.*]

The speaker who uttered those words was the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Andrei Gromyko. I do not believe I need add that the national liberation movement to which he was referring was zionism the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.

133. Times change. History is being rewritten by some; even encyclopedias are being rewritten and pages are torn out. But as far as we are concerned we shall not permit this rewriting of history here.

134. The violation of the international boundaries of Palestine by the Arab armies having constituted an act of armed aggression, the consequent illegal occupation by them of any territory previously forming part of the Mandated Territory of Palestine could not give rise to any legitimate claim of sovereignty. Thus the purported "annexation" of Judea and Samaria by Jordan in 1950 was in violation both of general international law and of the General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, signed in 1949.[5] It is not without interest to note in this connection that this purported annexation was not recognized at the time by the international community, except for one country, the United Kingdom, which had a very special relationship with Transjordan in those days and that even the League of Arab States, in 1950, threatened Jordan with expulsion from its ranks because of that purported annexation.

135. On 5 June 1967, King Hussein of Jordan spurned an official message from Israel delivered through the intermediary of the United Nations, inviting him to stay out of the Six Day War, which began that day. Instead, the Jordanian army of occupation of Judea and Samaria opened fire on Jerusalem and all along the armistice lines with Israel, and as a result of its renewed aggression Jordan lost control of Judea and Samaria. Thus, when the Israel Defence Forces entered Judea and Samaria in June 1967, in the course of repelling that renewed Jordanian aggression, they ousted from those territories an illegal invader who enjoyed at the most the rights of a belligerent occupant. However, the rights of such a belligerent occupant under the international law of belligerent occupation are self-terminating upon the conclusion of the occupation, and no rights survive for him thereafter.

136. Eminent authorities on international law throughout the world have repeatedly stated in recent years that in the light of the facts and the applicable law Israel has better title to any territory of the former Palestine Mandate than any other State. These distinguished authorities include Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School, Elihu Lauterpacht of the University of Cambridge, England, Julius Stone of the University of Sydney, Australia, and Stephen Schwebel, formerly of Johns Hopkins University and currently a Judge of the International Court of Justice. The latter, in an article published in 1970 in the *American Journal of International Law*, rightly stated that:

"Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the State which subsequently

takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defence has, against that prior holder, better title."

Stephen Schwebel concluded:

"Israel has better title in the territory of what was Palestine . . . than do Jordan or Egypt."[6]

137. If there has been an unwillingness to hear our arguments, still more has there been a reluctance to consider them. When, for example, Israel is on the record with a well-defined legal position with regard to the inapplicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,[1] to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, it is not enough for members to reject it out of hand, as has been done in most cases here. Differences of opinion are legitimate, and they deserve serious consideration. Suffice it for me to say here that the terms "occupying Power" and "occupied territory" have a well-defined meaning in international law and refer to the seizure by one Power of territory under the sovereignty of another Power. Since, for the reasons I have just mentioned, Jordan in no way constituted a legitimate sovereign in Judea and Samaria, the fourth Geneva Convention cannot be said to apply to Israel's present administration of Judea and Samaria.

138. Furthermore, even if the laws of belligerent occupation were for some reason applicable here, it would have to be pointed out that article 49, which has been mentioned in the course of this debate, bans forcible transfers, not voluntary acts of individuals taking up residence in the areas under consideration. Moreover, it must also be remembered that article 49 was written in the wake of the mass expulsion from their lands of population groups by the Nazis in order to make room for the settlement of Germans in those areas in place of the original inhabitants. However, no Arab inhabitants have been displaced by the establishment of the villages in question. Thus, for this reason, too, article 49 of the Convention does not apply here.

139. In addition, in this particular instance consideration should be given to the fact that Israel not only applies the principles of the fourth Geneva Convention with regard to the residents of the territories in question but goes significantly beyond them. The Convention, for example, allows for the application of capital punishment. Israel has never applied the death penalty in the territories in question, despite some atrocious crimes committed there. The Convention does not provide for access by local populations to courts of the administering Power. Israel allows the people in those territories to have access to Israeli courts, whether the cases are against individuals, against the Government of Israel, or against any of its officials, including military officers in those regions.

140. There is no provision in the Convention requiring that movement of the local population outside the territories be facilitated. Israel facilitates such movement in both directions, including movement to the Arab countries which regard themselves as being in a state of war with us. In particular, it facilitates pilgrimages to Mecca. The Convention says nothing about trade abroad by the territories in question. Israel facilitates such trade, including trade with Arab countries. The Convention accepts the jurisdiction of military tribunals of the administering Power. Israel goes further than that, and requires that the presidents of those tribunals should have been lawyers for at least six years and that they should be members of the Bar and fully qualified. Similarly, the civil and religious tribunals made up of local judges continue to function in those regions, applying civil and religious laws that were already in force.

141. The argument has also been raised that the presence of Israeli villagers and farmers in Judea and Samaria constitutes an obstacle to peace. Israel utterly rejects this assertion. Let me point out right away that due to Jordan's *Judenrein* policies—the expulsion of all Jews from the territories captured by Jordan in 1948 and the destruction of their property and villages—there was not one Israeli farmer living in Judea and Samaria between 1948 and 1967 and yet there was no willingness on Jordan's part at that time either to conclude peace with Israel. These villages are certainly, it is true, an obstacle. They are an obstacle to the enemies of peace, to those rejectionist elements in the Arab world who continue to seek the destruction of my country, to whom any peace or coexistence with Israel is anathema. These villages evidently frustrate the designs of those who would see in Judea and Samaria the first stage in a process of politicide—a weakening and eventual dismemberment of Israel, and its replacement by a terrorist entity and fresh source of instability in the region.

142. The constant recourse to futile and meaningless debate in the United Nations is but one more weapon in an obsolete arsenal. Reason, common sense and sheer humanity demand its abandonment once and for all in favour of the successfully proved way of direct and substantive negotiation between the States concerned.

143. Far from constituting an obstacle to peace, the Israeli villages are in fact a vital deterrent to war. Even a cursory glance at the map of the region shows clearly that along Israel's narrow central coastline, where 80 per cent of Israel's population lives, the distance between the pre-1967 armistice lines and the Mediterranean Sea averages between 9 and 15 miles, or about the distance from the northern tip of Manhattan island to the World Trade Center. Until 1967 all of Israel's major towns and cities were within range of medium Arab artillery, and our capital, Jerusalem, was within light mortar range of Arab forces. Villages of the kind we are discussing have proved to be an effective form of early warning system.

144. It is clearly the objective of Israel's enemies to try to have the territories leading to the outskirts of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv cleared of any Israeli presence which may stand in the way of their bellicose designs. But anyone prepared to consider seriously the security problems facing Israel would recognize that Israel being, as it is, still threatened on its northern and eastern frontiers by implacably hostile Arab neighbours, the presence of those villages is vital also for Israel's security. Judea, Samaria and

the Gaza district were used repeatedly in the period from 1948 to 1967 as staging grounds for ceaseless and unremitting aggression against Israel. Israel's major towns and cities were within easy range of Arab artillery and faced constant threats of attack. The Israeli villages in Judea and Samaria today are thus an effective form of early warning system, as well as a vital deterrent to war.

145. Yesterday in this debate [*2459th meeting*], Mr. Maksoud posed some rhetorical questions. He asked the Council what he and the group of countries for which he speaks is supposed to do. Should they resort to force? Should they come again before the Council when on so many occasions in the past, to quote him, the Council's deliberations have proved fruitless? Mr. Maksoud did not answer those questions. Let me answer them for him.

146. The most obvious answer, the most obvious choice and option, did not even occur to him. Rather than speculate about the use of force or about engaging the Council in these interminable debates—which, I agree with him, are exercises in futility—why not sit down and discuss all our outstanding problems as is customary in the rest of the world? Is it not absurd that this possibility does not even occur to him? He wishes to involve everyone, except for the party to the dispute—which brings me back to my introductory remarks. The root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict has been all along this unwillingness to recognize Israel's existence and its right to exist. The expression of this unwillingness has been a refusal to sit down with us and to negotiate without any prior conditions.

147. Now, where has all this led you, Mr. Maksoud, and the States which you represent? Are you any better off after 35 years of unrelenting hostility towards Israel than you were 35 years ago? Have not you and the rest of the Arab leadership led your peoples from one disaster to another? Has not the time come for you and for the leaders of the Arab States to reconsider your position?

148. If the Council wishes to make a constructive contribution to the Arab-Israel conflict, it would certainly encourage our Arab friends to reconsider their position. It would encourage the Arab States to sit down at long last to negotiate with Isral without any prior conditions on all the outstanding issues between us.

149. Mr. GAUCI (Malta) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, permit me first of all to express to you my friendly congratulations on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. The very fact that you presided over a meeting on the very first day of such a hot month augurs well for the effectiveness of your presidency and is a sign of your country's determination to bring about a resolution of the question before us.

150. I should like also to congratulate most warmly Mr. Ling Qing of the People's Republic of China, your predecessor, whose guidance of the Council's work through an equally busy July was impeccable.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

151. My expressed its views on Israeli policies in the illegally occupied territories on 14 February last [*2413th meeting*]; we shall therefore only confirm those views today without any unnecessary repetition.

152. It is to the future that we must look, after briefly reviewing the past, and without going into minute details.

153. The events brought to our attention on this occasion are, of course, tragic in themselves, but they are only symptoms of a wider malady. The Council, in a way, has become an inadvertent and reluctant party to a wider tragedy, in that its attention is frequently diverted from the real focus meriting its undivided attention to issues which are in themselves of a nature which demands immediate action but which, as I have already indicated, are only part of a much wider malaise. The Council, therefore, only reacts to grave situations or, even worse, to *faits accomplis*; it has not been able so far to initiate an objectively independent and comprehensive course of action.

15 This was not the case with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which took on the assignment given to it by the United Nations seven weary years ago. Throughout 1976, free from the pressure of immediate events, the Committee, by international consensus among its members, diligently drew up a prescription for a peaceful resolution of the Palestine issue within the Middle East complex.

155. The Committee then treated the question of Palestine as the central issue, which it is, while respecting previous decisions of the United Nations directly relevant to the Middle East. There was abundant material to use as the source and the inspiration for the Committee's recommendations. The number of meetings and the number of decisions taken on this question is, unfortunately, only a reaction to what has actually taken place on the spot.

156. The hopes generated by those recommendations, which were endorsed in each successive year by the General Assembly by an even more resounding majority, at least preserved for a few years a relative calm in the region, and violence, though not completely eliminated, was contained. The Palestinian people and its recognized leadership were encouraged to pursue their diplomatic initiative. However, the high hopes of the Assembly were not taken up by the Council, which continued to neglect the question of Palestine, or else, when frequently called upon to do so by the nature of events, was only able to react in a voice muted by dissent.

157. The end result was predictable. The attention of the Council was, in fact, drawn time and time again to several signals of a major storm gathering on the horizon. Israel was clearly taking advantage of the Council's hesitation, and it acted forcefully on the spot, allegedly in reprisal, but out of all proportion to any acts which it may have considered as a pretext. As usual, it chose to strike at the most vulnerable target. As a result, Lebanon—a small and friendly country valiantly striving to heal its internal problems—was singled out last year for a devastating blow. Today, Lebanon, a founding Member of the Organ-

ization, is, to say the least, in an unprecedentedly dangerous situation, to our regret, even to our shame.

158. The accumulated evidence is clear and receives confirmation practically every day. The approaches of the past cannot yield positive results. Israel itself, far from gaining the respect and security it seeks, is only sowing the seeds of further future conflict by its present militaristic policy, from whatever perspective one looks at it.

159. There can no longer be any doubt that Israel is now embarked on an insidious effort to take over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This has been confirmed. It is sufficient to mention that in just three years both the number of settlements and the number of settlers have more than doubled. Soon there will come a point of no return. We cannot remain helpless witnesses. The truth can no longer be obscured. It is difficult against cumulative and widely reported evidence to escape the conclusion that Israel is not only flouting international law but also that many of its civilians seem to take the law into their own hands. The genuine fear of West Bank Palestinians engendered by these illegal Israeli practices was intelligently described in the article by Mr. Jonathan Kuttab published in *The New York Times* yesterday. It is encouraging that the Israeli authorities have deplored this latest incident, but the fears remain and evidently they are not unfounded. We must act if we wish to prevent even worse disasters.

160. So even its best-intentioned friends, with all the good will in the world, must act together to persuade Israel not to continue with its present policies. Similarly the partial approaches that have deflected and by-passed the efforts of the United Nations clearly also are not enough. They too divert attention from the real problem and on account of their limited scope bring scant consolation—if, indeed, they bring any consolation at all—to the dispossessed Palestinians subjected daily to ever more repressive Israeli measures.

161. Let us now admit it once and for all: many elements are, of course, involved in the complex Middle East equation, but the Palestinian question deserves concentrated and priority attention.

162. Over the past seven years the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has laboured to bring out objectively all the elements of this question. These elements have already been the subject of concentrated attention in all the regions of the world, in particular during the past two years, in preparation for the climax during the International Conference on the Question of Palestine to be held in Geneva later this month. The preparatory work, therefore, has all been done. The stage is thus set for a determined effort, open to the contribution of all.

163. Innumerable Governments, including my own, have not contributed a single bullet to feed the violence of the Israel-Arab conflict. We have not once encouraged the escalation of animosity, verbal or otherwise. On the contrary, we have racked our brains and devoted much time and energy in advocating the benefits of dialogue, understanding, reconciliation and recognition, as well as constantly urging the start of a reverse momentum away from war and in the direction of peace in the Middle East.

164. A unique opportunity, which will not easily be repeated, therefore lies ahead in the proposed International Conference on the Question of Palestine. I wish to point out and to stress that it has already been agreed in advance to propose that the Conference make its best effort to ensure that its recommendations are adopted by general agreement. Here lies an opportunity for a breakthrough in overcoming the obstacles and the stalemate that have plagued the Middle East for more than a generation. We trust that the leaders of all the nations in the world will seize this opportunity to set down the fundamental guidelines that will truly recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and respond positively to their yearnings for a place among the family of nations, not by lip service but by resolute, concerted international agreement. Let all national leaders without exception devote one benevolent week this month to devising together a new approach to Palestine and the Middle East instead of recklessly fanning the fires of discontent by authorizing enormous sums for the dispatch of lethal arms to what is probably the most volatile region in the world—a region that unfortunately is already oversaturated with the weapons of war and whose soil is strewn with thousands of hapless victims. The former course would truly be a universal investment for peace in the years ahead, sorely needed and long overdue.

165. Eventually the Council will have to assume its proper role in world affairs. It is the only place in the world where all parties can meet around the same table and where other flexible arrangements can also be envisaged to facilitate contact, negotiation and reconciliation. The countries of the region and the major Powers, which wield such tremendous influence on the protagonists, should play their predominant part in a positive way in moulding a truly universal consensus on the imperatives of the Palestinian dimension to the Middle East conflict. It is the only way to change direction from antagonism and confrontation to tolerance and rapprochement, backed if necessary by strong international guarantees to satisfy the legitimate preoccupations of those who may wish to seek them.

166. Once more the Secretary-General set the right tone in his latest report on the work of the Organization:

> "It is absolutely essential that serious negotiations on the various aspects of that problem"—that is, the Middle East problem—"involve all the parties concerned at the earliest possible time. Far too much time has already elapsed, far too many lives and far too many opportunities have been lost, and too many *faits accomplis* have been created."[4]

It would be an even graver tragedy if, through uncertainty, division or indifference, the prospects offered by this beneficial opportunity were to be once again jeopardized or squandered in acrimony and thereby lost.

167. In these circumstances, I honestly feel that all nations should rise to the occasion, not to re-write history, but to right wrong. Malta for its part will do so, both at the Conference itself and in the Council during the remainder of our tenure. We desperately need something constructive for a region which lies in prolonged torment and which has tormented the international conscience for far too long. Surely it is not too much to ask that after a decade and a half of dithering with symptoms and partial remedies the international community, acting in concert, will finally direct efforts towards a road to peace based not on the sinews of war but on the sound principles of justice, human rights and national dignity.

168. Today we will vote in favour of the draft resolution presented [*S/15895*], but our expectations lie in the future, on the more difficult but constructive road that we should all choose.

169. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): As is his custom, the Israeli representative has tried to distract the attention of the Council and to turn the focus of attention away from the item on the agenda, the situation in the occupied Arab territories.

170. He has tried to prompt representatives on the way to formulate their statements concerning the aggression of Israel against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. He has tried also to set himself up as judge of the Council and of the representatives of States—as an arbiter of the accuracy of their statements and of their condemnation of aggression, expansion and occupation.

171. The anger displayed by the Israeli representative and his grudge against the Council and the Organization is not unusual, because here in the Council Israel is unmasked and here we see the process of unveiling its expansionist aggressive policy.

172. What has been stated by the Israeli representative about the Council and the United Nations devoting most of their time to Israel actually reflects the reality. He himself mentioned that the Council spends more than half its time on Israeli practices. However, he did not indicate the reason. It takes moral courage to state the reason since it involves self-condemnation. The Israeli representative forgot to mention, or was oblivious of the fact that the record of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories and its oppressive, arbitrary policies against the civilian inhabitants are the reasons for the Council's preoccupation with Israel. It behoves me to say that there is an unwillingness—and oftentimes a desire not to overburden the Council with the implications of Israeli practices and oppressive policy. I believe with all objectivity that the Council should meet constantly to grapple with the results of Israel's extremism, rash behaviour and expansionism.

173. The conceit and arrogance of the Israeli representative have gone so far that he arrogates the right to assess the content and formulation of statements of representatives concerning Israel's brutal and aggressive practices. I believe that what has been mentioned in the Council condemns Israel. It stems from the feelings of anxiety, concern and even revulsion as regards Israeli practices and hypocrisy.

174. The Israeli representative stated that a bone of contention is the lack of desire on the part of the enemies of Israel to recognize its existence and that of its people. He speaks about what he calls the desire and intention of others to destroy Israel. He refers to statements that were prompted by a feeling of danger and by the life threat posed by Israel's practices. There is before the Council a long record of Israel's daily practices designed to dismember the Arab nation, especially the Palestinian people. The Israeli representative was oblivious to the fact that until recent times his rulers did not even recognize the existence of the Palestinian people. He wonders why the Security Council showed disregard for and did not meet to consider what he called the murder of Jews.

175. He forgot that Israel has turned its people into an expansionist aggressor, and that the Zionist philosophy has turned the Israeli Jews into a people which occupies other States and achieves its ambitions at the expense of others, especially at the expense of the Palestinian people. What took place recently at the Islamic University of Al-Khalil is just one example of Israel's feverish quest to expel the indigenous Arab inhabitants from their homes and replace them with "imported" Jewish settlers. This is what has been said even by some Jews who oppose the racist Zionist philosophy.

176. In 1948 Jordan and a number of Arab States went to the rescue of the Palestinian people, which asked for help to prevent its elimination and expulsion at the hands of armed Jewish bands that resorted to terrorism to eject civilian Arab populations from their territories. Today, settlers use the same method in Nablus, Al-Khalil and the West Bank towns, as well as in the Gaza Strip and the Golan.

177. When Jordan and its Army heroically rose up in 1948 to prevent the genocide of the Palestinian people at the hands of the Irgun and Stern gangs, that was legal and legitimate under the rules of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Jordan is proud of its historical link with the Palestinian people and with Palestinian-Jordanian unity. It is the country which hosted the Palestinians after they were expelled by Israel from their territories in Palestine. It is the country which has shared with the Palestinians their pains, hopes and livelihood and has done its utmost to ease the pains caused by Israel.

178. We are well aware of the fact that it is impossible for the representative of Israel to understand those historical and equal bonds that exist between two peoples and two regions outside the framework of his State, which is based on the usurpation of the rights of others and replacing one people with another. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people cannot be replaced with temporary shelters and humane action to ameliorate the suffering caused by the Israeli occupation and the displacement that has taken place at Israel's hands. The rights of the Palestinians are political, legal and historical in the land

of their fathers and forefathers, in Palestine. As regards the claim of the Israeli representative to the effect that his country desires peace, I wish to state that peace consists in deeds, not in words only. The representatives in the Council are meeting today to consider Israel's actions that contravene the most rudimentary requirements of peace. But if we really want to consider Israel's aggressive record, our debate will be lengthy, and I do not believe that there is anyone in the Council who is not aware of that record. Just to refresh representatives' recollections, I shall recall that Israel is the only State which the international community has unanimously agreed is not a peace-loving nation, in accordance with the relevant resolution of the General Assembly. I wish also to recall to representatives that since the 1967 war Israel has been obstructing peace efforts with a view to keeping the West Bank and Gaza. Israel has refused to implement resolution 242 (1967) and has thwarted all attempts aimed at its implementation. Its most recent rejection of peace initiatives was its prompt rejection of President Reagan's initiative of 1 September last.[7]

179. The unlawful acts of Israel in the occupied Arab territories such as the building of settlements, the confiscation of territory and the expulsion of inhabitants condemn in the strongest way possible the claims of Israel and its falsifications and statements to the effect that it desires peace. The international community has unanimously adopted the principles of a just and lasting peace, most important of which are the withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The only State that departs from that international unanimity is Israel.

180. I will be revealing no secret when I say that the motive behind the actions of Israel is its desire to keep the occupied territories since it prefers that to peace. Here lies the disease.

181. We were expecting that at this meeting the Israeli representative would give an indication of good faith, and move from mere words to deeds. There is no doubt that until Israel states its intention to follow the path of peace the international community will continue to judge it on the basis of its acts and practices and not on the basis of its claims.

182. In conclusion I wish to refer to what was stated by the Israeli representative when he spoke of precision. He said that in my statement of last Thursday [*2457th meeting, para. 23*] I mentioned that the incidents of the mass poisoning of schoolgirls had taken place in February. I want to correct him. In my statement I said that these cases took place last March. I call upon him to make sure by consulting the verbatim record of that meeting if he wishes to do so. If correctness is a measure of credibility, I hope that that criterion will be used as far as concerns what has been said by the representative of Israel this evening.

183. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization wishes to make a statement. I call upon him.

184. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): Mr. President, since this is the first opportunity we have had to address you since you assumed the presidency, let me express our sincere recognition of the efforts of your Government to help contribute to an organic solution of this situation.

185. In June I was in your country, Sir; I visited Quay d'Orsay and, with your colleagues there, I sensed concern regarding where the Israeli settlement policy is leading us. I wish here only to record that your efforts in July 1982 in the Council and as manifested in the Franco-Egyptian draft resolution [*S/15317*] speak extremely highly of your endeavours to obtain a peaceful solution to the miseries of our people and to bring them to an end.

186. We have heard a very lengthy lecture dealing with legalisms, morals and so on. We have heard some accusations being launched against the Council. We could have been spared all those accusations of misinformation or misreporting if only the Commission that was established by the Security Council under its resolution 446 (1979) had been permitted to go into the occupied territories and to investigate for itself to find out exactly what was true and what was not true. By preventing such a visit by a Commission established by the Council, the criminals tried to hide some of their crimes. If they were so sure of themselves, why did they not permit the Council to carry out its duties?

187. I am glad to hear from the Council that there are of course differences of opinion on what is legitimate and what is not legitimate. But such differences of opinion should in no way be construed as an interpretation or misinterpretation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter tells us very clearly that all Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States. This morning the representative of the United Kingdom told us:

> "we consider these settlements to be contrary to international law and to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force" [*2460th meeting, para. 76*].

According to the Charter, according to the unanimous decision of this Council—and many decisions have been adopted unanimously to this effect—the presence of the Israeli forces in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, is illegal. I do not think we can convert this place into a class for the interpretation of legalisms.

188. According to the sixth paragraph of article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949:[1]

> "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."

We have concrete evidence that the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister for Housing, I think, Mr. Levi, says

that in Hebron he will settle 500 Jewish families in the coming three years—this in an area already settled by Arabs. The result will be that those Arabs will have to be evicted or, let us say, thrown out of their homes.

189. The Commission that the Security Council entrusted with the task of investigating Israeli practices presented a report on 25 November 1980 [*S/14268*]. That report was never brought to the attention of the Council; I really cannot explain why. I only know that the report exists and the Security Council never considered it. What is relevant in that report is contained in its conclusions. The Commission found as follows:

> "the Commission would like to reaffirm the entirety of the conclusions contained in its two previous reports, and more specifically the following:
>
> " . . .
>
> (*b*) A correlation exists between the establishment of Israeli settlements and the displacement of the Arab population;
>
> (*c*) In the implementation of its policy of settlements, Israel is resorting to methods—often coercive and sometimes more subtle—which include the control of water resources, the seizure of private property, the destruction of houses and the banishment of persons in complete disregard for basic human rights;
>
> (*d*) The settlement policy has brought drastic and adverse changes to the economic and social pattern of the daily life of the remaining Arab population and is causing profound changes of a geographical and demographic"—and I would underline the word "demographic"—"nature in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem" [*ibid., para. 234*].

That report was presented by the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, that consisted of the representatives of Portugal, Bolivia and Zambia. I do not think anybody could question the integrity of the members of the Commission.

190. It was alleged—or rather, stated—here that the crime committed in Hebron—or perpetrated against those students in Hebron—was condemned by the President of Israel and by Mr. Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister. It was also condemned by the mayor of Hebron. What happened? He was fired because he condemned the crime. Here we have a discriminatory criterion for condemning or not condemning crimes. Concerning illegality, I should like to recall what President Carter said on 28 July 1977. He stated:

> "This matter of settlements in the occupied territories has always been characterized by our Government, by me and my predecessors, as an illegal action."

Those are the words of a President of the Government of the United States, an elected President. I do know that in the United States the legislative branch changes, the economic plans change, the executive changes, but there is a continuity and full credibility in that country's legal system and in its judiciary. If, with a change in the executive, there is a change in the concept of law and legalism, of legalities and legitimacies, I wonder what will happen when we have the next President in this country.

191. Frankly, all this is academic. In the Council we do, of course, need some academic background for being here, but the fact remains that the Council has met to deal with a crime perpetrated against students, a crime that was continued by the Israeli army proper that fired on students in Bir Zeit, that fired on students in Nablus, that imposed further restrictions even on the burial of those victims of crimes against students in Hebron.

192. And there is nothing incidental about this. We recall that on 25 December 1975 the ex-commander of the Zionist paratroops, Mr. David Aaron, lecturing at the Ben Eleazar National College in Tel Aviv, told his audience:

> "If we really want to spare Jewish and Arab blood, then the final solution"—I repeat—"the final solution that we must strive for is that of transfer—that is, the removal of all Arabs from here to the Arab countries, which should, of course, be achieved by reasonable ways and means."

Mr. Aaron did not come out with anything new to us, because the founder of political zionism, Theodor Herzl, had said:

> "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border. The process must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly."

It boils down exactly to: "Kill them without pain".

193. But we the Palestinian people are not willing to participate in a final solution. Of course, the Irgun Zeva'i Leumi, which is the root of the present Likud and Herut Parties in Israel, was fishing for a final solution for the Jewish question. This appears in a document entitled "Basic outlines of the proposal of the National Military Organization in Palestine (Irgun Zeva'i Leumi) concerning the solution of the Jewish question of Europe and the active participation of the National Military Organization in the war at the side of Germany". This came out in the late 1930s, and I should like to read out exactly how the Irgun Zeva'i Leumi thought it would contribute to the solution of the Jewish question:

> "On numerous occasions prominent statesmen of National Socialist Germany"—in other words, Nazi Germany—"underlined in their remarks that the new order of Europe required a radical solution to the Jewish question through evacuation.
>
> "The evacuation of the Jewish masses from Europe is a precondition for the solution of the Jewish question, which, however, solely and finally becomes possible through resettling those masses in the homeland of

the Jewish people in Palestine and through establishing a Jewish State in its historic frontiers.

"To solve the Jewish question that way and thereby to free the Jewish people once and for all times is the aim of the political activity and long-standing struggle of the Israeli liberation movement, of the National Military Organization in Palestine, the Irgun Zeva'i Leumi.

194. The PLO has no intention whatsoever of co-operating with the neo-Nazis in Tel Aviv in order to find a solution to the Palestine question, either by evacuating the Palestinians from their home or by eliminating them, as was the result of this co-operation in Dachau and Auschwitz and other places. In that connection, we know how the Irgun Zeva'i Leumi, which is the root of the present Likud alignment in Israel, contributed to the elimination of those victims.

195. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of FRANCE.

196. The Council is meeting to consider the complaint submitted by the Group of Arab States following an attack in the Islamic University of Hebron. [*S/15890*].

197. The French Government cannot remain indifferent to this new tragedy affecting an already sorely tried city. It firmly condemns this act of terrorism, which has caused many victims.

198. The Israeli authorities must take all the steps necessary to prevent such tragedies. On this occasion, France recalls that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,[1] the Israeli authorities, as the occupying Power in the West Bank and Gaza, are responsible for the protection of Palestinian civilian populations. Consequently, we urge Israel to comply strictly with its obligations in this regard. More generally, in line with a basic principle of its policy, France cannot but disapprove of any unilateral measure imposed on any State or people whatsoever. It calls for respect for democratic freedoms and for cessation of the escalation of violence and repression.

199. In this regard, we are bound to note that the policy of *fait accompli* pursued by Israel in the territories occupied by it since 1967 is harmful to any peace efforts. The Israeli settlements are without legal basis and create an atmosphere of tension. That is the reason for the violent incidents that have been deplored for years.

200. It is through dialogue and negotiation, and not through violence and repression, that we can arrive at a peace that will ensure the security of all States in the region and justice for all peoples desirous of exercising their legitimate rights in their own homelands.

201. For that reason, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by almost all of the Arab States [*S/15895*].

202. I now resume my function as PRESIDENT.

203. The representative of the United States has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call upon him.

204. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): I shall be very brief on this occasion, Mr. President. I intend to speak again after we have voted on the draft resolution.

205. Apparently, the representative of Jordan has decided to exclude the representative republican democracy whose entity and ruling clique operate out of Washington, D.C. these days from the international community. He referred to the unanimous opinion of the international community in support of the infamous General Assembly resolution of last year identifying Israel as a "non-peace-loving State". I remind the representative of Jordan that on that occasion the representative of the United States, which, to the best of my knowledge, remains a member in good standing of the United Nations, if not of the international community, voted "No". I reiterate today that that representative voted "No". To the best of my recollection, it was this very forefinger which proudly pushed the appropriate button.

206. It is my further recollection that between 15 and 20 modest republics throughout the world, some of them Western European, some of them Latin American, some of them Asian, abstained from voting on that resolution.

207. So much for the unanimous opinion of the international community. The representative of Jordan conjoined in his remarks credibility and confidence. So much for credibility; so much for confidence.

208. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I take it that the Council is prepared to vote on the draft resolution before it [*ibid.*]. If there is no objection, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

209. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Jordan is pleased on behalf of the member States of the League of Arab States to introduce the draft resolution contained in document S/15895 of 1 August 1983. In this connection, I wish to state the following.

210. First, the conflict dealt with by the draft resolution is well known to representatives. It has been on the Council's agenda for a long time. Despite the attempts of the Council to deal with the matter, Israel's arbitrary practices and measures against the civilian Arab populations, languishing under the Israeli occupation for 16 years, have been on the increase. Moreover, the pace of Israel's settlement activities has increased, jeopardizing peace and security in the area.

211. Secondly, the elements of the draft resolution are basic, fundamental principles for any international posi-

tion, especially on the part of the Council, with a view to dealing with the deteriorating situation in the occupied Arab territories. No attempt to deal with the situation will be meaningful and effective unless it contains these principles in their entirety. To reject them or to show lack of enthusiasm for supporting them would undermine the credibility of any action aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

212. The draft contains the following principles.

213. First, the Israeli settlement policy is illegal and illegitimate and constitutes a major obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem.

214. Secondly, the Israeli policies in the occupied Arab territories are in contravention of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.[1] The Council calls upon Israel to abide scrupulously by the Convention and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and in materially affecting the demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories.

215. Thirdly, the Council affirms all its previous relevant resolutions.

216. Fourthly, in operative paragraph 5, the Council rejects all Israeli arbitrary and illegal actions, for which it uses its settlers. These measures aim at forcing the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to leave their homes and their lands in preparation for their replacement by Israeli settlers. Israel's intentions have been clear. They are to create an economic, psychological, social and security state that makes it difficult for the Arab inhabitants to live on their land and in their homes, thus impelling them to leave for the neighbouring States. In my statement to the Council last Thursday [*2457th meeting*], I indicated the grave implications of this policy for Jordan and other Arab countries.

217. Fifthly, the Council reaffirms its determination to take follow-up action in dealing with the situation and to examine ways and means to secure Israel's full implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

218. In short, the draft resolution reflects the past positions of the Security Council, adopted in many resolutions. It also reflects the situation in the occupied Arab territories and the grave implications of the continuation of the Israeli occupation, of the escalation of Israel's oppressive practices and of the settlement and immigration policies pursued by Israel.

219. The Secretary-General has pointed his finger at the root-cause of the malaise that the international Organization suffers from—the absolute adherence of States to their national interests, the arbitrary placing of the service of those interests over the interests of the international system. Representatives also have applied themselves for a long time to the analysis of the reasons for the paralysis which the Council is suffering from, as well as for its inability to deal with international crises that pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It has become clear that putting self-interest and narrow chauvinism, in the absence of a genuine threat, above considerations of collective security is the main reason for the paralysis. The draft resolution gives the Council a chance to affirm its validity and effectiveness in grappling with a matter of paramount importance that jeopardizes international peace and security.

220. The Group of Arab States and, through that Group, Jordan have tried to set out this problem rationally and objectively, and in such a way as to secure for everyone every opportunity to uphold the principles of justice, equity and equality so that the legitimate principled national or regional interests of no party will be compromised.

221. After painstaking effort, Jordan has pledged not to place any party in a position where upholding the principles of right and justice would clash with its legitimate national interests. On that basis, we hope that the Council will be able to adopt this draft resolution unanimously.

222. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on members of the Council wishing to make statements before the vote.

223. Mr. KABEYA MILAMBU (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, we shall take the opportunity in due course to offer you and your predecessor the customary words of congratulation.

224. There is no need to remind the Council that in the many debates devoted to this item, most recently in May 1983, it has been stated that Israel's practice of establishing settlements in occupied Arab lands is contrary to international law they have thus been condemned by the international community.

225. Today again—just as it was yesterday and as it will be again in the future—the Council is called upon to pronounce itself on the situation in the occupied Arab territories. The draft resolution to be put to the vote [*S/15895*], if endorsed by the Council, like others in the past will not lead to actions. We might wonder why the Council is being called upon to repeat itself. This state of affairs undermines the credibility of the Council both for its own members and for the international community, and it casts serious doubt on the applicability of its decisions.

226. Furthermore, looking at operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, we must see that it is not balanced. In the view of my delegation, murder—whether perpetrated by Israel or by our Arab brothers—cannot be tolerated, and must be condemned.

227. For all those reasons, my delegation will abstain in the vote.

228. Mr. KARRAN (Guyana): I should like first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presi-

dency for the month of August. With your demonstrated skill and competence as a diplomat, my delegation is confident that you will guide the work of the Council successfully through this month.

229. I should like also to pay a special tribute, and to express my delegation's appreciation, to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing of the People's Republic of China, and to his delegation for the efficient conduct of the business of the Council during the month of July.

230. The Council is again called upon to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories, and more particularly the grave situation and the recent tragic events in that region. My delegation, to say the least, was shocked to learn of the incidents in the city of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and particularly those at the Islamic University, where as a result of the criminal acts of armed elements 3 students were killed and about 40 others injured.

231. These incidents have taken place in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory, and Israel, as the occupying Power, must be held responsible for the atrocities visited on the innocent students. This is another instance of the systematic Israeli policy of aggression and annexation.

232. It is clearly a policy of creeping colonization combined with violent suppression of the rights of the Arab population, designed to weaken and demoralize the Arab people, in particular the Palestinians, and thereby to suffocate all nationalist sentiments within them and force them into submission.

233. As Guyana has said on several occasions before, any attempt to liquidate the Palestinian people or to erase the Palestinian national identity will never bring peace in that region. Peace and any lasting solution of the Middle East question can be found only in the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent sovereign State in their homeland, Palestine. Israel must come to terms with the Palestinian people. I should like to reiterate my country's position: Guyana recognizes the right of all States in the region to live in peace and security, and we believe that all negotiations must involve the PLO, as the sole authentic representative of the Palestinian people.

234. The recent incidents in Al-Khalil (Hebron) can only lead to greater tension and act as an obstacle to the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is high time for the Council to take appropriate action to ensure Israel's compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Council.

235. The draft resolution set out in document S/15895, which has just been introduced by the representative of Jordan, is balanced and is, in my delegation's opinion, a genuine attempt to deal with a deteriorating situation.

236. Israel's policies and practices in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, are of no legal validity and constitute a major and serious obstruction of the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

237. Guyana strongly abhors the use of force or the threat of force in the acquisition of territory and believes in the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. The Council must act, and act now, before it is too late. My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

238. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe.

Against: United States of America.

Abstaining: Zaire.

The result of the vote was 13 in favour, 1 against, and 1 abstention.

The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

239. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those members of the Council wishing to make statements after the vote.

240. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): I wish, first of all, to join in the universality of tribute to you, Sir, and to the great Republic that you represent as we welcome you to the presidency this month. You personally and your nation are widely and properly known for adherence to the rule of reason, to clarity and precision, to the rule of law and to an abiding concern for the rights of all human beings to live in freedom. We look to you for guidance and effective leadership with great confidence in this month.

241. I wish also to join in the many tributes expressed here to your predecessor, the representative of the People's Republic of China. He exercised leadership last month with calm, cool judiciousness and we are all in his debt.

242. One final preliminary remark: my momory has been further refreshed as to the present standing of the universality of the opinion of the international community regarding the resolution of the General Assembly. The vote on that resolution was something like 86 in favour, 20 opposed—including the United States—and some 45 abstentions. As I said before, some universality.

243. The issue before the Council today is a grave one and it is far-reaching. It stems from the continuing vio-

lence in the West Bank which disrupts the hopes of peace-loving people everywhere for an early settlement of the Middle East conflict. The United States shares the anguish expressed by many speakers in these meetings about the loss of life and destruction of property that the West Bank has witnessed in recent weeks, and indeed months and years. We are eternally opposed to violence and terrorism from whatever quarter such acts may come, not only because of the human tragedies involved but also because of the resulting damage to the spirit of reconciliation, which is so necessary to peace.

244. The draft resolution before us today reflects this feeling of anguish, but regrettably does so only in one operative paragraph condemning the Hebron events. It does not adequately address the recent series of criminal attacks in the West Bank. We, of course, join the other members of the Council in condemning these attacks against civilians. We condemn all such acts, including the murder on 7 July of an Israeli settler in Hebron and the wanton destruction of part of the Hebron market that occurred immediately thereafter. The brutal terrorist attack at Hebron University on 26 July was but the latest, the most horrifying of these criminal acts.

245. We also share the view expressed in the draft resolution that The Hague Convention of 1907[2] and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time War, of 12 August 1949,[1] are applicable to the territories occupied by Israel. The United States Government has stated this position on numerous occasions, and I affirm it again today. Israel, as the occupying Power in the West Bank, is in our judgement bound by the terms of the fourth Geneva Convention.

246. The draft resolution contain elements which are wholly unacceptable to the United States. Therefore we were obliged to vote against it. Let me make clear, however, that we did not vote against the draft resolution because we approved of Israel's settlement policy. On the contratry, President Reagan said on 1 September 1982—and I reaffirm it today: "further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated". The most obvious flaw in the text of the draft resolution is its clear implication that Israel has carried out forcible transfers of Arab population from the occupied territories. The allegation made here is not one of individual deportations—which have, observers recognize, reprettably taken place—but rather that a policy of large-scale transfers of the Arab population has been deliberately pursued. There is no body of evidence to support this allegation.

247. Moreover, turning to the provisions relating specifically to Israeli settlements, let me reiterate that we believe that settlement settlement activity in the occupied territories constitutes an obstacle to a fair and lasting settlement in accordance with Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and in particular that further settlement activity in urbanized areas such as Hebron can only exacerbate tension. As President Reagan emphasized on 1 September, a freeze on settlements throughout the occupied territories, more perhaps than any other single action, would foster the kind of atmosphere needed for negotiations leading to peace.

248. We do not believe, however, that it is at all practical or even appropriate to call for the dismantling of the existing settlements. The future of the settlements is precisely one of the key issues which will need to be addressed in negotiations. Nor can we accept continuing the sterile argument as to whether the settlements are "legal"or "illegal", an argument which unfortunately has dominated discussions in the United Nations on this question to the detriment of the basic issue, namely, how to bring about a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict—precisely the conflict—over the occupied territories, of which the recent events in Hebron are a tragic manifestation.

249. The problems of the West Bank are real; they are agonizing. The United States remains committed to the resolution of all aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict and its underlying causes. A debate in the Council, as I have just suggested, over whether the Israeli settlements are "legal" or "illegal" fails to address the real problem and encourages the kind of rhetorical, legalistic arguments that tend to polarize differences which can be bridged only by unconditional negotiations. We make these differences appear much wider and deeper than they are. Indeed, this polarization exacerbates the relations of the protagonists on the ground, the very parties who must be induced to come to the bargaining table in a spirit of mutual accommodation which is essential if there is ever to be peace in the Middle East.

250. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Since this is the first time that I have spoken in the Council this month, may I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the lofty post of President of the Council and wish you success in your responsible work.

251. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude to your predecessor as President last month, the representative of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Ling Qing, for his skilful organization of the Council's work during the month of July.

252. Today's statements by the representative of the United States have shown quite clearly the enormous gap existing between words and deeds of the United States. I shall speak of the deeds of the United States.

253. In voting today in full isolation against the draft resolution submitted [*ibid.*], the current United States Administration for the seventh time—I repeat: for the seventh time—has blocked the path to a just peace in the Middle East. This is some kind of record for the United States Administration. But in today's United States vote there is not only a numerical aspect; there is also a qualitative aspect. It might be boiled down to the three following ideas.

254. First, the current draft resolution was submitted by 20 Arab States. In other words, this is the united voice,

the united view, of all Arab nations. Consequently, in blocking the adoption of this draft resolution the United States has flagrantly disregarded the just demands of Arab countries and peoples.

255. Secondly, in its contents, the Arab draft resolution was a minimum. Its purpose was to prevent the swallowing up by Israel of Arab lands. Accordingly, the United States veto is a direct sanctioning by Washington of such a swallowing up and, first and foremost, a sanctioning of annexation by Israel of the West Bank.

256. Thirdly, after today's United States vote no one should have any illusions as to the essence of the policy of Washington itself in the Middle East. This is an anti-Arab policy. This is a pro-Israeli policy. This is an imperialistic policy. That is what today's United States vote tells us.

257. Just a few words in connection with the lengthy statement made by the representative of Israel, Mr. Blum. He spoke a great deal about others' restraint, but he was once again very surprising and in fact in a very sick way showed no restraint. The fact is that for the umpteenth time at a meeting of the Security Council Mr. Blum is expressing fears—in an almost maniacal way—that someone is supposedly fishing in troubled waters in the Middle East. But it is clear that for such an operation of fishing in troubled waters to be carried out one would need the necessary technical conditions. Some else would have to be stirring up the waters a great deal—and, in fact, that is what is being done in the Middle East, as is well known, by Israel, the aggressor State, the occupying State, the annexationist State. So for Mr. Blum finally to be cured of this illness there is one very simple prescription. It would be enough for Israel to withdraw its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in and after 1967. And, in light of Mr. Blum's statement, I think it should be very clear to all that such a step by Israel would, in addition to everything else, have a favourable effect on the health of Mr. Blum himself.

258. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): I do keep on having difficulties with the representative of the Soviet Union, whose professional association I do also cherish. Probably it is a consequence of his lack of practice in dealing with democratic nations and with free peoples.

259. The United States, for its part, rarely tries to enforce decisions which do not arise out of the genuine self-initiated will of the parties to a conflict or to any form of dispute. Our vote today is characterized by none of the three qualities that the representative of the Soviet Union has attributed to it.

260. The policy of my Government and of my President, Ronald Reagan, has been clearly, explicitly and repeatedly stated over the two years and eight months of this Administration and in the course of the seven vetoes to which Mr. Ovinnikov refers.

261. The path to peace, in the view of my Government, is the path that has always existed and that was specifically affirmed by the Council in its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)—unconditional negotiation without prejudgement, without precondition, precluding no issue, on the basis of the principles stated in resolution 242 (1967) and reiterated and reaffirmed in resolution 338 (1973). That has always been the policy of my Government; that is today the policy of my Government. And I sometimes suspect that the representative of the Soviet Union really knows that, although he never lets on.

262. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I am not disputing the words and statements of the United States, just as I do not intend to dispute what was just said by the representative of the United States. That would be pointless. I am talking about the deeds of the United States. The representative of the United States was not able to refute the obvious fact that the major flaw in United States policy in the Middle East is that the United States says one thing and does something else.

263. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization wishes to speak. I call upon him.

264. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): Let me express our gratitude and deep appreciation for the result of the voting. It is not the numbers that count but the substance. That one permanent member has opted to take a different course and to be the Lone Ranger in an adverse sense does not in any way surprise me. What really does confuse me is the statement that has been made to justify that course of action. It is really very confusing.

265. At a time when we are told by the representative of the Government of the United States that the United States shares the view expressed in the draft resolution—that the annex to The Hague Convention of 1907[2] and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, are applicable to the territories occupied by Israel, and that the United States Government has stated that position on numerous occasions—he has again affirmed that Israel, as the occupying Power, is bound by the terms of the fourth Geneva Convention. I take it that that is exactly in conformity with article 49 of the "Civilians" Convention, which says that the occupying Power shall not deport, and so on.

266. He then leads us into the following paragraphs, and he says that the settlements are the key issue that will need to be addressed in negotiations. Here my confusion is this. Since he admits that this is territory seized by force and Israel is the occupying Power, how can he permit these territories to become chips in the negotiations? Is he opening up the road to anybody to seize the territory of others, despite their admitting that they are illegally militarily occupying that territory? Can they still utilize such occupation as a chip in bargaining or in negotiations? I think that the paper he read should have been revised a little more before it was given as a statement. But naturally that is entirely up to him.

267. From his statement I would say that he also is rather confused. He says that the most obvious flaw in the text of the draft resolution is its clear implication that Israel has carried out forcible transfers of Arab populations from the occupied territories.

268. The commentary of the ICRC on the Geneva Convention confirmed that each article was to be treated separately and distinctly, so the draft resolution refers to the sixth paragraph of article 49, which states that the occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. What he may be referring to—and I admit he must have been confused—is the first paragraph of article 49, not the sixth paragraph, and there is no reference to the first paragraph in the draft resolution the Council has before it.

269. Going further, Israel is creating facts by this settlement policy—that is the purpose of those settlements—just like the Nazi facts that were created to facilitate the acquisition of territory. Here it is meant to facilitate the acquisition of territory so that it may become a bargaining chip in the so-called negotiations.

270. Of course I fully agree with him—he may not like that—that the question is not the legalisms, not the confusion, not the misinformation or misinterpretation, but how to bring about a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict. There I fully agree with him. And I fully agree with him that the parties must be induced to come to the bargaining table. The bargaining table is the Security Council table. As a matter of fact, that is why the Council was created. And if memory serves, in January 1976 occurred the first attempt to utilize this bargaining table—although I do not like to call it a bargaining table: it is a forum, a vehicle for peace, and that is what we should use it for. Since January 1976 the PLO has repeatedly said that within the Council, on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Let the Council become the vehicle for peace. After all, people say they do not want any conditions. No, we do not want any conditions. Our only conditions are the principles of the Charter, and one of those speaks clearly of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples. This is precisely what the Palestinian people is asking for: to go to the negotiating table with the right to self-determination affirmed and confirmed as per the provisions and principles of the Charter.

271. I am really somewhat confused, for the representative of the United States said that there is no body of evidence to support the allegation that mass deportation or forcible transfer of population exists. Again, if he had done his homework and had read the report submitted on 25 November 1980—that may have been before his time, so I do not blame him—of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979), he would have found the following specific statement:

> "The Israeli policy of settlements has led to major displacements and dispossession of Palestinians, adding to the ever-growing number of refugees, with all the attendant consequences.
>
> "Available evidence"—that is, evidence available to the Council Commission—"shows that Israeli occupying authorities continue to deplete the natural resources, particularly water resources, in the occupied territories for their advantage and to the detriment of the Palestinian people." [*S/14268, paras. 237 and 238.*]

272. It is clear, therefore, that the argument presented by the representative of the United States is based either on misinformation or on a misinterpretation and misconception of what the draft resolution contained, as well as of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention.

273. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Clovis Maksoud, permanent observer of the League of Arab States, whom the Council invited to the 2412th meeting, has asked to make a statement. With the consent of the Council, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

274. Mr. MAKSOUD: I wish to thank you once again, Sir, for allowing me the privilege of addressing this Council, because the Group of Arab States has worked very hard to focus on the primary concerns that preoccupy the world community. Needless to say, the draft resolution that has been vetoed by the United States represented our unanimous Arab eagerness to secure international unanimity. We have not diagnosed the entirety of the crisis in the Middle East, nor have we evolved what we deem to be a just and comprehensive solution. What we have realized is that in order to achieve justice, we unfortunately have to be gradualists, and in order to be gradualists we have to be pragmatists. We were therefore more eager to be relevant than we were to be principled and consistent.

275. We have undertaken a historic compromise, and we have submitted our collective assessment of what is achievable and of what, in the present circumstances and international equations, can be relatively equitable. We have deliberately sought to accommodate many States members of the Council whose strategic relationships with the United States might constrain them from full-fledged acceptance of what we deem to be full justice for the Palestinian people.

276. What this draft resolution has sought to do is not to achieve justice for the Palestinians but to mitigate the flagrant injustices to the Palestinians. We have acted as we have in a conscious act of compromise and what has been called moderation. We have sought the imput of many among the non-aligned, socialist and Western European countries. We wanted to bring about a unanimous decision in the Council. We worked hard. Many in the Arab States had reservations. Many thought that no matter how eager we are to accommodate there will always be a stumbling-block—and why should we be accommodating and pragmatic when the principal philosopher of international pragmatism would not budge even if his closest allies in Western Europe were convinced of the conclu-

sions that have been factored into the draft resolution submitted to the Council?

277. Yet we swallowed a great deal of our pride—despite the fact that we realized that those Palestinians who are suffering the oppressive nature of occupation, who are languishing in various refugee camps, would not look with great favour on our collective disposition to be pragmatic, to accommodate, to toe the line with international realism and the balance of power—in order, in our eagerness, to avoid a deadlock. For we thought that our Western friends would broker another condition within the Council, and yet the collective reason of the allies of the United States in Western Europe has failed to persuade that country, if not to vote in favour of the draft resolution, then at least to abstain in the voting—not out of deference to Palestinian rights or to the many friends of the United States among the Arab States, but out of deference to the many strategic allies members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We found that what a super-Power can get away with is really sometimes beyond our moral comprehension.

278. It has been stated firmly that it is a legal privilege for a permanent member of the Council to exercise the right of veto. Therefore, under no circumstances would any Arab challenge that right or the legality of exercising it. But we have reservations about certain ethical aspects of the exercise of that right, because we have worked very hard to accommodate, to moderate, to compromise. Those many millions of Arabs who have reservations will perhaps be justified, while the credibility of those Arabs who have always said "Let us give the United States another chance" may be eroded a little.

279. People have asked many times "What do the Arabs want? If some Arabs want something, others don't." We have come to the Council, through the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with a unanimous document that was accommodating. We deeply appreciate the international consensus that has been achieved, although the Council has failed to achieve international unanimity. Unfortunately, the discrepancy between the consensus and unanimity can develop into a further contribution to the destablization of a region already excessively volatile. We are hopeful that the damage done by the exercise of the veto can be controlled, although many of us are beginning to entertain doubts. We do not want this veto to be a rupture in Arab-American communications. We do not want it to lead to the logical conclusions. On the contrary, in many ways it might restimulate a dialogue, although we are not sure of the results. We are eager to show that flexibility does not mean willingness to reach a breaking point.

280. With our knowledge of the American system, our appreciation of the interplay of forces within the American body politic, we realize that what is at this particular moment is not necessarily permanent, that the collective moral, intellectual and political forces within the United States—that constituency of conscience that has evolved and exhibited itself during Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the questioning process that has been interrupted by today's debate—can, hopefully, resume their activities.

281. Many of us, in the Arab group and outside it, have always said that the United States is, of course, a super-Power, but that what is challenging is that it is not important for a super-Power to be a super-Power: it is equally important that a super-Power be a great Power. Greatness is not measured exclusively by the strategic framework and global impact that a super-Power's policies have. It is equally important that vitality and resilience and principled commitment to human rights, to self-determination and to legal rights become predominant determining factors in policy-making and decision-making processes.

282. Is the veto a rupture or a scar? We do not know. But the judgement of the United States is predicated upon the reports of many in its diplomatic service, in its embassies, in its intelligence services and among the correspondents who have achieved notoriety and who have reported objectively on what has taken place in the West Bank and in the occupied territories. These have had a modifying impact on many aspects of the bias that has characterized American policy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, they have not yet had the necessary impact.

283. What is it, therefore, that makes the United States unable to crystallize its judgements into policies as they pertain to the Arab-Israeli conflict? The United States is an open society which allows the interplay of forces. Opinion reaches certain conclusions about the situation in the Middle East, when the aggression and violations by Israel are so visible, clear, categorical and conclusive in the opinion of many people in the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the legislative branch. Those judgements are then arrested and paralysed. By what? By a flaw, a basic strategic flaw, in the dealings of the United States with the Middle East. It is a belief, unfortunately sometimes pervasive—yet in many instances challenged, fortunately—that Israel is the only strategic instrument of United States policies in the Middle East, that in order to persuade Israel to comply, not with international law, not with the United Nations resolutions, but with declared policies of the United States itself, the United States has to placate Israel, to please it, to satisfy it, to allow it a free hand.

284. Apparently the United States believes that under no circumstances should Israel—even at times or intermittently—be penalized. It is as if President Eisenhower's legacy is not a part of contemporary American history.

285. And then we have the projection of Israel to the liberal constituency—especially within Congress—as the legatee of Jewish history and destiny and as the "only democracy" in the Middle East. And we have a certain colour-blindness, for their position on Viet Nam has never been matched by a similar condemnation of Israel's aggression on Arab territories.

286. Israel's projection to the so-called conservative constituency as the latest colonizer in West Asia brings feelings of vengeance to that constituency, vengeance against the decolonizing process that has characterized the third world.

287. It is thus that Arab communication with both those constituencies becomes sort of parasitical to the comfort that Israel seeks to establish and consolidate within the American body politic. Therefore, we have a situation where politics blocks policies in the United States and in many instances the finger is proudly raised in veto—as the representative of the United States stated earlier—taking into consideration elements that are outside the framework of the United States judgements on issues that characterized the conflict in the Middle East.

288. Today is a sad day: while it is night here, it may already be daylight in many Arab countries: in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in the Sudan, in Kuwait, in Lebanon, in Morocco, in Qatar, in Tunisia. When these countries—with which the United States has such good bilateral relations—read that the raising of that finger was a matter of pride, I hope that they will not feel terrible shame at that friendship, a friendship that we intend to continue.

289. We have witnessed tonight a sad episode which I hope is only an interruption, however traumatic it might be. For we realize that within the United States body politic the resilient vitality of the constituency of conscience will not lie low. There are, however, pragmatic considerations, and they comments, inasmuch as those considerations tally with some of the remarks made earlier by the Israeli representative.

290. We are repeatedly told that negotiation is the only way to achieve genuine peace. We agree. But is the Council not a mechanism for negotiation, as the representative of the PLO has asked that it should be? Then, even if we grant the point of negotiations, we have a new problem: are the settlements—the subject of these Council deliberations—settlements? The representative of Israel does not even recognize that there is something called settlements. In the new lexicon of zionism, they are now called "villages". And they are not called Jewish villages; they are called Israeli villages. What does that mean? What does the United States think of this new terminology which the Israeli representative wants to slip in? Or is this only another expression of semantic acrobatics?

291. If they are villages, they can develop into towns, and a town can become a city, and a city can become an Israeli city. Are we expected to negotiate the future of villages? Is it correct to dismantle villages? It is easier to accept the dismantling of settlements. Even the United States at one stage called for the dismantling of settlements: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance called them illegal.

292. Now, the representative of the United States does not want us to get rhetorical, to get legalistic. But I want to know, on behalf of the entire Arab nation. Villages cannot be dismantled. The Israeli representative slipped that word in so in the next debate in the Council "settlements" should not arise. And villages will go the way of settlements, because later the Israeli representative will be talking about Israeli towns. These settlements are illegal whether or not they are called villages. They are illegal.

293. The Israeli representative has exposed himself: he was talking about Jewish blood and about how the Council does not discuss Jewish blood, in a way infering that if we do not accept his assumptions we are collectively harbouring lingering anti-semitism. This is a form of intellectual and diplomatic terrorism that has characterized many of the pronouncements of Israeli propagandists and diplomats.

294. We are not concerned about Jewish blood? I should like to state emphatically that the present Israeli régime itself is undertaking a policy of settlements that is making Jews cannon fodder for the expansionist, revisionist Zionist objectives of the Begin-Likud Government. That is why many people who are in the constituency of conscience within Israel have protested the various massacres that the Israeli Government has undertaken, and continue to show that what is taking place within Israel is the rebellion of Jewish humanism against Zionist revisionism. We are not exclusivists. Judaism is part of our heritage and Judaism can be part of our destiny. It is zionism that assumes a total alienation of the Jew and seeks to interrupt his sense of belonging. It is high time that the Israeli position did not get away with the proliferation of false actions and assumptions which, if not challenged on the spot, become novel jurisprudence, new politics. If the Israeli representative wants to open the whole question of Palestine, we are ready. Yet the United States representative wants us not to paraphrase the past, and he is right; but we want to spell out a future. If we are to negotiate we want to negotiate a feasible, mutually acceptable outcome. The United States representative, as well as the Israeli representative, says that negotiations should be unconditional. All right. Whoever it is that is attempting to broker the negotiations, I want to know: Is East Jerusalem negotiable? Are the Golan Heights negotiable? Should those territories not be outside the framework of negotiations since they have been annexed illegally?

295. *Ex cathedra* declarations were made by the Israeli representative that Jews have every right to be in Judea and Samaria, the right to be in Israel. The question is directed not to the Israeli representative but to the American United States: which Israel does the United States recognize? President Reagan rightly said that these are occupied territories. If the are occupied territories Israel should be treated as an occupier and therefore Israel cannot establish settlements. The United States should be consistent with what its President has declared: that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of an Arab political patrimony. Although he denied the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, at least in President Reagan's plan, which was quoted extensively by the United States representative this evening, the territorial parameters of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of a political patrimony, and the so-called villages, otherwise known as settlements, are an attempt ast a demographic and geogra-

phic dislocation, distortion and mutilation of the West Bank. They are deliberate attempts to pre-empt the emergence of any form of a Palestinian identity—any form of Palestinian self-determination.

296. It is no use to dilate on the counter-legitimacy to international legitimacy that Israel is seeking to provoke. However, when the United States asks us to moderate our positions we ask it: how much have you been able to moderate Israel's intransigence and aggression?

297. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Council has thus concluded the current stage of its consideration of this agenda item.

The meeting rose at 9 p.m.

NOTES

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973.

[2] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 44th meeting, paras. 90 and 91.

[4] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/37/1).

[5] *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.*

[6] Stephen M. Schwebel, "What Weight to Conquest?", *American Journal of International Law*, 1970, vol. 64, pp. 344-347.

[7] See *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1982), vol. 18, No. 35, p. 1081.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho. in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—July 1991—2,050

S/PV.
2462

READEX
FICHE

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2462nd MEETING: 3 AUGUST 1983

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2462)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902) ..	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2462nd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 3 August 1983, at 1.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2462)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

The meeting was called to order at 2.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Barma (Chad) and Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council is meeting today in response to the request made in a letter dated 2 August from the representative of Chad to the President of the Security Council.

3. Members of the Council also have before them document S/15903, containing the text of a letter dated 2 August from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Council.

4. The first speaker is the representative of Chad, on whom I now call.

5. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): It is with a special feeling that I have asked to be allowed to present our complaint at a time when my country, Chad, is the object of open aggression by Libya.

6. Before doing so, however, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to express to you, Sir, our satisfaction at seeing you occupying the presidency for August. There is no need to emphasize the historic links between France and Chad because they are common knowledge. France has had special responsibilities to discharge with regard to Chad. With that background and, above all, in the light of the breadth of your experience as a statesman and accomplished diplomat and your personal knowledge of the subject under consideration, we are sure that the outcome of the Council's deliberations will be a happy one for the martyred people of Chad.

7. We should like also to take this opportunity to express our great appreciation for the outstanding way in which Mr. Ling Qing, representative of the People's Republic of China, conducted the Council's business last month. The excellent relations between China and Chad were confirmed by the official visit paid to Beijing recently by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad.

8. Finally, we are grateful to you and the other members of the Council for having responded so promptly to the appeal of the Government and people of Chad as a whole at this critical time in our history.

9. Since 31 July, the very day when the Chad National Armed Forces retook the town of Faya-Largeau in the north of Chad, the Libyan air force came into action, cruelly stepping up Libya's barbarous aggression against Chad. Since that date that town has been the daily target, right up to this moment, of systematic massive bombardments by Libyan MiG-21s and -23s, Tupolev-22s and Mirages. During the night between 1 and 2 August, the planes bombarded the town for seven hours, thus causing a great many casualties among the innocent civilian population.

10. This is deliberate genocide against the martyred people of Chad, who ask only to live in peace and enlightened

understanding with all the brother and neighbouring peoples, including the people of Libya.

11. This situation undoubtedly endangers peace and security in the region. That is why today Chad comes before the Council, the main body charged, under the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, so that it should be able to assume its responsibilities in this serious situation that prevails between Chad and Libya—which is the latter's fault.

12. Representatives will recall that last March [*S/15643*], Chad made a complaint against Libya owing to its illegal military occupation of part of Chad's territory generally known as the "Aouzou Strip". Despite repeated denials from Libya, discussions in the Council clearly established the existence of a border conflict between the two countries. That is why, after those discussions, a major statement was unanimously adopted by members of the Council [*S/15688*] which invited both parties to resolve their dispute by peaceful means, particularly within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in accordance with the principles of respect for political independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity. But in particular the statement urged both parties to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation.

13. Blithely flouting that statement, the Libyan Government not only continued to extend its military occupation over Chad territory but also undertook a real attempt to destabilize Chad. Indeed, on 8 April—in other words, two days after the adoption of the Council's statement—Libyan planes began to fly over some parts of Chad, particularly the prefectures of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti and Kanem. That incident and others following it were brought to the attention of members of the Council by the Government of Chad in letters dated 8 and 19 April [*S/15693 and S/15709*]. At the same time Libya threw its hordes of mercenaries and its Islamic Legion into the conquest of the townships of Bardai, Wour, Zouar, Ounianga-Kebir and Yebbi-bou. This Libyan expansionism reached its frenetic height with the occupation on 23 June last of Faya-Largeau, the main township in the north of the country.

14. At that time the President of the Republic, Mr. Hissein Habré, personally informed the Council of that escalation of Libyan aggression in a message dated 23 June [*S/15843*]. Pursuing its expansionist action, the Libyan Government unleashed its Islamic Legion and mercenaries against the east of the country, successively occupying the townships of Fada, Kalait, Oum-Chalouba, Arada, Biltine and Abéché. But thanks to the energetic reaction of the government forces, backed up by appreciable logistic assistance and support from friendly countries, the enemy was routed and the central authorities again took control of the entire eastern part of the country.

15. We wish to pay a warm tribute to those friendly and fraternal countries that responded positively to Chad's appeal and to those who expressed their political and diplomatic support for the legitimate Government of the Republic of Chad.

16. The liberation of the strategic town of Faya-Largeau, which became the political capital of the Libyan occupation army and its mercenaries from all sides, was, as may be imagined, a rude shock for Colonel Qaddafi in his satanic undertaking to invade and annex Chad. It is easy to imagine the passion with which his air force indiscriminately struck the town of Faya-Largeau and its environs, causing enormous loss of human life and material damage.

17. Libya's covert intention, which runs counter to the rules of international law because it is giving itself over to acts of aggression against a neighbouring brother country, is to destabilize the régime in order to set up another that would be true to its own persuasion and thus to perpetuate its illegal occupation of the Aouzou Strip, annex the entire country and use it as a base for aggression against other neighbouring countries, which would enable it to carry out its diabolical dream of creating the famous "United States of the Sahel".

18. As everyone knows, for about 20 years Chad has been living through a real tragedy caused and maintained from outside, mainly by Libya.

19. The various successive Governments of Chad at N'Djamena, in particular that presided over by Mr. Hissein Habré, have spared neither time nor effort to try to bring about normalization of relations between the two countries. To give the latest example, negotiations were undertaken at N'Djamena and then at Tripoli in 1983 to find a solution to the dispute between Chad and Libya. But the conditions set by the latter, which we made known to the international community during the last Council debate on the Chad complaint [*2419th meeting, para. 177*], were so arrogant that the delegation of Chad rejected them *in toto*. Let us recall that for Chad those conditions would mean, first, its becoming an Islamic republic, when the country has definitely chosen to be a lay country, which did not prevent it from being a founding member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference; secondly, its forming a strategic alliance with Libya in order to destabilize neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, the Niger, Nigeria and the Sudan, which Libya describes as reactionary régimes; thirdly, our country's agreeing to consider only the historic boundaries between the two countries, which would be tantamount to Chad's accepting an outright merger with Libya, which the latter tried to bring about in January 1981, as with other countries.

20. Despite our rejection of those conditions, our Government has always expressed its willingness to maintain talks with Libya in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute. This emerges clearly from letters sent by our country to the President of the Council and dated 27 July and 1 August 1983 [*S/15889 and S/15897*].

21. It is therefore very hard to understand why the Tripoli régime would frenetically and at all costs strive to subject Chad by force, with absolute contempt for all international rules. Taking as an example the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*], which for the Libyans would be valid, though everyone knows it has been made a dead letter, one of the main provisions of that Accord forbids neighbouring countries to interfere in Chad's internal affairs, does it not? And yet Libyan aircraft savagely bombard townships in Chad, thus committing veritable genocide.

22. Chad is today the victim of flagrant aggression by Libya in blatant violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. This is implicitly admitted by the Libyan Government itself, if its spokesmen are listened to.

23. Libya is responsible for the loss of human life among peaceable Chad populations. Libya is responsible for the massive destruction of Chad's patrimony. Libya is responsible for blocking Chad's socio-economic development; indeed, we now head the list of the poorest countries in the world. Libya has always been and remains a major obstacle to the work of national reconciliation among the people of Chad.

24. Chad urges the Council fully to assume the responsibilities incumbent on it under the Charter of the United Nations by firmly condemning Libya for its untoward bombardments of Chad townships by its air force and immediately ordering it to end such bombardments and without delay to withdraw its occupation forces from Chad.

25. Despite the criminal action of Libya against my country, Chad remains ready to engage in talks to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As was stressed by the President of the Republic in a message addressed to the President of the Council on 17 March:

> "Chad must exist as any other sovereign State, and the territorial integrity which it acquired at the time of its independence on 11 August 1960 must be preserved in accordance with the principle of inviolability of frontiers inherited from the colonial era to which the African countries, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, solemnly subscribed in 1964 at Cairo. The people of Chad claim the right to live in peace within the frontiers which were inherited from the colonial era and which enjoy international recognition" [*see S/15644*].

26. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on whom I now call.

27. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, I have already had occasion to extend my thanks to you on your assumption of the presidency for this month, and I have also expressed our appreciation and gratitude to the representative of China for his excellent conduct of the work of the Council last month.

28. The position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the events unfolding in Chad has been clarified in previous statements to the Council and in several letters that have been addressed to the Council, among which are those contained in documents S/15844 of 27 June, S/15856 of 6 July and S/15903 of 2 August and the message we addressed to the President of the Council this morning, 3 August [*S/15906*].

29. Our participation in these deliberations is designed primarily to help the Council acquaint itself with the reasons underlying the painful events to which the people of Chad have been subjected for years and to explain Libya's point of view in that connection. My statement is not in reply to those who claim to represent Chad, because the current Government in that country is illegitimate and made up of insurgents. I should like to begin by reiterating the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's categorical denial of all the allegations contained in documents S/15897 and S/15898 of 1 August and S/15902 of 2 August, as well as in the statement that has just been made in the Council. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not intervene in the affairs of Chad and has sent neither planes nor troops to that country. We wish others would act in like manner; in particular we wish the war planes from the aircraft carrier of the American Sixth Fleet would cease their violations of Libyan airspace and waters, along with their spying activities over Libyan territory. The Jamahiriya has declared its neutrality *vis-à-vis* the current conflict in Chad and has proposed to the OAU that it send a fact-finding mission to Chad to verify it. In that connection, I wish to read out the letter we addressed this morning to the President of the Council. It reads as follows:

[*The speaker read out the letter contained in document S/15906.*]

30. I wish to assert that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya firmly believes in the principles of the United Nations, the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and that it adheres to respect for the principles of political independence, the territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States and good-neighbourliness.

31. The people of the Jamahiriya and the people of Chad are bound together by spiritual, cultural, geographic and historic ties. They share a common history of struggle against colonialism. When they were under colonial domination earlier in this century they fought side by side. The Libyans fought against French colonialism on the territory of Chad and the people of Chad fought on Libyan soil against Italian Fascist colonialism. Moreover, thousands of Libyans found refuge in Chad during the Libyan liberation struggle against Fascist colonialism, while thousands of Chadians currently live in the Jamahiriya, where they work and are treated as brothers.

32. The volatile situation and civil war in Chad are nothing new. Rather, they are results of colonialism. Chad acceded to independence in the early 1960s, and the disturbances there began in 1963; civil war broke out in 1965 and has continued up to the present time.

33. The conflict in Chad is one among factions in that country and has been fomented by religious, tribal and ethnic factors, and power struggles instigated by colonialism.

34. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has taken care to preserve the fraternal and good-neighbourly relations that bind the Libyan and Chadian people and has consistently sought to realize the unity of the people of Chad, as well as their security and stability. Libya was the first State that attempted to effect a national reconciliation in Chad and to put an end to the tragedy that has afflicted the Chadian people since the early 1960s. Among the results of the conflict in Chad are the adverse effects this conflict has had on the Jamahiriya. We now find foreign forces—a Franco-American colonialist military presence—on our southern borders. From the early 1960s until the first national reconciliation conference at Sebha in the Jamahiriya in February of 1978, the Jamahiriya has been instrumental in helping to break down the psychological barrier between FROLINAT [*front de libération nationale du Tchad*] and the Government of Chad and to bring about mutual recognition between the two parties in the meetings held at Sebha and Benghazi that ended on 27 March 1978. The Jamahiriya also participated in all the conferences subsequently held at Lagos, with a view to achieving national reconciliation in Chad, conferences that led to the Lagos Accord and the Transitional National Union Government, in which all the Chad factions were included under the leadership of Goukouni Weddey, a Government that was recognized by the OAU.

35. The Chad problem is one of the complex problems before the OAU. It has needed intense efforts by the Presidents of the neighbouring States throughout the past five years to restore peace to that fraternal country. However, those efforts have always come up against manoeuvres and conspiracies by colonialism and its power-hungry lackeys, who would not like to see peace and security in the country. Thus we saw one of the lackeys of colonialism, Hissein Habré, violating every agreement reached between the various conflicting factions. Those who follow the history of this person know full well who he is and what he wants. In a nutshell, he is an adventurer, whose only concern is to assume the presidency of the country by any means. Hissein Habré has consistently sought to fan the flames of civil war so as to be able, with the help of certain States, to eliminate all the other factions in Chad and achieve power on the corpses of the people of Chad.

36. The proof of this is very clear. After signing with the Government of General Felix Malloum an agreement which enabled him to reach the capital of Chad and to assume the post of Prime Minister on 31 August 1978, he did not like that post, and started manoeuvring to seize the presidency. He violated the Khartoum Agreement and unleashed a long war against the capital which claimed the lives of thousands of innocents.

37. Libya at the time was not responsible for what happened in Chad. The neighbouring States initiated collective efforts to solve the problem. These led to the convening of the first Kano Conference, held from 8 to 15 March 1979, and the signing of the 15 March agreement which led to the resignation of President Felix Malloum and Hissein Habré from their respective posts and the formation of a provisional Council of State under Goukouni Weddey to conduct the country's affairs pending the formation of a Transitional National Union Government including all factions in Chad.

38. Hissein Habré continued his sinister manoeuvres and deceived Goukouni Weddey into forming a Government including their two factions only and excluding the other factions. This led to the continuation of the civil war and necessitated further efforts by the neighbouring countries to achieve peace and national reconciliation. As a result the first Lagos Conference, which was boycotted by Hissein Habré, was convened from 25 to 27 May 1979. It issued a statement on 27 May emphasizing that the Government constituted at that time was a violation of the Kano Agreement and that its formation was an unacceptable act. The Conference called upon that alleged Government to resign immediately and to agree with the other factions to form a Transitional National Union Government. But Hissein Habré approved of dismantling the Government only when he ascertained that the OAU rejected that Government and that Goukouni Weddey would abandon him because he started doubting Hissein Habré's intentions.

39. Thus the second Lagos Conference was convened from 13 to 21 August 1979. It was attended by 11 Chad factions, including that of the Armed Forces of the North, led by Hissein Habré. All these factions signed the agreement which resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Union Government on 10 November 1979 under Goukouni Weddey, including all the conflicting factions in Chad.

40. Hissein Habré assumed the post of Minister of Defence, where he once more showed his hunger for power, using his post to consolidate his forces and to sow discord among the people of Chad. His forces waged aggression against the remaining forces, starting on 21 March 1980. This prompted the Government of National Union to dismiss him as an insurgent who had violated the Lagos Accord. The Government mobilized its forces to quell his rebellion, which it did in December 1980.

41. Libya, at the request of the legitimate Government and in accordance with an agreement between the two countries, acted to put an end to that rebellion. For the first time since 1965 Chad enjoyed peace. But Hissein Habré did not despair, since he was embraced by some African States and by the United States, which provided him with large amounts of arms and a large number of military advisers and mercenaries. He seized the opportu-

nity of the Libyan withdrawal from Chad to wage civil war again, and was able, through the collusion of some African States with forces in Chad, part of the OAU contingent, to return to the capital and expel the legitimate Government, the Government resulting from the Lagos Accord and recognized by the OAU. That Government moved to northern Chad and made Bardai its capital. Hissein Habré took advantage of the difficulties facing the legitimate Government and started contacting other States in an attempt to strip the Transitional National Union Government of legitimacy.

42. In this regard we should also like to mention that the message addressed to the President of the Council was addressed to him from outside Chad. Where were the forces of Zaire, which were among the African contingent at the time? Where was the conscience of the American Administration and of other colonialist Powers when the forces of Habré started their attack on the legitimate Government of the country? The United States intervened there, and there is a declared, official intervention by the United States, by France and by Zairian forces. However, it seems that this intervention and the presence of these Governments does not bother the conscience of the American Administration, and that these forces are in Chad to protect a legitimate, elected Government that respects human rights.

43. We also recall that Hissein Habré once arrested archaeologists, including Mrs. Claustre, a French archaeologist. France is well aware of that. Habré also murdered the French emissary who went to negotiate with him. After negotiations, and with assistance from Libya, it was possible to release Mrs. Claustre.

44. They say that the Government of Habré is a legitimate, elected Government, respecting human rights, those criteria adhered to by the United States in dealing with foreign Governments. All of this is baseless and spurious. The United States Administration is concerned not with human rights or elections but with those who protect its interests by imposing dictatorial régimes. It is concerned with those who are willing to be its lackeys and not its friends, not people with self-respect, but people who in return for a handful of dollars given through the United States Central Intelligence Agency, will exercise dictatorship and domination over the destinies of peoples.

45. Recently, when the legitimate Government under Goukouni Weddey was able to organize its forces and achieve several victories against the rebellious forces of Hissein Habré, the imperialist forces and some lackey States raised their voices, complaining of a Libyan intervention in Chad. Where were those voices when Hissein Habré rebelled against the legitimate Government in March 1980? Why did not those Powers move and pro vide the government forces with weapons and troops, as they are doing now for the Government of Habré, if they were really interested in peace in Chad? Why did they not object to the direct intervention of Zaire in Chad and call upon it to withdraw its forces from Chad, as it did with Libya in 1980?

46. The cause of the deterioration in the situation in Chad, which, to an extent, is jeopardizing peace and security in the area, is foreign intervention, especially the direct intervention by the United States and France. Those countries have begun an air-lift to provide the rebellious forces of Hissein Habré with equipment and military advisers. Zaire has sent more than 2,000 troops to fight on the side of the forces of Hissein Habré, and mercenaries have in addition been recruited from France and Belgium.

47. Today's newspapers tell us that French assistance has reached $40 million and that this assistance is unlimited and could well increase. As for declared American assistance, it has reached $10 million, and a further $10 million has been allocated for Redeye anti-aircraft missiles. American military advisers are now on their way to N'Djamena or are there already. America is pressuring France to use its aeroplanes or its air force; it is exerting this pressure through promises of material aid. A "committee" has been formed under the chairmanship of the President of the United States to plan intervention in the affairs of Chad and of Libya.

48. I regret mentioning France while that country's representative is presiding over the Council, but these are facts which cannot be escaped.

49. This continued intervention will only aggravate the situation and will not restore peace in Chad. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya condemns these acts of intervention and calls for their immediate termination. It calls for the withdrawal of Zairian and other forces and of American and French military advisers and for the termination of arms shipments. This would help the Chad people to put its house in order and to restore security in Chad.

50. What is happening in Chad is an internal issue which concerns the people of Chad only. A solution of the problem must be found within the framework of the OAU and in accordance with the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*], which was endorsed by the OAU. In this connection, we should like to recall the statement issued last month by the Bureau of the OAU. In the fourth paragraph of that statement, the Bureau

> "requests the current Chairman of the OAU to undertake any action, including the convening of the Standing Committee on Chad, aimed at bringing about lasting peace in Chad."*

51. The OAU is considering the problem of Chad. Contacts are now being made. We believe that the Charter of the United Nations itself calls for and encourages regional initiatives and solutions and bilateral negotiations. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is ready to settle any problems with the legitimate Government of Chad under Goukouni Weddey, and to do so at any time and in any place.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

52. If there is a genuine desire to restore peace in Chad, action must be taken immediately to convene a conference on national reconciliation under the auspices of the OAU, to be attended by all the Chad factions which signed the Lagos Accord. Furthermore, an end must be put to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Chad and to the flow of weapons to the rebellious forces of Hissein Habré.

53. The Jamahiriya is always ready to work with its sister States of Africa to help achieve peace and security in Chad.

54. A question was raised: who is responsible for what is taking place in Chad? I should like to state that those responsible for the murders and massacres in Chad are the rebels, the imperialist forces, and the current intervention in Chad, particularly by France and the United States.

55. Even the mass media say that it is difficult—or rather that they have not been able—to ascertain the veracity of the allegations of the Habré régime concerning the raids by Libyan war-planes on Faya-Largeau. The reason is that the illegitimate Government of Habré has forbidden journalists to visit that town.

56. Permit me, Mr. President, to refer to the statement issued by the representative of Chad, or rather the illegitimate Government of Chad, and I reiterate that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is not occupying any part of Chad and has no designs on the territory of other States. Libyan forces were in Chad legitimately and, had Libya wished to impose its will on Chad, it could have done so then. Moreover, the allegations of the imperialist Powers and their lackeys concerning the so-called Islamic Libyan legion are a baseless fabrication of the mass media and of the lackeys of imperialism in the region.

57. Especially from the Libyan point of view, the problem of Chad is a pretext, in particular, for the American Administration to satisfy its hunger for dominating peoples in the world. What is happening to Libya is also happening to Nicaragua in Central America, and in South-East Asia. The United States does not want national Governments: the United States Administration wants to return to Libya after having been expelled, so that it can exploit our oil and our airspace and build military bases with the intention of intervening in neighbouring States, of spying on Arab and African States, of supporting the expansionist Zionist entity in the Middle East region, and of smothering any voice raised against its immoral policies, especially concerning the Middle East question.

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As President I am obliged to point out that the letter addressed by the representative of Chad was on behalf of the Government of Chad.

59. I shall now call on the representative of Zaire who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

60. Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, despite the gravity of the situation I should nevertheless like to take this opportunity to express my particular pleasure at seeing you in the Chair. Not only does your country maintain excellent relations with my own, but I note that your delegation and mine enjoy excellent relations, too. I have no doubt whatsoever that your competence and experience, which you have so often in the past placed at the service of the Council, will be of invaluable assistance to us again.

61. I also take this same opportunity to associate in this tribute the representative of China, who presided over the Council last month with so much competence.

62. Returning to the subject under discussion, I shall be brief. In my dialect we say, "When you want to stop a naked madman, you must be dressed yourself", because if you adopt the same fashion as his, people will wonder which one is the madman.

63. Having said that, reference was made just now to President Habré as an adventurer. It is not up to me to respond to that; I hope that the representative of Chad will have occasion to respond to that kind of calumny. Obviously what is at issue here is the Government. But what was the régime of the present Libyan Government at the beginning? Did it overthrow a king? Does it owe its present legitimacy to that? I do not think so.

64. But since the representative of Libya has raised the question of where the Zairian forces were when Weddey was in power, I should just like to refresh his memory by saying that the forces of Zaire were in fact in Chad at the request of the OAU, as, indeed, was the case with other forces under the command of the OAU, and their instructions were not to intervene in a civil war. It was at that time that the forces of Zaire were in Chad, at the request of a Government which the whole OAU considered to be the legal Government of Chad. It was not because one or two States were challenging its legitimacy that the Government of Chad suddenly became non-legitimate.

65. The forces of Zaire are in Chad; let us not attempt to conceal the fact. We are not hypocrites. They were requested by the Government of Hissein Habré and will remain there as long as the Government of Hissein Habré so wishes.

66. If the forces of Zaire are involved, it is because external forces committed aggression against what the OAU considers to be a legitimate Government.

67. In June the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU was held at Addis Ababa. At that same time there was a country which thought that the real Government was that of Goukouni Weddey. The head of State of that country had to leave the meeting. Why? Because he was clearly in the minority and not supported by anyone.

68. I am astonished by the claim just made here in the Council—where this is considered a serious matter—that the legal Government is that of Mr. Goukouni Weddey. That is certainly not the understanding among Africans.

69. Reference has also been made here to the communiqué from the OAU Bureau, but the previous speaker who quoted that has forgotten that that communiqué was first addressed to his country. It was because his country had intervened in Chad that that communiqué was made public so as not to make the situation worse.

70. He also said that his country is not an enemy of Chad's. Well, yesterday I think everybody had an opportunity to read the press reports. The press agency of his own country yesterday announced the death of President Habré. Unfortunately for him, President Habré is still alive. The town was savagely bombed, in an obvious attempt to kill President Habré. But unfortunately for them this did not happen. There can be no doubt as to who bombed the town, since the other side does not have an air force.

71. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on the representative of Chad.

72. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): The Libyan representative, who is seated across the room from me here, claimed not to be exercising the right of reply in response to the statement made by my delegation on behalf of the Chad Government and indulged in describing the background to the situation in Chad as if he were a leader of the country. He even dares to make a judgement about the legitimacy of a Government, as if his own Government were legitimate.

73. As the representative of Zaire has rightly just recalled, we know how Colonel Qaddafi came to power. It was by a *coup d'état*. He overthrew the king. Does he have some sort of certificate of legitimacy delivered by an international body? I think not.

74. The representative of Libya has just shown the international community how far his country clearly interferes in the internal affairs of state in Chad. By what right can he make value judgements about the person of the President of Chad?

75. I will not descend to the level of the representative of Libya because I am well-brought up and I speak on behalf of a State. I shall therefore not give myself over to the sort of silly nonsense and pettifoggery that we have just heard about my Head of State, and I shall not dignify it with a reply. It is not he who is going to set up any régime in Chad, although we all know that for 20 years that is what Libya has sought to do. Chad has not been at peace because Libya has wanted exactly what I have described, despite the fact that the Libyan representative claims that his country seeks national reconciliation. But we know otherwise: it is Libya that is the major obstacle to national reconciliation. It wants at all cost to have puppets in Chad, so that it can do what it wants in Chad. But it will not succeed in that goal because of the great determination of our people. We know that they have been an obstacle to our development, as I said in my statement.

76. The Libyan representative said that his country was neutral concerning current events in Chad and that it had requested the OAU to send a commission of inquiry to see what was happening in Chad. As far as I am aware, the Chad rebels have no aircraft. Who, then, is bombing the city of Faya-Largeau, if not Libyan aircraft? His own spokesmen have admitted that Libyan aircraft are overflying Chad territory and that their bombing of that territory was continuing.

77. As for what he called "foreign intervention in Chad," I should like to say to him that, if there is any foreign intervention in Chad, it is precisely Libyan intervention. There is overt aggression by Libya against the Chad people, which is a tragedy for that people. If friendly countries—which he named—have been kind enough to respond to the appeal made to them, they did so on the appeal of a legitimate Government, a Government that is recognized by the international community—even if that does not please the Libyan representative. Hence, if there is foreign intervention in Chad, if there is aggression against Chad, it is precisely on the part of Libya and no other country.

78. I shall confine myself to this statement for the time being, but I reserve the right to make an appropriate reply after I read the verbatim record of the statement made by the representative of Libya.

79. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has asked to speak, and I now call on him.

80. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At its eighteenth session, held at Nairobi in June 1981, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a resolution on Chad, one of whose paragraphs reads as follows:

> "Reaffirms its support to the Transitional National Union Government and requests that all Member states of the OAU support this Government in its efforts to maintain peace and security in the country and abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of the country."[1]

81. I stated that there were Libyan forces in Chad; and had Libya wanted to impose a president on Chad, it would have done so. But those Libyan forces went to Chad at the request of the legitimate Government of Chad and withdrew at the request of that Government.

82. Libya takes a neutral position on the conflict in Chad among Chad factions.

83. If it is alleged that there is a legitimate Government and security and stability in Chad, then why should we go to the trouble of discussing the deteriorating situation in Chad and why are Zairian forces and military advisers from the United States and other countries there, as well as mercenaries, as reported by Japanese journalists?

84. Is Goukouni Weddey a Chad national or not? Are those fighting with him not also Chad nationals? Who occupied Abéché and Oum-Chalouba? Were they Libyan

forces? Who destroyed N'Djamena and murdered worshippers in a mosque? Was it not Hissein Habré? Who abducted the French archaeologist? Was it not Hissein Habré?

85. With regard to the statement from the OAU, it was addressed to all African States—and that is why it was rejected by Hissein Habré. It is also addressed to non-African States intervening in Chad.

86. I stated that the deteriorating situation in Chad certainly had adverse effects on my country and that it would create problems for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. As I said, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stands ready to seek genuine national reconciliation in Chad, including all Chad factions.

The meeting rose at 3.25 p.m.

NOTE

[1] A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.102 (XVIII)/Rev.1.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى: الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—July 1991—2,050

S/PV.
2463

READEX
FICHE

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2463rd MEETING: 11 AUGUST 1983

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2463)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2463rd MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 11 August 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2463)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In conformity with the decision taken at the previous meeting on this item [*2462nd meeting*], I invite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Korom Ahmed (Chad) and Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Sudan in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast), Mr. Kofa (Liberia) and Mr. Elfaki (Sudan) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is Mr. Korom Ahmed, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad. I welcome him and invite him to make his statement.

4. Mr. KOROM (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Since this is the first opportunity I have had to speak in the Council, I should like to associate myself personally with the sentiments of great satisfaction already expressed to you, Sir, by the delegation of Chad on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency for this month. I take pleasure at that fact, and we would reiterate our delegation's complete readiness to assist you in the performance of your duties.

5. I should also like to associate myself with preceding speakers in paying a respectful tribute to the members of the Council, whose primary responsibility it is to maintain international peace and security.

6. At its meeting on 3 August [*ibid.*] the Council heard the complaint of our Government against Libya for its naked aggression against the Republic of Chad. That aggression, which was at the time limited to the military occupation by the Libyan army of the northern region of Chad known as Tibesti, has increased considerably in recent days and has taken the form of a virtual genocide of the martyred people of Chad, with indiscriminate bombing of sites in the north and east of the country by the Libyan air force.

7. We have asked the Council to live up to its responsibilities by unreservedly condemning Colonel Qaddafi's Libya for its criminal action and demanding that Libya immediately withdraw its troops from Chad.

8. The Council heard the representative of Libya respond to this legitimate complaint from Chad with his habitual arrogance. He asserted that he would not respond to our delegation, because he did not recognize our Government, although, to his great misfortune, he was obliged to sit at the same table as us. This is sufficient proof that the recognition of the legitimacy of the Chad Government cannot be subject to any doubt within the United Nations, nor inside the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

9. But, while claiming that he would not respond to us, the Libyan representative, to divert the attention of members of the Council, painted a fantastic picture of the Chad tragedy, for which his country is primarily responsible, and uttered words whose insolence and insulting nature towards the head of State of Chad have no equal except in the scorn which Colonel Qaddafi has for his African peers.

10. As was only to be expected, the representative of Libya denied the accusations against his country, claiming that Libya does not intervene in the affairs of Chad and has sent neither aeroplanes nor troops to that country.

11. The task of the representative of Colonel Qaddafi in this debate is not easy, so he chose the facile course of categorically denying the allegations against his country, because he was in no position to provide any proof of the much-vaunted neutrality of Libya in this serious matter.

12. One has only to read the many letters which Libya has addressed to the President of the Council in response to our accusations, which were specific, and the statement of the Libyan representative in the Council, to get a precise picture of the high degree of Libyan interference in the internal affairs of Chad and to understand the nature of the open warfare upon which it has now embarked against Chad.

13. Libya has always intervened flagrantly and openly in the internal affairs of Chad, and has never concealed its intention to invade and occupy the whole of Chad and thus forcibly to merge it with Libya. That would be a fine way to resolve the problem of the "Aouzou Strip".

14. Therefore, during the conferences on national reconciliation in Chad, held successively at Kano in northern Nigeria and at Lagos, the federal capital of that country, Libya consistently tried to impose as head of State of Chad a man who was in its pay. If one of the provisions of the Lagos Accord of August 1979 [*S/14378, annex I*] forbade neighbouring countries to intervene in the internal affairs of Chad, that provision was aimed first and foremost at Libya. That obviously did not prevent it from trampling the provision scornfully underfoot.

15. The Lagos Accord was rendered invalid at the time by the Transitional National Union Government of Chad itself, which substituted for it the N'Djamena Agreements—just a few days before the forces of President Hissein Habré took power. Therefore, it is, to say the least, absurd for Libya desperately to cling to that Accord, asserting that it is valid.

16. Libya's interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Chad were exposed when in November 1982 Libya categorically opposed the participation of the official Chad delegation in the second attempt to convene in Tripoli the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

17. Libya's shameless manoeuvres to obstruct the participation of the Chad delegation in international conferences were repeated in January 1983 at the ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at Managua, which was essentially devoted to questions of Central America, and at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi in March 1983.

18. Each of these attempts by Libya was thwarted, to the great chagrin of the Libyan delegation. Each time, the Libyan Government tried to justify its extraordinary behaviour by suggesting that the OAU should deal with the Chad question before it could recognize the Government of N'Djamena.

19. The opportunity so ardently awaited by Libya presented itself with the convening at Addis Ababa in June 1983 of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. In accordance with both the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the OAU's President at the time and the host country invited President Hissein Habré to take part in the work of the Assembly.

20. Presented with this *fait accompli*, Colonel Qaddafi then proposed some odious horse-trading, consisting of his acceptance of the participation of the Chad delegation at the Assembly on condition that the POLISARIO *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro* be admitted, although the two questions had nothing whatsoever to do with each other.

21. Everybody knows what happened next. The Chad delegation was officially admitted to take part in the proceedings of the Assembly. Colonel Qaddafi, unable to contain his anger, decided to boycott totally that Assembly of the Heads of African States.

22. The Chad Government's achievement of victory all along the line on the diplomatic level could only irritate the Libyan régime even further, particularly because the Chad Government made clearly known its intention to recover its occupied territory. Since Chad's title to this part of its national territory cannot be denied, and since there is no argument, of however little validity, for its being overturned by any international juridical body, the Libyan régime could only have recourse to force of arms.

23. The Chad delegation brought to your attention on 2 and 4 August [*S/15902 and S/15907*] the magnitude of this war which, since then, has assumed profoundly disquieting proportions. From two military bases set up right in the middle of Chad territory, one at Ogui, to the north-west of Faya-Largeau, and the other at Ounianga-Kebir, to the north-east, Sukhoi, Tupolev, MiG and SF260 aircraft, in flights of six, come every day to drop fragmentation and napalm bombs on the towns of Faya-Largeau, Oum-Chalouba and Kalait, causing considerable loss of innocent life. From 8 to 9 August alone, we counted more than 200 killed and more than 300 wounded, some by phosphorus and napalm bombs.

24. Furthermore, again from the same bases, which house two motorized battalions equipped with 55-mm and 75-mm recoilless cannons and 105- and 106-calibre cannons as well as BM-13, BM-16 and BM-21 so-called Stalin Organs and AML 90s, which were unloaded from large freight aircraft, mostly Iliyushins, as well as four armoured divisions equipped in particular with T-54, T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, Libya has since yesterday sent in against Faya-Largeau three armoured columns comprising 350 tanks, the models of which I have just mentioned, supported by observation aircraft and MI-24 helicopter gunships, which are the most sophisticated available today in the Libyan army. This new form of warfare began, as has just been said, on 9 August, with a heavy artillery pounding of that locality. As I am addressing the Council that city is being put to the fire and the sword. Women, children and old persons are dying victims of 500-kilogram and 1-ton bombs. The Council should know the suffering that is taking place in Chad.

25. The people of Chad are offering courageous resistance. It is an affront not only to the people of Chad but to international public opinion. This shows how valuable and beyond price is the struggle for independence and liberty.

26. Thanks to the modest defence capacity that has been given to us by friendly countries, we have begun to call a halt to the onward march of this armada of ultra-modern weaponry being unleashed against us. Thus on Friday, 5 August, we shot down a Sukhoi-22 bomber that was bombing Faya-Largeau. Its pilot, who was arrested, was Commander Abdel Salam Mohamed Sharfadine, a colonel in the Libyan air force, of whom we have here some photographs and documents. I would ask the Secretariat to make them available to the Council. Indeed, Libya cannot deny its intervention in Chad. He is a Libyan; he is a colonel who was trained in Libya, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He has confessed everything. He speaks those languages perfectly well. He is now in N'Djamena. There are photographs of him and of some other Libyan soldiers who have nothing whatsoever to do with Chad. There are no white Chadians. These were the Libyan soldiers captured at Faya-Largeau.

27. Commander Abdel Salam Mohamed Sharfadine is the direct subordinate of Colonel Massoud Abdelaziz, commander of operations in northern Chad—southern Libya, as the Libyans so often tend to say. Colonel Massoud, who is conducting the Faya-Largeau operations right now, has as his deputy this Commander Sharfadine, who on 8 August was presented to the public and the press. I think it is appropriate now to inform the members of the Council that the Chad delegation has in its possession all necessary proof of the Libyan presence in the national territory of Chad and the participation of the Libyan army in the in-depth operations inside Chad territory. This is material evidence, and we can make it available to the members.

28. This is the war that has been inflicted upon us by Libya. It is total war. It shrinks from no means and makes no differentiation between victims. It is no longer a war against soldiers. It is a war of extermination, a war of genocide suffered by the martyred people of Chad at the very time we are addressing the Council. Unfortunately, ill-informed or ill-intentioned people continue to describe the events in Chad as civil war. That is not the view of those who are living through it. We are faced with an armed conflict between Chad and Libya. The time of guerrilla warfare in Chad has long passed. It is now total war.

29. For the benefit of those who are still talking about a "Goukouni army" the Government of the Republic of Chad would like to make it absolutely clear that one year ago those protégés of Qaddafi—Goukouni, Kamougué, Mohamat Abba and others—left the national territory in disastrous circumstances without even their luggage and still less with their armed forces.

30. The army now to be found on the national territory of Chad, face to face with the Chad armed forces, is in fact an army that was scratched together by the Tripoli régime using as a basis elements of the Libyan regular army, which constitutes its nucleus. In addition to those elements are Chadian and other African workers in Libya who were press-ganged into action, and particularly the Islamic Legion financed by petrodollars and composed of agents of all nationalities, recruited primarily in the sub-Saharan countries and then sent from Benin towards Libya, where they received training in military camps.

31. The nation of Chad is, then, facing in the field a Libyan army of aggression that is over-equipped, well trained, wholly motorized and tremendously mobile.

32. There is no need to go back over the Libyan motives for this aggression. No one could possibly be fooled by that, so frequent are Libya's acts of interference in the internal affairs of other States and so frequent also are its subversive and destabilizing actions against other countries.

33. Chad has an absolute right to peace and security. Since 7 June 1982, the date on which the patriotic forces threw off the shackles of slavery imposed by settlers and mercenaries of all kinds recruited by Qaddafi and made available to puppets, agents in the pay of the new Libyan imperialism—ever since those forces were catapulted out of Chad, the President of the Republic, Mr. Hissein Habré, has spared no effort to bring about national renewal. But against this fundamental will, Libya believes that Chad has no right to independence. Its aggression is too grave for those States to which peace is dear, and in particular the members of the Security Council, who bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, to assume an attitude of indifference.

34. As everybody knows, Libya excels in the art of falsehood and diversionary tactics. Proof of that has just been supplied by the complaint it has made in connection with various events occurring between sovereign States, in whose name Qaddafi himself has acknowledged he has no right to speak.

35. The fact is that that complaint, contained in document S/15912 of 6 August 1983, is nothing but a fraud pieced together by the Libyans to divert the attention of members of the Council from the real debate on the question of Libyan aggression against Chad.

36. The war of aggression now being waged by Libya against Chad is without justification. It has been inflicted in contravention of the norms of international law. It was launched in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force".

37. That is why the Government and people of Chad reiterate their request that the Council fully shoulder its responsibilities and strongly condemn Libya for its armed aggression against Chad, ordering it immediately to cease its bombing and pounding, requiring it immediately to withdraw all its troops from the territory of Chad, and calling upon it to cease its interference in the internal and external affairs of Chad so that the martyred people of Chad can recover its dignity and independence and can live in understanding with all its neighbours.

38. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The Permanent Representative would have liked to participate in this meeting himself, but unfortunately he is away from New York and has asked me to make this statement.

39. I should like first of all to welcome the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the sister Republic of Chad.

40. In our reply of 3 August to the allegations of the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [*2462nd meeting*], we outlined the basic position of Zaire on the question of Chad at present before the Council. We should like now, in this substantive statement, to state that position in greater detail.

41. But first, Sir, we should like to return to our congratulations, on which we barely touched last Wednesday, on your assumption of the presidency of this important United Nations body. You have long diplomatic experience. You have already acted as President of the Council. You have great talent, and in the course of these few days we have had the opportunity to admire your skill and wisdom, as well as your firmness. In addition, you represent a country which has sealed its friendship with Zaire in a blood-alliance. As the country of freedom, France has sometimes seemed to be, as Jean Giraudoux puts it in *l'Impromptu de Paris*, the "world's spoilsport", for "It was created—and created itself—to undo plots, established roles and long-standing systems in the world." Thus, it is fortunate, Sir, that it is you who are presiding over our work in the present circumstances, and we have no doubt that, thanks to all these things, the Council is in good hands.

42. For reasons beyond our control, we were unable personally to congratulate the representative of China, who guided the Council's work in July with the proverbial skill, competence, finesse and effectiveness which are the heritage of his country's diplomats. Furthermore, Zaire and China have come to enjoy a co-operation and friendship which can be an example to the entire world.

43. To return to the question before the Council, it is significant that certain speakers—and not the least important of them—felt obliged to state that the question of Chad had been discussed last April [*2419th, 2429th and 2430th meetings*] and that, since the Council deferred that question to the OAU, it is for that latter organization to debate it first.

44. That position is clearly mistaken, for the question before the Council last April concerned a border dispute between Chad and Libya. The disputed area is known as the "Aouzou Strip". The question now before the Council is quite different and concerns armed attacks by the aforementioned country against Chad.

45. First of all, have there been acts of aggression or armed attacks against Chad? In his statement of 3 August [*2462nd meeting*], the Libyan representative told us that this was actually a civil war in which Libya was not involved and in connection with which it had maintained strict neutrality.

46. Either the Libyan representative is not at all aware of what is going on in his country, in which case he should be better informed by his Government, or perhaps, on the contrary, he is perfectly well aware of the actions of his Government in Chad; in that case, he was taunting the members of the Council, on whom he wished to foist his lies.

47. In either case, this is a very serious matter. For who on the Council does not know that Goukouni Weddey's troops were trained in Libya and that at this very moment others are being recruited for training in Libya? Who does not know that it is Libya which is arming Goukouni's troops and seeing to their logistic needs? Who does not know that Libya has hired and trained a so-called Islamic Legion, made up of mercenaries and fighting along with Goukouni's troops? Who does not know that military advisers provided by certain countries whose names I shall not mention are guiding that Islamic Legion and Goukouni's troops?

48. We are fully aware that in these conditions the countries which provide those advisers and those weapons are resorting to manoeuvres in order not to be denounced to the Council, but it is foolish to think that these facts are not known to the public at large and, even more so, to the members of the Council.

49. However, if it were only a question of the provision of weapons to Goukouni's troops we would be dealing with a sort of indirect aggression which, moreover, would have been repulsed by the troops of the legitimate Government despite the presence of the celebrated Islamic Legion.

50. The only problem was that, having failed, Libya decided to commit direct aggression. It brought into play on a massive scale its air force. Indiscriminately and in disregard of all international conventions on the subject, it systematically bombed both military and civilian objectives, killing defenceless civilian populations.

51. Since the time of nazism, this is one of the darkest pages ever written and one of the most barbarous acts ever known to history. Other countries may have committed such acts or may still be doing so elsewhere, but it seems to us that this is an excellent opportunity for the Council vigorously to condemn once more such acts and such practices.

52. Too much suffering has been inflicted on the populations of Chad and it is high time that they be allowed to live in peace so that they can tackle the task of rebuilding their country.

53. Libyan bombings in Chad are a perfectly obvious fact that cannot be denied. There has, indeed, been an act of aggression committed against Chad, notwithstanding the Libyan representative's feeble denials.

54. It will be recalled that on 1 August, the Libyan media announced that N'Djamena's forces were completely encircled in the city of Faya-Largeau. Immediately there began the pounding of the city and on 2 August the Libyan agency JANA triumphantly announced the death of President Hissein Habré. That death was not, however, borne out by facts. Will we continue to be told that Libya has had nothing to do with what is happening in Chad? I hope not.

55. Is Hissein Habré's Government illegitimate? Similarly, the Libyan representative stated in the Council that the Government of N'Djamena presided over by Hissein Habré was illegitimate. That represents the speaker's point of view only. But such statements and condemnations are in and of themselves a kind of interference in the internal affairs of Chad. Indeed, in public international law there exists what is known as the theory of effectiveness. We are speaking of effectiveness and not about a *fait accompli*. According to that theory the effective Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the one which rules in effect in Tripoli and governs Libya. The same applies to other countries.

56. One must not confuse legality with legitimacy. Legitimacy is a sociological concept whereas legality has more to do with legal forms. Thus, a Government can be legal without necessarily being legitimate, and vice versa. Naturally it would be ideal for a Government to be both legitimate and legal. After all, it is not because one country denies the legitimacy of another Government that it loses its status. Recognition does not confer legitimacy, on the other hand. It is only the statement of a point of view.

57. At the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa, the legitimacy of the N'Djamena Government was confirmed since it was accepted by the majority, although not by all, of the representatives at the Assembly. Only the head of the Libyan Revolution supported the Government of Goukouni and because of the insult inflicted by his colleagues who were heads of State he had to leave the conference hall and the Ethiopian capital. Furthermore, Mr. Goukouni's Government was also expelled at Managua and New Delhi, as far as we know.

58. We do not think it would be helpful to return to the fact that the N'Djamena Government is illegitimate. We might just recall, as we did on 3 August, that no matter how just his cause, the fact remains that the Libyan Revolution's head is himself an insurgent. Should we therefore conclude that Colonel Qaddafi does not represent Libya? It would, of course, be insane to assert such a thing. Therefore, why would what is true of the Libyan head of State not be true of the N'Djamena Government?

59. Similarly, it seems to us childish to mention to us the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*] and the declarations of the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Nairobi in June 1981. They were at the time all valid, but one must be honest—we will not say intelligent—one must be honest enough to recognize that the Lagos Accord and the Nairobi declarations, to which the Libyan representative referred, are today no longer applicable.

60. It is as if we were told that the decrees and laws of the ex-King Idris which were abolished by the new order continued to be valid in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

61. The position that the N'Djamena Government is illegitimate does not stand up to analysis. Principles and facts establish this quite clearly. It is not for Libya or for any country to say which governments in the world are legitimate. The time of the Crusades belongs to the past.

62. Regarding the presence in Chad of Zairian troops and advisers from friendly countries, everyone in this room was surprised to hear the Libyan representative speaking about the withdrawal from Chad of Zairian troops or other advisers from friendly countries. This is a little like the thief who cries "Thief!" in order to sow confusion, divert attention and make his getaway after having committed his crime. But our brothers from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should realize that these manoeuvres are not always successful, especially when the thief is not committing his first misdeed and has been operating in the same neighbourhood for some time. The same is true of Libya: its interventionists seem to be everywhere.

63. Returning to the presence in Chad of Zairian troops, I should like to recall that if they are there it is at the urgent request of the legitimate Government of that country and that Zaire has acted in complete independence and sovereignty.

64. Our country, which has experienced many tragedies of the same kind and been the victim of many acts of aggression, has always been able to count on assistance from friendly countries in difficult times. In spite of our

own difficulties, we cannot, therefore, fail to heed an appeal from a fraternal country faced with an act of aggression orchestrated on a broad scale.

65. The troops of Zaire are in Chad. They certainly do not intend to stay there for ever. Unlike other countries, Zaire has no special interest there except to help its martyred brother, but its troops will remain there as long as aggression continues and as long as the N'Djamena Government wishes it to.

66. Whether it is a question of the Zairian troops or those of other friends which sent the N'Djamena Government equipment or other assistance, we have all come to the assistance of a country that is acting in self-defence. One cannot reasonably place both the aggressor and the victim on an equal footing.

67. We want it to be quite clear. For Zaire, men come and go but States remain. We have nothing against Mr. Goukouni, and if he had been in Mr. Habré's place, as a nationalist and the head of a legitimate government he could have called on Zaire to repulse alien aggression, and Zaire, if the situation so allowed, would have acted in the same way.

68. Moreover, as the representative of Libya so aptly recalled, Zairian troops had already been in Chad under the aegis of the OAU. As such, they abided strictly by the orders received from the command of the OAU, namely, not to intervene in the civil war and to create conditions to restore peace and reconciliation. Now that they are in Chad under the orders of the legitimate Government of Chad, they will abide by the orders of that Government to protect the civilian populations against the fury of the aggressors.

69. The Libyan representative spoke of the communiqué from the OAU Bureau calling on all States not to interfere in the crisis in Chad and appealing to the Chadians to bring about national reconciliation. The Libyan representative seems to have forgotten that, in reality, this appeal was addressed first and foremost precisely to his Government, which bears primary responsibility for current events in Chad and that, if Tripoli had not inspired and encouraged this killing and if it had not committed aggression against Chad, the situation we are deploring today would not have occurred.

70. In the final analysis, Zairian forces and friends of Chad have intervened only because the forces of disorder and the forces of destabilization had already entered Chad. Once these forces of aggression and genocide are withdrawn, the other forces will no longer have any reason to remain in Chad.

71. That said, the statements of the Libyan representative—in which he clearly did not believe himself—must not conceal the gravity of the situation in Chad. Libyan bombing continues to kill innocent people in Chad, people who have done no harm to the Libyan people. These innocent people have made but two mistakes: on the one hand, they have President Hissein Habré as leader, who is not to the liking of the leader of the Libyan revolution; and, on the other, they are poor people—but poor people who are sitting on a golden strip which the aggressors covet.

72. Chad has the right to live in peace, to choose its leaders and to conduct its life in keeping with its culture and its own identity—sheltered from treacherous sirens and any aggressors. It is immoral and criminal that some States, because they are oil producers or wealthy, have chosen to destabilize or commit acts of aggression against poor countries. Where will all this end? If this is allowed to continue, will not insecurity and the law of the jungle become legitimate and legal?

73. It is symptomatic that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has had and continues constantly to have unpleasant dealings with most of its neighbours, not to mention nations thousands of miles from its territory. If it is not Egypt, it is the Sudan; if it is not Brazil, it is Chad; if it is not Morocco, it is Tunisia—even if matters seem to have been settled there; and, if it is not the Palestine Liberation Organization, who will be the next victim?

74. In conclusion, we should like to express again our earnest hope that the Council will condemn such acts of aggression and see to it that they cease.

75. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Ivory Coast. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

76. Mr. ESSY (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, the delegation of the Ivory Coast is happy, for two reasons, to see you occupying the presidency of the Council, which is debating for the third time in six months this vital problem of Chad, which may determine the very future of the whole of our continent. Your personal qualities and your long experience in diplomacy, which have in recent years been applied to finding concrete solutions in the face of divergent interests within the international community, will be very useful to us in this particular matter of which the Council is seized today. You also represent France, a country with which my own country is honoured to be able to maintain special relations, and one which was very quick to learn the lessons of history and produce, with the active assistance of our leaders, a policy of decolonization which made it possible for the vast majority of States concerned to achieve political independence without bloodshed. No country is in a better position than France to understand the tragedy of Chad in all its dimensions—political, economic, social and, in particular, human—in the face of the misfortunes which have afflicted its people, a people aspiring only to peace so that it can devote itself to the difficult task of development, which is quite rightly of utmost concern to that country's legitimate authorities.

77. My delegation takes this opportunity also to convey its warm congratulations to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, representative of China, for the outstanding way in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last month.

78. It will be recalled that at the end of our deliberations last April [*2419th and 2428th to 2430th meetings*], following Chad's complaint against Libya on account of military occupation by Libyan troops of part of Chad territory—the Aouzou Strip—the Council urged the two parties to abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in keeping with the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which demand respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of States.

79. Statements in the debate and the difficult negotiations that made possible the drafting of a declaration read out by the President of the Council [*S/15688*] showed in particular the desire of States to see the two parties settle their differences by peaceful means.

80. The nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in June at Addis Ababa, only acknowledged once again that which was obvious in any case, that is, the authority of the leaders in N'Djamena, who alone are authorized to speak on behalf of Chad and to enter into commitments internationally.

81. The events that have occurred since then in Chad have made it clear that one of the two parties—in this case, Libya—did not see fit to comply with the recommendations of the Security Council and the decisions of the OAU.

82. Indeed, not content with having obstinately refused to associate itself with the efforts of the international community and, above all, those of the OAU to establish peace in Chad and promote the restoration of the unity of the country, undermined as it was by years of fratricidal struggle, the Libyan Government actually strove to destroy that State by supplying its henchmen with a vast quantity of sophisticated weapons, the annual cost of which far exceeds the operating budget of the overwhelming majority of African States that have known only peace hitherto.

83. One may well wonder what financial resources coming from what territory can permit Goukouni to justify the exorbitant means at his disposal to destroy his country to pursue a scorched-earth policy by providing an opportunity to the Libyan air force to rain fragmentation and phosphorus bombs on his own brothers.

84. In the face of such a situation, in the face of the disproportion between the forces concerned, how can one imagine that the legitimate Government of N'Djamena should not have appealed to friendly countries which might provide it with necessary aid for its own survival?

85. It is in the face of this new evolution in the fratricidal war fomented and maintained from outside by destabilizing elements, enemies of freedom, that the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally, meeting on 1 July 1983, published a communiqué in which it approved the energetic measures taken by France within the framework of agreements of military co-operation between it and Chad to come to the assistance of the legitimate Government of that country, the Government recognized by the United Nations, the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and appeals to the true friends of Africa who are anxious to see its harmonious development in peace, freedom and independence to come to the assistance of the legitimate Government of Chad fighting for respect, the territorial integrity of its country, restoration of peace and national reconstruction.

86. The statements of the N'Djamena Government and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad—confirmed from many different sources, and all of which agree—demonstrate undeniably, in spite of Tripoli's denials, the direct participation of the Libyan air force in the Chad conflict, thus fully justifying the presence at the side of the Chad Government of friendly States which come to its aid at its request to provide military assistance as called for by the situation.

87. Apart from Libya, none of Chad's neighbours has any territorial ambitions or hidden economic designs on Chad.

88. The occupation of the Aouzou Strip draws attention to and highlights Libya's true interests and ambitions in Chad. By dismissing at its will certain leaders of FROLINAT to arm others who are more subservient to its policy and by imposing itself as judge and as party to the Sebha agreements, it was no longer able to dissemble its wish to bring Chad within its sphere of influence.

89. Of course, internal causes can explain in part the Chad problem—and, indeed, this is the case in many States—but it is, above all, external factors which go well beyond the confines of that country, the many cases of interference which this State in its death throes cannot resist, which explain the present situation.

90. The concern to make Chad a united nation has been a constant of the policy of that country ever since its independence. One factor could have played an essential role in the emergence of national unity: the level of economic development for which peace is indispensable. After more than 20 years of fratricidal warfare, the only growth one is able to observe today in Chad is that of its underdevelopment.

91. Condemned to live together within frontiers which it did not choose, the different elements of the Chad population must find solutions in terms of possible coexistence which will promote contacts, exchanges and mutual esteem—any solution which excludes the idea of oppression of one party by another. The Sudan, Chad's immediate neighbour, has been able to come up with a form of organization adopted to its country.

92. Chad, left to itself and free of external interference, can overcome its internal problems by dialogue to restore peace and stability, which will in turn permit it to devote itself to its development in the higher interest of the people of Chad.

93. The Council should not allow itself to be taken in by the cry of "Thief" uttered by the fugitive thief himself to mask his own crime and divert attention from himself.

94. My delegation expects of the Council not only that it recall the cardinal principles of the United Nations and of the OAU but that it take all necessary steps to ensure that no Member contravenes international rules without which no State can feel safe.

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Sudan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

96. Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation would like to express its gratitude and appreciation to the President and members of the Council at a time when it is examining an important question closely connected with peace and security in our region and, indeed, in the whole world.

97. We have studied with great interest the many messages which have been sent to us by the Government of the fraternal country of Chad and listened with interest to the important statement by our brother Ramadane Barma, the representative of Chad [*2362nd meeting*]. He reviewed the serious events which have occurred and continue to occur in his country as a result of the flagrant aggression and interference by Libya in Chad's internal affairs and of the repeated bombing and bombarding of Faya-Largeau and other villages and towns in Chad, along with Libyan material and logistic support to the insurgents and outlaws who have turned against the legitimate Government of Chad.

98. Today we have listened with great interest and concern to the important statement by Mr. Ahmed, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the fraternal country of Chad, who has given us valuable additional information regarding Libyan intervention and the bombing and bombarding of some cities in the north of Chad. I should like to take this opportunity to welcome him to the work of the Council.

99. The persistent and intensive acts of aggression, past and present, of the Libyan authorities against the territory, towns and villages of Chad were described today by the Secretary of State and yesterday by Chad's representative as an attempt to commit an act of genocide against the people of Chad, and as another attempt by Libya to destabilize the Government of Chad. This is a brazen violation of the principles that we have always defended—principles in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

100. The Sudan, like all the countries neighbours of Chad and Libya, has a great interest in these grave developments, because they constitute an actual and direct threat to its security, integrity and stability. They also constitute a violation and breach of the basic principles of relations among neighbouring countries that must be respected and upheld. Foremost among those principles are those that apply to the sovereignty and independence of States and to their territorial integrity, as well as to non-interference in their internal affairs and non-use or threat of force, and the settling of all conflicts and differences by peaceful means.

101. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations set forth quite clearly the principles I have just enunciated, and need no further explication. Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity[1] sets forth the principles that underlie that important regional organization. It sets forth the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each African State and its inalienable right to independent existence, as well as affirming the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. It prohibits subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State. Article VI, which concerns the obligations of members of the OAU, requests every member to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the Charter. Every member has an absolute duty to do this, and no member that fails to respect those articles in its relations with other countries can remain a member of the OAU, an organization whose survival and development we must preserve if we want to see the hopes placed in it realized.

102. The delegation of the Sudan was not surprised to read the many letters addressed to the President of the Council by the Libyan authorities over the past few days. We were not surprised to hear the representative of Libya speaking in the Council on 3 August [*ibid.*], because experience has made us familiar with the practices and habits of the Libyan leaders. We know what they are capable of and we know what they seek. The letters and the statement were a desperate attempt to deny Libya's intervention in Chad. Those letters and the statement made in the Council have mentioned that the Government of Chad, a country that is a full-fledged member of the United Nations and of the OAU, as well as of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, is illegal and does not represent the people of Chad. Can there be any greater form of aggression and interference? The Libyan Government wishes to impose its authority on Chad and to interfere in that country's internal affairs, acting against those who are governing the country. What right or instrument do the Libyan authorities have to legalize Governments of other countries? Do those authorities not know that the legitimacy of Governments is an internal affair of concern only to the people of the country involved? Such senseless allegations cannot justify subversion or support for rebellion. Neither can they be invoked as a justification for aggression and interference in the internal affairs of another country or for threats against the sovereignty and independence of another country, or occupying its territories by force. Is it not time that Libya realized that no dispute over the legitimacy of Governments, should such dispute arise, can serve as a pretext for occupation, aggression or expansion, or for the appropriation of the territory of others by force? Has Libya not learned its lesson?

103. All attempts to prevent the legitimate Government of Chad from participating in the extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Managua last January, and the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March of this year, have failed. Has Libya not understood that the OAU, at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held at Addis Ababa last June, said its final word on the subject and that it will not countenance Libya's desperate attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the Government of Chad? Does Libya want, by such peculiar behaviour, to disassociate itself from the decisions of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU with regard to Chad?

104. There is no need to state the need for respect for principles, covenants, agreements, resolutions and conventions and that such respect must be reflected in practice. Slogans and fine words are not enough; all countries have eyes and ears. They can see, hear, and watch the practices and behaviour of each other.

105. Libya's aggression against Chad and its interference in that country's internal affairs, as well as Libyan occupation of part of the territory of Chad and its renewed attempts to impose its authority and hegemony through the use of agents, insurgents and mercenaries to destabilize it, are obvious to all and cannot be denied. Libya wants a régime subject to its influence in Chad and in collaborating or even merging with such a régime, Libya could appropriate the entire Aouzou Strip. Libya wants a régime it can use to satisfy its greed and carry out its conspiracies against neighbouring countries, including the Sudan, which has been, and continues to be, the victim of countless aggressive schemes and plots on the part of Libya.

106. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan has expressed, here and in other international and regional bodies, its condemnation and denunciation of all foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any other State, regardless of the reasons invoked or the pretexts used. Such intervention is contrary to customs, laws and international agreements accepted by the whole international community as a basis for relations between States, nations and peoples. It is on that basis that the delegation of the Sudan strongly condemns Libyan aggression against the fraternal people of Chad and interference in its affairs. It requests that this aggression and interference be ended immediately and that Libya withdraw its troops from Chad territory unconditionally, so that the people of Chad, who have long suffered, may win back their security, integrity, independence and sovereignty and the unity of its territory. We call on Libya to put an immediate end to material and logistical assistance that can help the insurgence against the Government of Chad. We call on it to put an end immediately to its air and land attacks on the towns, villages and people of Chad, and to put an end to the use of mercenaries of all nationalities in order to sow death and destruction in Chad territory.

107. With the support of sincere, fraternal African countries, the Government and people of Chad can once again regain national unity and stability, which are necessary to get rid of the aftermath of the periods of aggression and insurrection and to embark on the long-awaited projects of economic and social development.

108. In March and April last [*2419th and 2428th to 2430th meetings*], the Council considered Chad's complaint against Libya, which had occupied the Aouzou region, and the Council issued a statement on 6 April [*S/15688*], noting the desire of various countries to enter into negotiations to put an end, by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, to the dispute and to the escalation of the situation. The situation that prompted the Council to issue that statement has deteriorated and become more acute. Now the two countries must enter into negotiations, into a dialogue, to end the dispute, which has lasted too long. A final solution must be found. We must put an end to one of the causes of the crises and instability that our region has experienced from time to time.

109. It must be remembered that at its fourteenth session, held at Libreville in 1977, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU created an *ad hoc* Committee[2] to study the border dispute between Libya and Chad. We hope that the two countries will co-operate with the Committee and put a peaceful end to their dispute, by means of a dialogue, an understanding, or arbitration. Alternatively, the matter could be taken up by the International Court of Justice, which could hand down a just and final judgement.

110. Chad has come before the Council, which is the international body primarily responsible for international peace and security. That action also demonstrates the gravity of the present situation. It is serious not only for Chad but for the integrity and sovereignty of the countries of the region. All necessary steps and measures must be taken to protect the sovereignty and independence of Chad and the security and integrity of neighbouring countries, along with the security of the world. We support Chad's request that Libya's aggression against it be condemned and denounced, and that Libya end its armed aggression and its bombing, that it withdraw its troops from all Chad territory and that it cease giving assistance to the insurgents and the mercenaries.

111. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to appeal to the international community as a whole, and to African countries in particular, to support the efforts of the Government of Chad to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Chad, as well as to rebuild what has been destroyed as a result of aggression, civil war and foreign intervention, in order to bring about the economic and social development necessary for people who have suffered so much and sacrificed so much. We ask all those countries to give whatever assistance they can to the Government and people of Chad. We are very grateful to those countries that have already

offered such assistance in an effort to help Chad to protect its independence and sovereignty and to prevent attempts of displacement and genocide against it.

112. We have good-neighbourly relations with the fraternal people of Chad and Libya. We are anxious to see that these two fraternal peoples, as well as others in the region, will make full use of their sovereignty and independence, their bonds of fraternity and good-neighbourliness, and will promote co-operation to bring about prosperity and peace, which we all ardently desire.

113. The people and Government of the Sudan will continue to do their utmost to realize the hopes of all of us to enjoy peace, stability and progress in fraternity and fruitful co-operation.

114. Mr. ADJOYI (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation would like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Korom Ahmed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad. We thank him for the important statement that he has just made. His participation in the Council's work is an expression of his Government's concern about the situation in his country.

> "The people of Togo earnestly hope that they and all nations will enjoy peace and progress, but peace must be real and contribute to the effective emancipation of all countries. That is why Togo, given the general state of disarray of world affairs today, threatening international equilibrium, has always advocated a fraternal dialogue and a general meeting of minds in an effort to bring about just solutions, in peace, to the painful conflicts which exist in our world and which take such a heavy toll of human life."

Those words of the President and founder of the Rassemblement du peuple togolais and President of the Republic, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, assume great significance given the present tragedy in Chad, where military operations suggest that tomorrow the picture will be even more sombre.

115. It is not surprising that my country, which shares with other members of the Council primary responsibility for peace in the world, is once again trying with others to agree on a negotiated solution to the tragedy in Chad. It was in that spirit that we joined in the consensus that emerged last April in the Council, which adopted a statement calling on both parties

> "to settle the dispute without undue delay and by peaceful means, on the basis of the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which demand respect for political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity"

and urged

> "both sides to refrain from any actions which could aggravate the current situation" [*ibid.*].

116. The situation has worsened over the past five months. One of the sides, flouting on the one hand the statement engaging the responsibility of the Council and on the other the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, has by widespread military actions questioned the legitimacy of the existence of the other side—Chad's legitimate Government that was indeed recognized by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its nineteenth session, held at Addis Ababa last June.

117. The facts as reported by that other side are very troubling. Innocent civilian populations have been bombed for no reason—or, rather, for the sole reason of enjoying the protection of the competent authorities of their country.

118. How can the bombing of Faya-Largeau be justified except by saying that it is the result of a savage desire to create chaos in Chad with a view to pursuing certain unavowed goals? An end must be put to these bombings at once, and foreign occupying troops must be withdrawn to allow the people of Chad to tackle the great task of national reconstruction it has already begun. The demand for an end to the bombing and the withdrawal of the occupying troops is part and parcel of the refusal of the international community to see violence set up as a political system governing relations among nations. There is no need to recall that the occupation of a country through the use of force is a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

119. Togo is a country that cherishes peace and freedom, and we believe that relations among States must be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and on the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness, non-use of force and the settlement of disputes through negotiation.

120. In signing or acceding to the Charter of the United Nations, all States have pledged to respect and defend those principles. My country will always feel concern when those principles are flouted, no matter what country is responsible, particularly when African countries are involved. That is why my country has deplored and continues to deplore the occupation of Chad and the bombing of civilian populations. That is why Togo joins all other peace-loving nations that cherish the principles of the Charter in calling for the withdrawal of the occupying forces from Chad so that the Chadian people, which has suffered such hardship during these long years of war, may finally enjoy all their rights in freedom and peace.

121. My delegation appeals to both countries concerned without delay to apply the statement of the Security Council of 6 April [*ibid.*]. The international community cannot accept the occupation and bombardment of Chad as a *fait accompli*. If it did, that would establish a precedent that would jeopardize the confidence that militarily weak, small countries have placed in the United Nations to ensure their right to existence and independence and respect for the integrity of their territory.

122. The people of Chad have claimed that right to existence and is prepared to go to the negotiating table in order to exercise it. Since Libya has also declared here its deep desire to settle the problem of Chad by means of dialogue, my delegation has reason to hope that the guns will soon fall silent and that there will commence negotiations to bring about an independent and free Chad in which peace will have full significance.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

124. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Since this is the first time that we speak under your presidency, the Egyptian delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at seeing France occupying the presidency of the Council, which bears a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We are particularly happy, Sir, to see you personally in the Chair, for your wisdom and judiciousness are well known to us all and are a reflection of your vast experience and expertise. Those qualities have been manifested in your conduct of the proceedings in the Council's consideration of this particularly delicate matter: the complaint by Chad against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The circumstances surrounding this complaint have rapidly worsened and have reached the stage of aggression and invasion of the territory of an African country and a Member of the United Nations by a fellow African State, also a Member of the Organization. This poses a threat to security and stability in a vast and vulnerable region.

125. Before I go into the item under consideration today in detail, I should like to convey the congratulations of the Egyptian delegation to the representative of China, Mr. Ling Qing, who did such a good job of conducting the proceedings of the Council in July.

126. We asked to participate in this debate because of the deterioration in the situation in that vital part of the African continent, resulting from the ambitions of certain leaders in the region, from regional expansionist designs, from foreign intervention in the affairs of other States, and from encroachment on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of those States. Egypt considers that the complaint before the Security Council is founded in the fundamental principles by which we abide always and in all circumstances. Libyan intervention in Chad is not in the interests of the African continent or of the cause of liberation. It is a matter of constant concern to the OAU, whose Charter we respect. I should like to mention in this connection the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its previous sessions, in particular that of the nineteenth session held last June at Addis Ababa.[3]

127. Chad is sorely in need of constructive assistance so that it can stand up against internal dissension. This is of great importance to the OAU; we all need stability, peace and understanding so that we can be the masters of our own development, and so that we can ensure the progress of our peoples. Accordingly, Egypt and other fraternal African countries cannot remain silent in the face of designs and actions which have led to instability as they have now done in Chad. Egypt condemns Libyan aggression against Chad and supports legitimacy in Chad. We therefore support the legitimate Government under the presidency of Hissein Habré.

128. At a time when we all desire stability, this is a very serious situation posing the threat of instability. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity has forbidden the use of force, and this makes the matter even more serious because of the intervention of a neighbouring country, Libya, in an internal conflict between a legitimate Government and other parties not enjoying the same legitimacy. Libya has committed armed aggression with armoured and airborne units; the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad before the Council today provided considerable details of this aggression, which leaves no room for doubt about the role being played by Libya in this aggression.

129. On every possible occasion, the Government of the Jamahiriya persists in denying that it is interfering in Chad's affairs, claiming that what is happening in Chad is a spontaneous internal conflict between Chadian parties, and that Libya is leaving it up to the inhabitants of Chad to settle their differences and is taking up a neutral position. There is a blatant contradiction here between words and deeds: Libya's present deeds require no further proof. We cannot conceal the fact that the problem of Chad, with its two parties, Libya and Chad—that is, the legitimate Governments of Libya and Chad—presents us with great difficulties. The people of Libya is the people of a fraternal Arab country, and that of Chad is the people of a fraternal African country. We do not like to see the territory of Chad being occupied by Libya, which refuses to recognize the legitimate Government of Chad. Libya refuses to negotiate with the legitimate Government of Chad concerning the occupied Aouzou Strip, and also refuses to settle the dispute between the two countries by peaceful means. We are worried at seeing Libya constitute a source of instability and threaten the legitimate order in certain African countries.

130. That is why when, last year, Libya withdrew its forces from Chad, saying that it would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of that African country, we glimpsed a ray of hope that a new era of Libya keeping its promises might be ushered in, thus opening the way for the people of Chad to achieve true national reconciliation emanating from the people itself, to direct its efforts towards the development of its resources, and to live in peace and co-operation with all countries. That would be in the interest of everyone. Unfortunately, we see from the facts that Libya is still bent on its old designs and ambitions: to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad, to impede national reconciliation, to attempt to overthrow the legitimate Government of the country, headed by President Hissein Habré, and to assist those who have turned against the legitimate Government and have breached Chad's sovereignty through acts of aggression by land and air.

131. We think that in order to put an end to the fighting and bring about peace and stability, so ardently hoped for by the people of Chad, we must create a propitious climate for that. There must no longer be any interference in the internal affairs of Chad or any attempt to oppose its legitimate Government. This is the only possible basis for peace and stability for the people of Chad in that vulnerable part of the African continent.

132. As for the attempts at destabilization and the origin of the intensive air bombardments, everyone knows that the rebel forces have never had any air capability. How could those rebel forces overnight come into possession of modern bombers, which are dropping bombs of great destructive power on civilians?

133. Suffice it to reiterate, at the conclusion of our delegation's statement, what has already been stated by the representative of Chad and Secretary of State, Mr. Korom Ahmed. The Egyptian delegation hails his appearance before the Council and echoes his appeal. We wholeheartedly support him in his request made on behalf of his country. It is incumbent upon the Council to live up to its responsibilities under the Charter and condemn the bombings and acts of Libyan aggression against Chad. Libya must be called upon to put an end to these acts and to undertake no further intervention in the affairs of Chad and to withdraw from all Chad territory.

134. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

135. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am happy to have heard almost all the statements made to the Council regarding the sad conflict which exists between Chad and Libya. I have learned a lot from those statements.

136. I realized, as everyone in the audience did, that some speakers attacked the Libyan leaders. Some of them named President Qaddafi; some of them attacked just the leaders in general. I learned also that there is a problem in Chad. There is a sort of insurgent movement, and I learned that the insurgents have been moving towards the capital but have been stopped. This information has been passed on to me and to the rest of the audience by the speakers. I thank them all.

137. I learned also that military assistance has been given, quite legitimately, to Chad upon the request of the Chadian régime and I think I also heard that this military assistance has been very necessary for the survival of the Chad régime.

138. I learned something else that was not new to any of us, that is, that the Chad régime is legitimate and that the people of Chad support it very strongly. I do not know why then so much military assistance has been necessary.

139. However, I did not hear anything about some other sources which very generously offer military assistance and other help to the area and, as a matter of fact, add fuel to the fire. I am sure that everybody has read today's paper and knows that some 180 soldiers from France have already been deployed and that another 100 might be deployed very soon. We have also heard of the assistance that is given to the Chad régime by the United States. I do not know why these two important pieces of information were simply forgotten.

140. My delegation believes that there is a far better solution to the problem of Chad than coming to the Council and magnifying the problem. Chad is a very young country. I think it achieved its independence about 20 years ago, and has unfortunately had problems almost ever since. It was after only five years, in 1965, I think, that the French army returned to the country, presumably because they thought it was necessary.

141. However, in a young country like Chad, whose independence is only 20 years old, one can objectively assume and conceive that there might be some border differences with the neighbouring countries. These differences, my delegation believes, should be resolved in a very peaceful manner. It is quite unfortunate that those who are adding fuel and contributing to the conflict are probably preventing or delaying a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is very sad that some countries, which are now adversaries and contributing to this conflict, have signed so many peace treaties and agreements, one of them being the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*], which is very recent and the signatures to it still fresh. We therefore think the best way is for them to go back to those previous agreements and not be used by the imperialist Powers to aggravate the situation and create further animosity between the countries of the region.

142. One good and practical way of resolving these differences is probably direct negotiation. I believe the OAU is a very relevant and appropriate referee for this problem, particularly since the Council has not been very successful in resolving such differences.

143. My delegation therefore believes taking sides in this matter, trying to work out resolutions that might create injury for one of the parties or making any attempt to magnify and strengthen animosity should be avoided.

144. I hope some super-Powers that always find it in their interests to create conflicts in the area will refrain from contributing to this conflict; I also hope that some puppet régimes—respectfully speaking—in the area will refrain from further contributing to this sad conflict.

145. My delegation hopes the parties will soon achieve peace and contribute to the stability and strengthening of the area.

146. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

147. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to make a brief statement and at the same time exercise the right of reply. Permit me to make some comments on the question we are now discussing.

148. We stated clearly at the previous meeting [*2462nd meeting*] that the present situation in Chad concerned solely the Chadians and that imperialist forces were trying to internationalize the conflict in Chad by supplying one of the parties with weapons of all kinds and sending in troops and aircraft to support that party—that is, Hissein Habré, the Commander of the northern army, one of the 11 parties to the Chad dispute—Mr. Hissein Habré, who rebelled against the legitimate Government under the 1979 Lagos Accord counter-signed by 11 parties [*S/14378, annex I*].

149. The Government of Goukouni Weddey is the sole legitimate Government; it came to power not by force but under an agreement counter-signed by neighbouring countries and accepted by the Chadian parties; the other Governments came to power by military *coups d'état* or by force of arms.

150. We have stated more than once that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is neutral and is not intervening on the side of any party, because we recognize in Chad only the legitimate Government of National Unity, headed by Goukouni Weddey. We have stated in the Council that the question of Chad is an African question which is before the OAU, which has set up an *ad hoc* committee.[2] We have also stated that, in order to find a solution to this problem, we have to bring about national reconciliation and that all parties should take part in the government of the country. We have proposed a council for national reconciliation, under the aegis of the OAU. We expressed our willingness, along with our African brothers, to participate in the search for the solution of this problem.

151. We should like to see an end to the assistance and massive supplies of weapons to the northern army; we should like to call upon the parties to bring about national reconciliation; we should like to ask the OAU to work towards such national reconciliation, which would put an end to civil war and foreign intervention in Chad.

152. But the imperialist forces are continuing to make charges against my country, unfortunately with the support of one of the African forces that receives orders from Washington. These imperialist forces want to find a pretext for their intervention in the area to perpetuate the state of war. They are sending tons of weapons and ammunition to Mr. Habré; they are supplying him with thousands of soldiers and mercenaries of many nationalities; they have taken no initiative to put an end to the war and bring about reconciliation. We hear no one in Washington or anywhere else calling for reconciliation within the country among all Chadian parties; but we do hear appeals to war and war cries addressed to Chad. The objective of those forces sent to Chad is crystal clear: to threaten the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

153. Those countries that defend Hissein Habré are defying the OAU and want to make it impossible for the OAU to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is amusing that they are not talking about the people of Chad but of supporting Hissein Habré. Everyone knows that he is an insurgent and rejected by the people of Chad, and that those countries are acting against the will of the people of Chad, which supports its legitimate Government of Goukouni Weddey. We wonder where those countries were in the past, and why they did not help the legitimate Government against the rebellion of its Minister of Defence, Mr. Hissein Habré. Why did those countries not think of providing food, medical and clothing aid to Chad before these events? They have taken advantage of recent events to provide the rebels with all kinds of weapons which are used for genocide against the people of Chad.

154. Permit me to say here that Mr. Habré enjoys no popular support. He left the capital so that French, American and Zairian troops could protect it and, with a group of mercenaries, resist the forces of the Government of National Unity headed by Goukouni Weddey. The proof of that can be found in the rejection by Mr. Habré of the proposal of sending a fact-finding commission by the OAU. It is clear he does not want world public opinion to know that he has very few troops: just a few mercenaries of various nationalities. Many newspapers have reported those facts, and I shall confine myself to what has been published by *The Washington Post* in its issue of 4 August 1983:

> "According to French news accounts, an unknown number of foreign mercenaries have also been recruited to serve with Habré's forces and could be called upon to help install anti-aircraft defences in Faya-Largeau."*

155. Some Japanese journalists also saw mercenaries in Abéché and Oum-Chalouba.

156. I shall quote some extracts from *The Washington Post* of 24 June:

> "A Chadian diplomat in Washington said yesterday that the Embassy here had not received any precise information, but the Chadian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris was quoted by the Associated Press as saying that Libyans, Libyan-recruited foreigners and rebels loyal to ousted President Goukouni were involved in the fighting.
>
> "A State Department official said yesterday that there were 'no reports' on Libyan use of aircraft against the government defenders of Faya-Largeau."*

157. *The New York Times* of 14 July published the following:

> "He said that as many as 600 rebel soldiers had been killed, wounded or captured since Friday. He said no more than '3 or 4' Government troops had been lost.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

Among those killed on the rebel side, he said, were 3 Libyans, but he offered no evidence that Libyans had been there."»

158. The following is from *The Washington Post* of 1 August:

"Battlefield reports could not be confirmed independently because journalists were not permitted to travel to the front."*

159. *The New York Times* of 3 August reported that:

"Mr. Soumalia also reported that Faya-Largeau, the largest town in northern Chad, came under Libyan air attack Tuesday for the fourth day. He said large parts of the oasis had been destroyed, and casualties were heavy among the 10,000 residents and the combatants.

"It was impossible to verify the reports because journalists are not permitted to travel to Faya-Largeau."*

160. There are many things that I could point out here by way of example. One recent example is the following from *The Washington Post* of 10 August which reads:

"The sources, whose information could not be independently verified, said that Libya had dispatched Soviet-made T-62 and T-72 tanks loaded on flatbed trucks but that the trucks had become bogged down in soft sand 50 miles north of Faya-Largeau."*

161. Most of this comes from the sources of Mr. Habré and from American sources, even from the White House or the State Department.

162. I should like to quote also the following article from the *Daily News*, representing Tanzania's stand on the question of Chad:

"This intervention has taken not only the form of massive military and logistic support to one faction of the Chadian conflict, namely the Hissein Habré forces, but it has also taken the form of the introduction of military personnel under the excuse of providing training for these forces.

"The factional fighting between the Habré forces and those of former President Goukouni Weddey is continuing the civil war. It is neither here nor there to argue that the Habré régime is the legitimate Government of Chad, for from where does that Government draw its legitimacy? Or, to put it differently, how more legitimate is the Habré régime compared to the legitimate Government of Goukouni? In an attempt to justify intervention, a number of factors of recent history are conveniently forgotten. Goukouni was the President of Chad leading a Government of National Unity. The Government in which Hissein Habré was Defence Minister was recognized and supported by the Organization of African Unity. Indeed, it was given formal support by the Heads of State and Government of Africa at their eighteenth Assembly, held at Nairobi in June 1981.

"Ironically, it was also that Government that facilitated the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad in the aftermath of Libya's quick withdrawal of its forces from Chad following the request to do so by the Government of President Goukouni. Those Libyan forces were there at the request of the legitimate Government of Chad. That Chad's legitimate Government was forced to abandon N'Djamena in the face of heavy forces, despite the presence of the OAU peace-keeping forces outside the country does not really answer the question of legitimacy."

"At any rate that is the view of one of the countries."*

163. I should like to quote another statement issued in Accra on 9 August:

"The Ghana Government yesterday, 8 August 1983, appealed to the Organization of African Unity to redouble its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Chadian conflict and to save that country from further suffering. The Government added that the internal conflict had been turned into an explosive international situation because of the massive military assistance to Habré by the United States and France. The Foreign Minister's statement said that the Government was watching with concern the worsening situation in Chad and added that Ghana deplores the internationalization of the Chadian conflict and supports the call of the OAU for all outside Powers to desist from further interference, direct or indirect, in Chad."*

164. I should also like to note what was said on CBS on 27 June. CBS reported that early in 1981 the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had begun to provide arms to Hissein Habré and FAN, the Armed Forces of the North. The original amount of the appropriation for assistance to Habré was $10 million.

165. In his statement the representative of Zaire tried to tell us something about morality. He gave us a whole juridical lecture on that subject. My response, however, will not be long. Briefly, I would say that I am aware that the authorities of his country are forced to send their troops to Chad because those who sent troops to the insurrection in Katanga and who protected the Mobutu régime have imposed on it the duty of sending troops to Chad. We might have hoped that Zaire would send its troops to one of the front-line African States confronting the racist régime of Pretoria, which is occupying part of Angola. We know that that is not possible for that régime, since Zaire has very close links with the racist régime in Pretoria and imports many goods from that country, even the carrot, in violation of the decisions of the OAU.

166. I do not know what Zaire's attitude is towards the problems of Kampuchea, but, according to the represen-

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

tative of Zaire, those who occupy that country's capital are the country's legitimate authorities. I hope that he would advise his Government and Zaire's ally, the United States, to apply the same principle to Kampuchea.

167. As for the theft, corruption and exploitation of the goods and property of the people, I need say nothing about the corruption and plundering of the money of the people of Zaire, nor of the money deposited in Belgian banks and other banks. We are aware of the price of sending troops to N'Djamena.

168. The OAU appeal was addressed to Libya; it was directed at extra-African forces. Perhaps the representative of Zaire does not know that Libya is a part of Africa, or perhaps he considers it non-African.

169. Libyan leaders have no private bank accounts. They are not subject to the CIA. Libya's oil income is exploited solely in development projects with a view to benefiting the people of Libya. Its distribution is equitable. At the time of the visit to Washington of the President of Zaire, the papers stated that he had lunch with Messrs. Bush, Shultz and Casey. Everyone knows Mr. Casey—he is the head of the CIA. A deal was worked out and Mobutu received the price of his intervention in N'Djamena in United States dollars, through the CIA, which were deposited in private accounts in American and Belgian banks.

170. My brother the representative of the Sudan vented all his anger against my country. It would appear that he was making a fine distinction. He expressed his pleasure at seeing the troops of Zaire, France and the United States in Chad, and he is not calling for the withdrawal of those troops. He is claiming that there are Libyan troops there and that they should withdraw. We in our country call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad, and we are ready to co-operate with the OAU in dispatching a fact-finding commission. My country wants peace restored to Chad and everywhere else in the world. My country is the biggest donor of assistance to Chad—not by sending arms, but by loans, by joint agricultural ventures in agriculture, fishing and other fields, while the United States has provided instruments of war.

171. There is no doubt that the United States is particularly pleased to see dissent and struggle between us and our brothers so that it can have a pretext to justify its presence in the region, and to return to the days of military bases and economic exploitation.

172. The representative of Egypt said many things. I repudiate everything he said about expansionist designs and any invasion of Chad by Libya. It is not true. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has quite enough territory of its own, and we have no population explosion. We want to preserve our own territory. If there are those in Egypt, people like Sadat and those who worked with him, who are ready to give away Egyptian and other Arab territory, the Libyan leadership and the Libyan people are not ready to act similarly, in such a shameful manner, but we are determined to protect Libyan territory and to help our Arab and African brothers to defend their territories.

173. Egypt, the Egypt of Nasser, and its great people played a great role in the liberation of the third world. It faced up to imperialism and imperialist bases. Unfortunately, the situation today is different. Egypt is a base for aggression against Arabs; it is allied with the United States; it is the enemy of the Arabs, Muslims and Africans and of the liberation movement of the third world.

174. The United States claims to be interested in Egypt. It destroyed the Egyptian army and Egyptian schools with arms given to the racist régime in Palestine. It supports the régime in South Africa, which is committing aggression against the front-line States; it is sustaining and protecting South Africa in its attacks on Angola, Mozambique and other States.

175. We know why Egypt, that is, the Egyptian régime—because Egypt is a great country that plays a great role and has been in the lead of Arabs for a long time—is interested in Habré. The answer is very simple. Habré supports the Camp David accords and is prepared to establish relations with Israel. The Egyptian régime finds itself in an awkward situation in the Arab and Islamic world, and it must therefore use all possible means to find régimes which might follow its own path.

176. I do not wish to respond to my colleague from the Ivory Coast, whose country faces major difficulties. Its President received promises of assistance from the American Administration if he takes up an anti-Libyan position, and in particular a position against Colonel Qaddafi who, as we know, is Mr. Reagan's enemy number one.

177. In concluding my statement, I should like to say that we are greatly concerned about the peace and security of Chad. Chad is a neighbour of Libya, and the Chad and Libyan peoples have bonds of blood, bonds forged in their common struggle. We should like there to be peace in Chad. Without peace we shall see imperialist forces arrive very close to our borders in the south. We are prepared to co-operate and enter into dialogue with any legitimate Government in Chad, and we are prepared to co-operate with Chad and with other countries in economic development and to act for Chad's well-being, if those countries themselves wish Chad's well-being.

178. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council has heard the statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. He had asked to exercise his right of reply, and I granted him that right. That being so, I must, in my capacity as President of the Council, refer to the Council's records, and particularly to the statement made on 6 April by the Council's President on behalf of the members of the Council [*S/15688*]. That statement, the terms of which are surely remembered by all the members of the Council, is one in which the Council indicates that it had heard the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It is a statement in which the Council gives its

opinion about the dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and in which the Council refers to both parties—Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

179. In my capacity as President of the Council, and in keeping with the text adopted by the Council, I cannot fail to reply to the statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya about the legitimacy and the very existence of the Government of Chad.

180. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The Libyan representative had difficulty in refuting the arguments put forward by the delegation of Zaire on the specific question before us. He tried to look through the papers and quote some writers. Finally he said that Zaire collaborated with South Africa. Does he have proof? When we are speaking about South Africa, what about Libyan oil going there via third parties?

181. I know that the Libyan representative is a great champion of his country's interventionist policy. It is his right. But is the distribution of Zairian property of any concern to Libya? Has Zaire asked Libya to come and tell us how to distribute our material goods?

182. Is the presence of my President in the United States Libya's problem? To speak of such matters is indeed interference in the internal affairs of a country. To speak of the visit of a head of State to a friendly country is interference. Are we here to consider the presence of our President in the United States or to consider the matter of the Libyan aggression against the territory of Chad?

183. Do not members of the Council believe that for the Libyan representative to speak of the foreign or domestic policy of Zaire is interference in the affairs of my country? The question that we are considering here is Libyan aggression against Chad. Let the Libyan representative speak. Let him refute the arguments which the delegation of Zaire put forward here.

184. Zairian troops are present in Chad at the request of the N'Djamena Government. Can the Libyan representative tell me that the presence of the Libyan troops in Chad is at the request of the N'Djamena Government? Since he will deny their presence, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad has shown us photographs. The Libyan representative has come to tell us that Libya is not intervening. What about the pictures?

185. I know that everything that we have said has gone straight to the heart of our Libyan friend. I know that all these matters are things that he will not be able to refute. He has spoken about events that are happening in my country. Why are we not giving assistance to the front-line States attacked by South Africa? Has he himself already sent troops there? Has he organized an Islamic army or legion to liberate Namibia?

186. If the legitimate Governments of the front-line States request it of Zaire, we should certainly not fail quite legitimately to help those countries, as we are helping Chad, and as other friendly countries have helped us when we have had difficulties.

187. I reserve my right to speak again on another occasion.

188. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): This morning, in our informal consultations, it was agreed that we would stop the debate on the complaint of the Government of Chad at 6 p.m. I think that under the circumstances it would be appropriate to hold to what we said. We could then, as agreed, immediately proceed to take up the complaint of Libya, it being understood that the debate on the complaint by Chad would be resumed tomorrow, 12 August, at 10.30 a.m.

189. I call on the representative of Chad, though just for one minute. I think we must stick to the arrangements we have agreed upon.

190. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be brief. The Libyan representative has shown the Council how many arguments he has. He has indulged in an exercise that has, I think—at least this is the impression of my delegation—put the members of the Council to sleep. He has given confused arguments, citing newspaper articles in an effort to prove that his country is not intervening in Chad. I do not think the members of the Council have been fooled.

191. As is apparent, the Libyan representative has not even denied that a Libyan aircraft was shot down by the armed forces of Chad and that its pilot was captured and made a statement that we shall make available to the members of the Council in a Council document.[4]

192. As regards the sending of a fact-finding mission to Chad, I should simply like to observe that the Government of Chad has never refused such a mission. I shall hold to that.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

NOTES

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 479, No. 6947.
[2] A/32/310, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.108 (XIV).
[3] A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Rev.106 (XIX).
[4] Subsequently issued under the symbol S/15928.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经销处均有发售。请向书店查询或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—August 1991—2,050

S/PV.
2464

READEX
FICHE

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2464th MEETING: 11 AUGUST 1983

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2464)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 8 August 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15914)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2464th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 11 August 1983, at 6.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2464)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Letter dated 8 August 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15914)

The meeting was called to order at 6.55 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 8 August 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15914)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cuba, Democratic Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In keeping with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took a place at the Council table; Mr. García Iturbe (Cuba), Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council is meeting today in response to the request made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Council in a letter dated 8 August.

3. Members of the Council also have before them the following documents: S/15912, containing the text of a letter dated 6 August from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Council; S/15913, containing the text of a letter dated 8 August from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General; S/15919 and S/15920, containing the texts of two letters dated 10 August from the representative of the United States to the President of the Council.

4. Members of the Council have received photocopies of a letter dated 11 August from the representative of the Sudan to the President of the Council. The text of this letter will be distributed tomorrow as document S/15921.

5. The first speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on whom I now call.

6. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, I wish at the outset to express to you, and through you to the other members of the Council, our thanks for the prompt response to our request for the convening of the Council. There is no doubt that this prompt response clearly indicates the Council's desire to discharge its responsibilities concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. In a message conveyed by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Leader of the victorious Revolution of glorious September, addressed to the President of the Council and the Secretary-General, he indicated the threats posed to international peace and security, as well as the reasons for convening a meeting of the Council [*see S/15912*]. He informed the President of the Council that international security was faced by a threat of the utmost gravity in the Arab region and Africa as a result of the landing of United States forces of all kinds in these areas, some of them taking place on Libya's borders; and that the landing of those forces presents a direct threat to the security of Libya, which is compelled to defend itself from the threat posed by the landing by sea and by air of American forces on its borders.

8. The Leader of the revolution added:

> "I wish to inform you that the responsibility for any breakdown of international security in this region as a result of that landing lies entirely with the Government

of the United States, and consequently with the Security Council, if it does not intervene to compel the Government in question to halt this large-scale troop landing, which threatens security in this extremely sensitive and troubled region.

"I request the Security Council to take all measures consistent with its responsibilities for safeguarding the security of States Members of the United Nations and also peace and security in the region." [*ibid.*]

9. As representatives know, the Council met last February [*2416th meeting*] when it was acquainted with United States aggressive intentions and provocations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. We had hoped that the United States Administration would change its conduct and cease its provocations and violations of Libya's territorial sovereignty and allow the Libyan people to live in peace and build its country in security like any other nation. But the United States Administration, which is driven by a lust for power, still believes that military power is enough to frustrate the will of the people and change the political systems in the smaller countries which oppose its policy, reject the domination of its hegemony, pursue a free policy and observe the principles of non-alignment. Thus the United States Administration has persisted in its aggressive policy against Libya and escalated the tension in the area, using all means and designs in order to create the pretexts it believes necessary to attack the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

10. The United States has been an enemy of Libya since the 1969 revolution in Libya. The reasons for this enmity are crystal clear. Libya pursues a non-aligned policy, and the United States wants it to be one of the puppet régimes, under its hegemony, as was the case before the revolution. Libya dismantled the American bases that were on its soil, and the United States wants to restore those bases to use them in acts of aggression against the neighbouring countries, as it did in 1967 when American aircraft took off from Willis Air Base to attack Nasser's Egypt and help the Zionist entity in its aggression against the Arab countries, as well as support the racist régime in South Africa and provide it with weapons from those bases.

11. Libya nationalized the oil companies and put an end to the American monopolies; it liberated its economy. But the United States does not want it to control the main resources of its economy so that the United States may continue its enslavement of our country and keep it linked to the will of American imperialism. Libya stands by countries under colonial and racist domination and supports their liberation movements, as in the cases of the peoples of Palestine, Namibia and South Africa. The United States supports the two racist régimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv. It considers them its allies, and that is the reason it can never support the policy of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and its support of freedom.

12. Therefore, Libya has been the object of virulent media campaigns and a series of direct and indirect threats and provocations and aggression. We have given details of those acts in the United Nations, in addition to our statement before the Council on 22 February [*2415th meeting*]. There is no need to go over those details. It is enough to indicate here that after that date we conveyed a letter on 10 May to the President of the Council concerning the aggressive and provocative acts of the United States Administration [*S/15755*]. I should like to point out briefly that the United States aggressive policy against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been embodied in concrete acts since 1972, as follows.

13. Since 1972 the United States has refused to enter into a dialogue and to establish normal diplomatic relations with Libya. Since 1973 American aircraft have so far violated Libyan airspace 336 times, 174 of them during the past months; 158 violations took place after the meetings of the Council last February. It seems that the United States is in complete accord with the international community! In 1974 the United States stopped the delivery of eight C-130 aircraft despite the fact that they had been paid for. In January 1977, the United States Defense Department added Libya to the list of enemies of the United States of America. In 1978 the United States launched an undeclared economic war and froze the civil Boeing aircraft deal which was about to be concluded with the Libyan Arab Airlines. In the period 27 to 30 July 1978, the United States Sixth Fleet conducted provocative manoeuvres near the Libyan coast. On 22 April 1979, a United States jet fighter intercepted a civil Libyan aeroplane which was on a regular flight between Benghazi and Damascus. On 8 August the United States Sixth Fleet conducted further provocative manoeuvres near Libyan territorial waters. In May 1980, espionage cells spying on the Jamahiriya were discovered.

14. Since 1981 there has been an intensification of the inimical media campaign against the Jamahiriya. In May United States authorities closed the Libyan People's Office in Washington and expelled all those who worked there. On 3 July, the plot hatched by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assassinate Colonel Qaddafi, the Leader of the Libyan Revolution, was unveiled. On 19 August, United States aircraft violated Libyan airspace and engaged in a skirmish with two Libyan aircraft that were on a regular flight. Also, the aircraft-carrier *Nimitz* entered the territorial waters in the Gulf of Sidra. Since August pressure has been brought to bear on American oil companies to stop their operations in Libya. On 18 September, the United States Administration prohibited the completion of American spare parts for the maintenance of civil aviation in Libya. On 10 December, the United States Administration advised all Americans to leave Libya and prohibited American citizens from travelling to Libya with a view to preventing Libya from exporting oil and, consequently, undermining its economy.

15. On 10 March 1982, the United States Administration prohibited the importation of Libyan oil and the exportation of spare parts and technical equipment used in the oil industry in Libya. On 26 March, exportation of all equipment and technical devices to Libya was prohibited.

16. On 16 February 1983, the United States Administration sent four AWACS aircraft to Egypt and moved the aircraft-carrier *Nimitz* to the Libyan coast. On 18 Febru-

ary, the *Nimitz* jammed radio broadcasts inside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and obstructed civil wireless communications. On 18 March, the American Administration enacted legislation preventing Libyan students from studying nuclear energy or aviation in the United States. And just yesterday, nine Libyan students were arrested in Miami and put in jail by the American authorities. On 31 January, American fighter jets intercepted a Libyan aeroplane on a regular flight from Greece to Libya. The Rapid Deployment Forces are at present conducting manoeuvres in two countries neighbouring on Libya; and we already stated our views with regard to those manoeuvres, along with a number of other States, in document S/15872 of 18 July.

17. All that is from the historical perspective. But what is the present situation? The United States is exploiting the civil war in Chad and has begun to send its troops and to concentrate them in three countries bordering on the Jamahiriya, as well as off its coast. These forces have in the last few days been sent in successive waves consisting of military aircraft, ships and spy planes, as well as aeroplanes capable of in-flight fuelling, all within the framework of preparing for aggression against the Jamahiriya under the camouflage of helping and protecting the rebel régime in Chad, claiming strategic interest in the region. The sophisticated military machinery being directed against Libya, which includes the aircraft-carrier *Eisenhower* and another ship carrying guided missiles and seven escort ships are now north-west of Benghazi, off the Libyan coast. A helicopter carrier is stationed south of the island of Crete, along with four other ships. Along the border between the Sudan and Libya there are at present two AWACS aircraft, 16 F-15 jet fighters and 4 tanker aircraft for refuelling in the air, as well as Y-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The strategic American reconnaissance planes are conducting military missions, and two of them are engaged in continuous 24-hour-per-day operations along the Libyan-Egyptian-Sudanese-Chadian borders. One of these planes takes off from an Egyptian airbase while the other takes off from Sudanese territory. Four reconnaissance aircraft fly continuously over the Libyan coasttwo of them are based in Greece, one in Cyprus and the fourth in Egypt.

18. As for the American aircraft stationed in Egypt, there are two AWACS and six airborne refuelling aircraft, as well as 24 F-16s and 40 military helicopters. One C-135 began flying aggressive missions aimed at monitoring movements in Chad from Sudanese territory. A satellite station has been placed in N'Djamena, as well as missile platforms furnished by the United States to the rebel Habré in N'Djamena near the Sudanese border.

19. The United States persists in bringing pressure to bear on Egypt and the Sudan to compel them to send their troops to Chad. The United States has sent a group of transport aircraft to Zaire to transfer more of that country's troops to Chad to fight alongside the rebel Hissein Habré and possibly to play a part in the American conspiracy and aggression against the Jamahiriya.

20. The United States has reneged on all its international responsibilities as a major Power and a permanent member of the Security Council, and it has begun to engage in and lead international terrorism, as well as to commit acts of piracy and terrorism as a day-to-day policy. The deployment and spread of American bases and the American fleet throughout the world has but one aim—that of intimidating peoples and protecting imperialist monopolies, as well as to protect racist régimes, strangle liberation movements and fight against nationalist régimes.

21. The actions being taken by the United States confirm the gravity of the American policy, a terrorist policy aimed against international peace and security and the freedom and independence of peoples. The sending of such troops to Africa and the increase of its naval flotilla off the Libyan coast is a direct threat to the security and sovereignty of the people of Libya. On 5 August, we sent a letter to the President of the Security Council setting forth our point of view [*see S/15910*].

22. I cannot fail at this juncture to draw the attention of the Council once again to the serious situation that has resulted from the intensification by the American Administration of tension both in the Mediterranean and in Africa through its official statements, which are of a threatening nature, as well as through the sending of units of the Sixth Fleet to the waters off the coast of Libya and of advisers and military equipment to Chad, not to mention the AWACS planes to neighbouring countries of Libya with a view to monitoring Libyan airspace.

23. That policy and the practices being pursued by the American Administration confirm the fixed aggressive intentions of that Government against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, intentions that we have drawn attention to in the past.

24. The American provocations and threats directed against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and other peoples in the world are part of the American strategy of intervention in the affairs of independent States which refuse to yield to the policies and colonial interests of that country and that reject racism, monopoly and hegemony.

25. Such aggressive practices are violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, especially the principles prohibiting the use or threat of force and calling for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States and recognition of the rights of people freely to choose their political, economic and social systems. They are also a violation of United Nations resolutions aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation.

26. The continuation of such practices on the part of the American Administration constitutes a source of aggression, intervention and instability in many parts of the world. It is also support of the racist régimes in Palestine and southern Africa against the interests of the Arab and African peoples. Libya is now alerting the international community of the threats being posed to it and to the

security and peace of its people, and the gravity of the situation in the Mediterranean and Africa and is thus drawing attention to the danger to international peace and security inherent in that policy.

27. The claims of protecting interests on which the American intervention is based have made many countries of the world subject to American provocations, aggression and intervention in their internal affairs. The United States has arrogated to itself the right to act as international policeman and has assumed the right, through its troops, military bases and agents to dominate the world and usurp the competence of the Security Council and to immobilize it by resorting to the exercise of its right of veto against draft resolutions aimed at protecting the rights of people. It thus flouts the will of the international community and stands beside the racist and imperialist régimes. It has exercised its veto power more than 30 times against the causes of various peoples.

28. This is sufficient. I shall not delve into the American conspiracies and aggressive acts in different parts of the world, especially in Central America. It is sufficient to mention what it does against Nicaragua, Cuba and Grenada. We mentioned something to this effect at last February's meeting.

29. We are a small, peaceful, non-aligned people. We work at building our country. We want peace for ourselves and security for ourselves and other peoples. The people of Libya, which liberated its country from the American and British bases, liberated its economy and achieved mammoth development progress, wishes to have relations based on mutual respect and non-intervention with all nations, including the United States. We have tried to enter into dialogue with the United States, and we are still ready to do so, and to consider any present problems, if there are any, with the American Administration. But that Administration continually refuses the policy of dialogue and insists on the policy of dependence, putting us in the position of puppets, which we refuse. I wish to confirm that the Libyan people will protect its freedom, sovereignty and achievements, whatever the circumstances and whatever the sacrifices, and will never be intimidated by the aircraft carriers or the AWACS aircraft on its borders.

30. In conclusion, I should like to say that the Security Council must discharge its responsibilities in full and condemn the American provocations and put an end to them if it really wishes to preserve the prestige of the United Nations and its reputation as a means of maintaining peace and security in the world.

31. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): At the outset, I must comment on the dramatic and revealing contrast between the dignified and compelling presentation that we heard earlier today from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, addressing a real and urgent issue of international peace and security, and the combination of fabrications and irrelevances that we have just heard from the representative of Libya.

32. The Council today is confronted with a most grave threat to international peace and security and a brazen, contemptuous challenge to the bedrock principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This threat and this challenge come primarily from one source—and let there be no doubt on this score. Libya is engaged in open, flagrant, unprovoked aggression against the legitimate Government of the sovereign nation of Chad. Libyan ground and air forces have invaded Chad. These forces, with Libyan tanks, Libyan aircraft and Libyan artillery, attacked and overwhelmed the key military outpost of Faya-Largeau. That town has been subjected to vicious bombardment by Libyan war planes manned by Libyan pilots—indiscriminate bombardment with napalm and high explosives on civilian as well as military targets.

33. This is Libya's war. It is Libya that is guilty of aggression. It is Libya that stands in contemptuous disregard of its obligations under the Charter. And one more basic fact must be confronted: in this assault on the very concept of non-use of force in reconciliation of differences between States, the outlaw régime of Muammar Qaddafi is supported, supplied and encouraged by a permanent member of the Council, the Soviet Union.

34. And now the Soviet Union joins Libya in an attempt to obfuscate the clear issue we have been confronting—the fact of Libyan aggression against Chad—with a smokescreen of patently diversionary countercharges. They—Libya and the Soviets—allege United States intervention, United States interference, in the affairs of African nations. And so it is necessary, as a first order of business, to sort out these various issues, even as we keep our principal focus on the overriding issue of Libyan expansionism.

35. One of the peripheral issues injected into the debate as a deliberate diversion is that of joint training exercises in the Middle East in which United States forces will be engaged along with those of several other nations—even, I might note, as the Soviets and Libyans engage in such exercises, as recently, indeed, as 30 June to 4 July of this year. These exercises have absolutely nothing to do with the events we confront in Chad, as the Libyans and Soviets know perfectly well, and as the United States Government made perfectly clear in a letter of 22 July addressed to the President of the Council [*S/15887*], and reiterated in its letter dated 10 August [S/15919]. I quote from that letter:

> "The purposes and scope of these joint exercises are clearly set forth in my letter of 22 July [*S/15887*] to you, and in advance announcements by several of the Governments whose forces are participating in the exercises. These training exercises threaten no one, are wholly defensive in nature, do not involve contested land or sea space and are entirely consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
>
> "The United States unequivocally states that the exercises pose no threat to the security of any country in Africa and the Middle Eastern region and that the exercises are not a response to any other situation or activity which may be taking place in any neighbouring country or countries.

"These exercises were scheduled and planned before Libya launched its invasion of Chad with ground and air forces. No amount of obfuscation on the part of Libya can disguise the fact that Libyan conspiracies, threats, and aggressions against its neighbours—now graphically demonstrated by Libyan armoured battalions and warplanes operating deep within the territory of Chad—have upset the peace and security of the region."

36. A second issue intended simply and solely to divert attention from Libyan aggression is that of alleged United States intervention in northern Africa, as charged in a tandem of complaints by Libya and the Soviet Union earlier this week [*S/15910 and S/15913, annex*]. The United States Government has also replied to these utter fabrications in a letter to the President of the Council dated 10 August [*S/15920*], from which I wish to quote:

"The statements contained in these two letters are clearly designed to divert attention from the fact that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya itself bears the primary responsibility for tension and conflict in Chad and the surrounding area. It has been conclusively demonstrated that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is engaged in the unlawful use of armed force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Chad. Over an extended period, aircraft of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have conducted an intensive campaign of bombing cities in Chad using incendiary as well as conventional bombs. Units of the Libyan Army have penetrated deeply into Chad and are now engaged in offensive military action against the armed forces of Chad.

"These Libyan forces have been equipped by the Soviet Union with highly sophisticated military equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles and artillery, which is being used against military targets and civilian population in Chad.

"The United States and other concerned countries have responded to this unlawful use of force. At the request of the Government of Chad, a country with a very limited and purely defensive military capability, the United States has provided logistical support and assistance in monitoring the situation to aid Chad in its struggle to defend itself against the unprovoked acts of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Council should be aware that we are dealing with a case of aggression by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which constitutes a major threat to the peace and security of the region.

"All of the actions of the United States have been designed to assist the Government of Chad to exercise its inherent right of self-defence. These actions are wholly consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations."

37. Now let us return to the realm of harsh reality: to the factual record of Libyan aggression against Chad, which is and must remain our primary focus today, as it also constitutes the sole present threat in that region to peace and security.

38. On 24 June, Libyan-supported rebel forces led by Goukouni Weddey captured the key outpost of Faya-Largeau from the army of Chad, led by its President, Hissein Habré. The town of Abéché fell to rebel forces on 8 July. But then, to Libya's apparent consternation, the army of Chad recaptured Faya-Largeau on 30 July, as it had re-taken Abéché on 12 July; and it was this dramatic turnabout that sparked a sudden escalation of Libyan involvement in Chad, which was extensive before that battle and which has been critical to the insurgents all along. Indeed, since August of last year, Libya had been building up the insurgent forces of Goukouni, principally at a training base at the town of Sebha in Libya.

39. Elements of 15 Libyan battalions have been active in northern Chad, going back to last August. These include commando, mechanized infantry, armed reconnaissance, artillery and tank battalions. The artillery that was used with such devastating effect in June in the battle of Faya-Largeau, for example, was manned by Libyans.

40. The insurgents have been massively armed with new and sophisticated Soviet equipment by Libya. Almost everything the insurgents have, from heavy artillery to shoes to food, has been provided by Libya.

41. Insurgent administration, logistics and operational planning have all been under the authority of the Libyan commander at Sebha.

42. During the last two weeks in July, just before the recapture by the armed forces of Chad of Faya-Largeau, several Libyan units were dispatched to Ounianga Kébir and Ogoui, both located in northern Chad, but well to the south of the contested Aouzou Strip—in the territory of Chad, that is to say, even by Libya's own definition—to permit the insurgents, with Libyan advisors, to concentrate on Faya-Largeau. Libyan transport aircraft in this period made daily flights to Faya-Largeau with arms and supplies. But at this point in the campaign Libya had not yet committed major ground forces on a scale comparable to the 7,000 to 9,000 Libyan troops sent to Chad in 1980 and then withdrawn in 1981. Apparently the Libyans thought Goukouni would win without them.

43. The immediate Libyan reaction to the re-taking of Faya-Largeau on 30 July was bombing raids on Faya, using Soviet-supplied SU-22 ground-attack aircraft from the Libyan airbase near the town of Aouzou in the Aouzou Strip. On this day, 30 July, there was a squadron of SU-22s at the Aouzou airbase, as well as several SF-260 attack aircraft and Soviet-supplied MI-24 attack helicopters. In the initial attack the SU-22s used napalm, cluster bombs and high-explosive bombs and concentrated their attacks on the centre of Faya-Largeau. There were comparable air attacks virtually every day after 30 July until Faya-Largeau fell on 10 August.

44. On 1 August, SF-260 attack planes and MI-24s were moved to airfields at Ounianga Kébir and Ogoui in northern Chad, much closer to the front. During the night of 1-2 August, two Mirage F-1s flew sorties over Faya-

Largeau, dropping both napalm and high-explosive bombs.

45. The attacks continued throughout this first week of August, carried out by SU-22s, TU-22s and, for night-time raids, Mirage F-1s. During the night of 2-3 August, three F-1s were employed, and on the night of 3-4 August four F-1s. The first wave of SU-22s at dawn on 3 August dropped no fewer than 48 bombs, and on that same day the Chad Government forces brought down their first SU-22, whose Libyan pilot was captured and has since confirmed that the air attacks, using napalm, were carried out by Libyan planes, flown by Libyan pilots, operating under Libyan command.

46. Meanwhile, at the Sebha and Kufra barracks in southern Libya, artillery and armoured convoys were formed and began moving into Chad. An entire Libyan mechanized infantry battalion was sent to Ogoui on 31 July, and another had arrived there by 4 August, with more than 30 armoured personnel carriers and both T-54 and T-55 tanks. As we meet here today, upwards of 2,500 or 3,000 Libyan troops have overwhelmed, and now occupy, Faya-Largeau in this Libyan war against its neighbour, Chad.

47. These are the plain, grim, undeniable facts. They constitute the tangible scenario of open and unprovoked Libyan aggression that mocks the Charter of the United Nations, and the message seems clear to my Government: if that aggression is permitted to go unpunished, then the Council will be revealed as impotent and Qaddafi's brutal "new colonialism" will threaten even more urgently the security of northern and north-central Africa.

48. Nor, indeed, should any of this come as a surprise to us. The pattern of Libyan expansionism, Libyan aggression, Libyan misconduct—in Africa and far beyond—is long-standing.

49. Colonel Qaddafi conducts a virulent, hostile foreign policy which respects the territorial integrity, national independence, right to peace and security and self-determination of no one. Along with offensive military power—arrayed, as in Chad, against the powerless and the impoverished—Qaddafi pursues his expansionist goals through a combination of economic and military aid to radical Governments around the world; bribery of officials; help to international terrorists by providing sanctuary, funds, weapons and operational planning; assassination of exiled opponents and the planned assassination of the officials of target Governments; and assistance to guerrilla groups working to overthrow established Governments.

50. The Qaddafi régime has been engaged in all these activities almost since it took power. In 1972, for example, Libya provided sanctuary to the perpetrators of the Munich Olympics murders. Qaddafi also gave refuge to the terrorists who took hostages at the meeting held at Vienna in 1975 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Libya has consistently been used as a safe haven in which terrorists have planned their campaigns for many European capitals. The infamous "Carlos" has operated out of Libya for several years. The weapons found on the French terrorists Breguet and Kopp had been sold originally to the Libyan army. It was their release that Carlos demanded.

51. Assassination has been an important Libyan tool, and the proof of Libya's utilization of this tool is not hard to come by. The murders in 1980 and 1981 of a dozen Libyan exiles, primarily in Western European capitals, have been reported in detail in the international press. Less widely known are a 1975 plot to murder the prime minister of a neighbouring country; plans to kill United States ambassadors in several Middle Eastern countries and in at least one European capital; and a November 1981 attempt to plant explosives in the American Embassy Club in Khartoum, explosives concealed in stereo speakers and designed to detonate on a Saturday evening when scores of people would have been present and killed.

52. A major facet of Libyan foreign policy has been and remains subversion and destabilization of independent Governments in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Chad has, of course, been a principal victim as it is the victim today—but Libyan aggression against Chad is but one element of a clearly systematic pattern. In the Horn of Africa, in the Sudan and Somalia, Libya works to overthrow the Governments. In February of this year, the Sudan uncovered a Libyan-backed coup plot against the Government of President Gaafar Nimeiri and, just in time, apprehended Libyan-sponsored insurgents and infiltrators. As all of us will recall, the Council met in urgent session last February [*2415th to 2418th meetings*] to consider that Libyan plot—fortunately an unsuccessful one. But the effort continues: Libyan "advisers" continue to train Somali and Sudanese guerrillas; Libya supplies arms, ammunition, explosives and other material to the Somali Salvation Front and to Sudanese rebels. Libya's delivery of increasingly sophisticated weapons to warring tribes in the Sudan has contributed to death and violence in that region.

53. Elsewhere, even in the Western Hemisphere, Libya delivers military equipment to guerrilla groups and to military dictatorships—always in opposition to democratic régimes to established Governments.

54. This is the pattern of Libyan misconduct, worldwide. It constitutes, as I have said, a most grave threat to international peace and security, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, of every norm of rational, civilized behaviour. The culprit in this proceeding is identified beyond any reasonable doubt or question.

55. What then is to be done? The immediate, urgent requirements are simple enough to state. First, the unprovoked, flagrant aggression of Libya must be labelled for what it is: a direct challenge to the Charter and a grave threat to international peace and security. Secondly, there must be an end—now, today—to this latest in the long-standing pattern of Libyan lawlessness, by whatever

appropriate means are available to the Government of Chad and to those nations in Africa and elsewhere which have responded to that Government's appeal for help.

56. With an end to Libyan aggression, the enduring problems of that embattled nation can be addressed in a reasonable way, in a spirit of reconciliation that will promote international peace and security.

57. With an end to Libyan aggression all things are possible. As long as this lawless behaviour continues, it must be condemned and it must and will be vigorously opposed.

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. AL-ATASSI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation has already had an opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month, when this important organ has shouldered the responsibilities entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations in reviewing the situation in the occupied Arab territories and the practices of the Zionist racist entity as a result of the criminal attack perpetrated by Zionist settlers against the students of the Islamic University of Al-Khalil. As representatives will recall, the Council's work ended in failure owing to the negative vote of a super-Power, the United States. On this occasion I repeat my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, a true son of France, which is linked to my country by ties of friendship and affection.

60. I wish also to express to the representative of China my own admiration and that of my delegation for the wise and able manner in which he guided the Council's work last month.

61. Today the Council is meeting at the urgent request of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which believes there is a threat against its national security and its sovereignty over its lands and resources, and its people with death and annihilation, by a super-Power, a permanent member of the Security Council, a State which claims to have great responsibilities, including responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. That State is the United States.

62. It is truly natural and right that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should feel endangered. The series of events justifies its recourse to the Council. The intensive military manoeuvres to train American soldiers in desert fighting—training being carried out by the United States with its friends and allies on the eastern borders of Libya—and its sending of AWACS spy planes over Libyan territory in themselves pose a great threat to the people of the African continent and to the Arab people as a whole and, indeed, to international peace and security.

63. The United States Administration's recent accusation against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of intervention in the internal affairs of Chad is paving the way for sending more AWACS spy planes and F-15 fighter aircraft and increased military assistance to Chad in an attempt to tighten the vise around this young Libyan Revolution.

64. The United States realizes fully that its accusation against Libya of intervention in Chad is transparent and based on no firm facts. The United States of America is not unaware that the situation in Chad has been the same for approximately 18 years without Libya having interfered at all in the situation. The United States cannot deny that it knows that foreign forces are present in Chad; rather, it blesses those forces. Their presence will only fuel the fires in that country, which has many ties with my country. The fact that the United States of America has sent military experts to Chad is an overt, flagrant challenge to the OAU, which is still in control of the situation and exerting all possible efforts to find the appropriate African solution to the situation in Chad. The United States is not deaf to or unaware of all those facts. Instead it deliberately ignores them so as to find justification for escalating its virulent campaign against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, that young State which has chosen the path of revolution and steadfastness in the face of the Zionists' imperialist designs.

65. If the United States were truly willing to maintain international peace and security, it would have been more appropriate for it—instead of accusing Libya of endangering international peace and security—to use such language in the case of Israel when that country invaded Lebanon in the summer of last year. It would have been more appropriate to use such language in respect of Israel when it annexed Jerusalem. It would have been more appropriate to use such language when Israel annexed the Syrian Golan Heights. Unfortunately, the United States of America did not consider those Israeli acts as any threat to international peace and security. It did not send AWACS spy aircraft. It did not send F-15 aircraft. Nor did it send American military advisers to assist those States which fell victim to Israeli aggression. That would be an exception to the rule, since Israel is the favoured strategic ally of the United States, the guardian of American interests in the area.

66. My delegation believes that the rancour of the United States against the Libyan Revolution has been lurking since its inception on 1 September 1969. The first achievement of the Revolution was the elimination of foreign military bases from all its territory and, more importantly, the maritime Willis Air Base in the Libyan Capital of Tripoli. I had the honour of serving in Tripoli as a representative of my country when the Libyan Revolution took place. I assure the members of the Council that the Libyan people, who were forbidden even to approach the walls of the American base, had many stories to tell about the huge base and its role in the Zionist aggressive war against the Arab nation in 1967. It was even said that the base was being visited by an Israeli official every week to co-ordinate and harmonize activities against the Arab nation.

67. We would need many words and long speeches were we to list all of the factors that led American imperialism to escalate its campaign against the young Libyan revolution. The United States is against every revolution in the world. It is against the aspirations of all peoples to build their future for themselves with their own resources. The United States feels that its interests are threatened and it does not hesitate to employ a policy of oppression and of injustice and even of threats of aggression against all revolutions throughout the world. How otherwise can one explain the presence of the American fleet in Central America? Is it for pleasure, or for fishing, or is it rather to flex its muscles in the face of the Sandinist Nicaraguan revolution and to attempt to strike at that revolution both from within and without? How otherwise can one explain the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, if not to strike at the Libyan Revolution and other Arab revolutions and to support the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine? Has there not been an American attempt to strike at the Iranian revolution from American bases and ships in the region? It is truly paradoxical that the United States should be the country to carry out all those acts while it is a Permanent Member of the Security Council, and claims to defend international peace and security when in fact it is threatening international peace and security.

68. The Syrian Arab Republic shares Libya's concern at the American provocations. Syria considers itself to be in the same boat as Libya in the struggle for independence and sovereignty. It has been written that we are to take the difficult path, the path of struggle, for this is the path of dignity, instead of the easier path, the path of capitulation, defeatism and humiliation as set forth in the Camp David accords. American threats against Libya and the military manoeuvres being carried out on the borders of Libya, as well as the many names and denominations being brought into play—Rapid Deployment Forces, American Strategic Alliance, "Bright Star-83"—all motivate our Arab people to renew their commitment to fight on to victory. Viet Nam is an example that is still remembered.

69. We hope that the Council will be able to prove its credibility before all the peoples of the world. We hope that it will demonstrate its independence and its commitment to the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that it will lift the threat and injustice from the shoulders of the oppressed peoples. The Articles of the Charter are clear to all who attempt to pose a threat to international peace and security.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Democratic Yemen. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

71. Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It gives me great pleasure at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for this month. We are confident that your well-known wisdom and abilities will contribute to the success of the Council's deliberations. I should also like to pay a tribute to the wise guidance of your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing of the People's Republic of China, during his term as President last month.

72. The resentment of the international community with regard to the provocative policies and practices of the United States is increasing; those policies and practices are creating hotbeds of tension and entail threats of the use of force in order to prevail and of intervention in the internal affairs of peoples and States throughout the world, especially those States that have opted for an independent economic and social system. Those policies being pursued by the American Administration are in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles of international law and pose a threat to international peace and security.

73. In order to achieve its strategic aims of dominating the natural resources and plundering the wealth of the peoples of the world, the United States has invoked the pretext of its security, even at distances of thousands of miles. It has no qualms about resorting to the threat or use of force against nationalistic, progressive States, as well as against liberation movements resolved to confront its conspiratorial and aggressive policies.

74. On the pretext of security and national interest the American Administration has engaged in a series of military provocations and threats against many States in the Middle East, the Far East, Africa and Latin America, aimed at extending American influence and at compromising the freedom and independence of peoples that long for peace and stability. In Central America, Nicaragua, that peaceful country in the process of building its new society amidst unfavourable economic circumstances, is being subjected to every sort of provocation and threat, as well as to military, political and economic pressures on the part of the United States, culminating in the sending of the American fleet to the Nicaraguan coasts in an operation fraught with the threat to employ force against the Sandinist Revolution. The Council has witnessed broad-based denunciations by the international community against these aggressive acts.

75. Today the Council, for the second time in less than six months, is seized of the complaint of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against American provocations that are jeopardizing its security and sovereignty—provocations that have been brought to a grave stage by the sending of American *matériel* and equipment, including AWACS spy planes and F-15 fighters, to the countries neighbouring the Jamahiriya. Equally provocative has been the United States admission that it does spy on Libyan territory and that it is doubling its military assistance to Chad, which now amounts to $25 million, in its attempt to escalate the civil war now raging in that country. All this is being done in order that the United States can have a pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of African States.

76. These foolhardy provocations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are but one manifestation of the aggressive policy pursued by the American Administration in the Arab area in particular and in other parts of the world

generally. It is not a pure coincidence that the American provocations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya occur at the same time as the military manoeuvres conducted by the American forces in collaboration with the United States' agents in the area since the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Forces, for which the United States set up a military command in the Middle East. One of these exercises will take place near the coast of Democratic Yemen.

77. Democratic Yemen has more than once drawn attention to the gravity of the American goals and the provocative actions of the United States aimed at returning our area to the era of direct colonialism, hegemony and imperialist domination over the destiny and riches of the peoples of the area.

78. Democratic Yemen, together with other concerned countries, sent the President of the Council a letter dated 18 July [*S/15872*], drawing the Council's attention to the fact that a major Power's conducting these manoeuvres poses a grave danger to the security and independence of the peoples of the area and is considered a direct intervention in their internal affairs. We also made it clear that these repeated provocative manoeuvres represent part of the American policy based on aggression and intervention in the affairs of other States, and that the United States thereby proves that it has abandoned its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council, foremost among whose tasks is the maintenance of international peace and security.

79. Democratic Yemen regards the conducting of such manoeuvres near its territories as a threat to its security and stability as well as to the security and stability of the whole area. It also draws attention to the fact that the goals of these manoeuvres go beyond the flexing of muscles. They become a direct threat not only to Democratic Yemen but to many of the other countries of the Middle East and Africa, because of the aggressive designs of the United States, whose tentacles stretched as far as Lebanon, exposing Syria to threats of deliberate aggression, with the aim of shaking its steadfastness against imperialist as well as Zionist designs. This also exposes the Palestinian cause to the danger of total liquidation.

80. At the same time as denouncing the American provocations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Democratic Yemen declares its full support for, and solidarity with, the Libyan revolution in standing firm against these American provocations and threats, aimed at compromising the security, independence and sovereignty of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. They reveal aggressive intentions against Libya.

81. I wish to conclude my statement by reading the text of a telegram sent by President Ali Nasser Mohammed to his brother, Muammar Qaddafi:

> "We are following with deep concern the news of the escalation of the American aggressive provocation against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where fleets and American military aircraft violate the territorial waters and airspace of Libya, in contravention of all international laws and norms. This is an expression of its aggressive frantic intentions in preparation to launch a treacherous aggression against the Libyan Revolution, and is an attempt to force the brotherly Libyan people to retreat from its position that is nationalistic and inimical to imperialism and zionism. These aggressive acts, which are simultaneous with the provocative manoeuvres of the Rapid Deployment Forces on the territories of certain Arab countries, are but one new act in a series of attacks and conspiracies against the national liberation movement of the Arab world, and a serious challenge to the security, stability and progress of our entire Arab peoples. This is a matter that requires more resolve and steadfastness againt all the manifestations of the hostile, imperialist, Zionist activity.
>
> "We in Democratic Yemen, the Party, the people and the Government, reaffirm our unlimited support for the fraternal Libyan people in its confrontation with the American provocations in all their forms and in defending its territories and its territorial waters, and denounce the American circles' aggression in this respect. Moreover, we call upon Arab States and peoples and all the forces of liberation and peace in the world to stand by the fraternal Libyan people and to condemn the American aggressive intentions."

82. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Only six months ago, in February, the Council considered the item concerning provocations of the United States against Libya. Now the Council once again has to return to this item, since the situation in and around Libya is once again dangerously tense.

83. Major units of the American fleet, including two air-strike task forces, have been sent in haste towards the Libyan coast. United States military aircraft are daily carrying out provocative flights near the Libyan border, seeking a pretext for a military confrontation. American aircraft such as the AWACS spy plane are carrying out all kinds of reconnaissance deep in Libyan territory. Finally, in the territories of countries neighbouring on Libya or near it, major exercises have begun with the participation of American troops. The anti-Libyan nature of all of these manoeuvres is quite clear.

84. All of these militaristic preparations are accompanied by a systematic campaign of threats and intimidation waged by the American Administration against Libya and its leadership. Under various sorts of fallacious and trumped-up pretexts, the atmosphere of tension around Libya is being whipped up. The United States feels it can virtually give that sovereign State an ultimatum, dictating what policy it should pursue.

85. The question arises: does simple coincidence explain the fact that the United States is now involved in large-scale flexing of its military muscle both in the Middle East and in Central America? Is it mere happenstance that Washington applies virtually the same policy to Libya

and Nicaragua? We see the very same basic components and elements: open threats and blackmail, demonstrative emplacement of aircraft carriers and reconnaissance aircraft and so-called routine manoeuvres in areas adjacent to the borders of those two countries.

86. Logic and history have taught us that repeated phenomena often conceal a pattern. In this case it is the aggressive militaristic essence of the policy of the United States which from all the evidence has begun to consider holding sway in the countries of the third world with the help of the military fist and the big club. Libya and Nicaragua have today had to bear the brunt of imperialistic attack because those two small developing countries are pursuing an independent foreign policy and not asking for advice from Washington. Tomorrow any other non-aligned State whose policy for some reason does not suit the United States might also become a victim.

87. This is how serious the situation is. Events in and around Libya prove that what is involved is in essence an attempt by imperialist forces to achieve most dangerous neo-colonialist plans against developing States and against the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole.

88. Today we cannot but refer to specific pieces of information and the plans of the Pentagon and the CIA. They are still secret, but today we can point to facts that are known and form part of the preparations for these vile schemes. And that is what we intend to do.

89. The brain trusts in the United States have worked out these plans in good time. We can refer in particular to a study entitled "Collective Management" issued recently under the aegis of a well-known New York institution, the Council on Foreign Relations. There, quite clearly, is dependence on the collapse of such organizations of the third world as OPEC, the Group of 77, the OAU and even the Organization of American States if it escapes control by Washington. There are also frank attempts "to complete the elimination of 'third world' from the vocabulary of contemporary international relations".

90. Let us turn to other American sources. Let us take a recent publication of the Stanford Research Institute entitled "Seven Tomorrows". Of the seven versions of tomorrow chosen there for the possible developments over the next 10 to 15 years—the 1980s and the 1990s—two versions provide for the economic recolonization by the United States of States that have freed themselves from colonial dependency. The other five versions are geared towards direct military intervention by the United States against those countries. In particular there is provision for—and I think this is useful for all to know—American military operations against Mexico, the countries of North Africa, the countries of the Middle East, in particular Kuwait, and against Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, Jamaica and, finally, China. In this context the authors believe it possible in particular to make an attempt by military means to seize the oil fields in Libya.

91. Finally, yet another study published by the Centre for Strategic International Study of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., entitled "The Future of Conflicts in the 1980s", asserts that the main sphere of conflicts of lesser intensity would be the third world and that those conflicts would arise primarily out of internal complications and instability there. Further on in that study cynical scenarios are given as to how the United States and other Western Powers might best interfere in these internal conflicts.

92. One wonders what this is: is it an innocent academic exercise carried out by a few irresponsible authors? No: it involves something far more serious. These are by no means mere theoretical studies. They are guidelines for action. Suffice it to state that in the current United States Administration almost half of the assistants to the Secretary of State and other high-ranking foreign policy officials are members of that Council on Foreign Relations—almost half. In the current Administration no less than 40 high-ranking officials are graduates of the Stanford research complex, including the particular institute which I mentioned. Finally, the Georgetown centre is represented in the current Administration by the Under-Secretary of State, by a number of officials on the National Security Council, and also—I would like especial note to be taken of this—by the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. In other words, those who recently developed these vile schemes directed against third-world countries are placed today in official posts so that they can make the appropriate policy for the United States.

93. And that policy is already being carried out in actual fact. The United States has established the so-called Rapid Deployment Forces, which are directed, first and foremost, against the countries of the Near and Middle East. The first of January 1983 saw the establishment of a new military command in the Pentagon, which has been called the Central Command. It is responsible for 19 States in Asia and Africa as well as a substantial part of the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The United States is relentlessly seeking for itself greater and greater military advantages and bases in those areas, and it is establishing spring-boards under the label of so-called multi-national forces. States there are being arbitrarily united, one after another, in a sphere of "strategic" or "vital" interests of the United States. Thus, what is involved is a global plan for carrying out punitive operations against relcalcitrant developing countries which do not wish to follow along with Washington's policy.

94. That is why what is occurring today in and around Libya—like what is occurring in and around Nicaragua—is only, so to speak, the tip of the iceberg. It is but a part of what American strategists have in store for countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America: an attempt to re-colonize liberated States under a new façade, and to go back to the times of the colonizer's pith helmet and gun-boat diplomacy—perhaps even to usher in a new era of "aircraft-carrier diplomacy".

95. One cannot fail to see that such activities and hegemonistic United States claims to the role of "international policeman" are in flagrant contradiction of the main principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the obligations of the United States as a permanent member of the Security Council. We are now able to understand quite clearly why the United States and other countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) voted against the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1981.[1] They did not wish to tie their hands by any obligations but preferred to keep them free for intervention.

96. In these circumstances, the Soviet delegation considers as appropriate and valid the appeal by Libya to the Council for the protection of its sovereignty and national independence against imperialistic meddling. Motivated by feelings of friendship and solidarity for peoples of young developing countries, the Soviet Union strongly condemns the policy of military blackmail and threats pursued by the United States against Libya. Through its actions, the United States is attempting to exacerbate what is already a hotbed of international tensions in the Middle East, and to create yet another serious threat to international peace and security. Such conduct is unacceptable and inadmissible in relations among States. Washington's great-Power high-handedness and its systematic and flagrant interference in the internal affairs of other States must immediately come to an end.

97. I should like to say a few words about the statement made by the representative of the United States. By his frequent use of the words "Soviet Union" and "Soviets", he tried to convey a fallacious idea of the source of the threat to third-world countries. But the facts speak more eloquently. It is not the Soviet Union, but the United States, which is dispatching its naval fleet to the shores of small, young countries. It is not the Soviet Union, but the United States, which has covered the globe with its military bases, which number close to 1,500.

98. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States which has 43 per cent of all its military forces outside its borders in the territories of others. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States which has declared as a sphere of vital interest regions which are tens of thousands of kilometres distant from the United States. Finally, it is not the Soviet Union but the United States which, with cowboy bravado, is today spreading nuclear weapons all over the world.

99. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has asked to speak again, and I now call on him.

100. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset I wish categorically to deny the allegation of Libyan intervention in Chad made by the representative of the United States. Talking of Chad is but a pretext the United States has searched for or probably created to enter the region.

101. The United States of America claims to be concerned about peace. Yet it rushed to the rescue of Habré. How we wish it had hurried to save Lebanon when it was subjected to a sea, land and air invasion. We do not know what the United States Administration has given to the people and Government of Lebanon or to the Arabs or to the Palestinian people. The representative of the United States has given only his veto to the cause of the Palestinian people—to the cause of self-determination. How we wish that the United States would really put into practice all the principles it preaches. All these principles should be applied to South Africa. How we wish it would rush to liberate Angola and force South Africa to desist in attacking Angola, Mozambique and other countries in the region. How we wish it would apply human rights to black Africans in South Africa.

102. Muammar Qaddafi does not act as a world policeman as does the United States Administration. As for the United States training exercises which were said to have been planned long in advance, they have become an unacceptable myth because they always coincide with events. As our past experiences have taught us, they are prepared in advance, filed and put into action at the appropriate time.

103. The United States representative mentioned the matter of the Libyan pilot as did the representative of Habré. I had wanted to deal with this subject at the previous meeting, but did not have a chance to do so. I wish to say that that pilot is part of the Libyan Aviation Club. His aircraft was downed in 1981. He was imprisoned by Habré's forces in 1981 and Habré now brings him out to try to prove a point.

104. As for the OPEC incident mentioned by the representative of the United States—it seems that he does not even know the details of the incident, and that everything that happens is traced back to Libya—I wish to draw his attention to the fact that a Libyan national was a victim of that terrible event. He was Yusuf Al-Zamari, who was a member of the Libyan delegation to OPEC at that time.

105. As for attempted acts of sabotage, assassination and *coups d'état*, I shall quote from a speech made by Mr. Treiki on 22 February before the Council. He said:

> "Provocations, threats and acts of aggression against Libya are nothing new; they fall within the United States strategy of intervention in the affairs of States which refuse to acquiesce in its colonialist policies and colonialist interests.
>
> "It is an open secret that the United States intervenes in the internal affairs of States all over the world. In Asia, the United States waged a war of aggression against the Vietnamese people that ended in the defeat of the United States.
>
> "We all know of its continued intervention in Korea's affairs, the latest being those aggressive manoeuvres a few weeks ago in which more than

70,000 American soldiers participated, designed to threaten North Korea and destabilize the area.

"The United States also intervened in the affairs of the Iranian people, overthrew the patriotic Government of Mossadegh and imposed a puppet régime in 1953, supported the dictatorship of the Shah and provided it with all means of torture through its intelligence. However, the struggling Iranian people triumphed and the American influence ended. The United States did not despair; it went on working . . . against the Iranian Revolution . . . and it launched an act of direct aggression against Iran's sovereignty. It is now trying to prolong the war between Iran and Iraq in order to smash the Iranian Revolution and debilitate and distract Iraq from its national goal of confronting the Zionist enemy . . .

"In Latin America, acting from the viewpoint that that region falls within the American sphere of influence, the United States undermined unity there when it partitioned Greater Colombia.

"In 1963 the United States dispatched 23,000 soldiers to the Dominican Republic and imposed a pro-American Government.

"The United States became hostile to Cuba once its lackey, the dictator Batista, was overthrown . . . The United States tried to invade Cuba several times, the most important attempt being the so-called Bay of Pigs invasion, and when it failed the United States made several attempts to assassinate President Castro through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and laid political and economic siege to Cuba.

"In 1954 it intervened in Guatemala and imposed a Government to its own liking.

"In Chile it overthrew the elected Government in 1973 . . . As the facts have shown, Kissinger personally planned this operation, which was implemented by the CIA.

"In Nicaragua the United States Administration supported the feudal, oppressive régime of the dictator Somoza, which conformed to American interests. The United States Administration tried to prolong the life of that régime although it was aware of its violations of human rights. Since that régime was overthrown, that Administration has financed and plotted terrorism against the people of Nicaragua. Here I would recall that the Co-ordinator of the Council of the Government of National Reconstruction declared in a recent statement before the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Managua from 10 to 14 January that the CIA was behind all the military operations waged against his country and that it was using the neighbouring countries as springboards in implementing its plans for further intervention in the the internal affairs of Nicaragua [*see S/15628, annex, appendix I*].

"The United States Administration tries persistently to stop the 'winds of change' in Latin America through the destruction of progressive régimes; it uses all means to achieve its ends and to support those régimes loyal to it, as in the case of El Salvador and other countries.

"In Africa the United States Administration supports and is allied with the racist régime in South Africa. It supports that régime militarily, economically and politically. It obstructs the achievement by Namibia of its independence and tries to implant its military bases there . . .

". . .

"*The New York Times* of 16 January published an article . . . in which it stated that at a moment when the Reagan Administration is forcing most Government agencies to retrench, the CIA and its fellow intelligence organizations are enjoying boom times. With a budget increase of 25 per cent for 1983 as compared with the previous year, this is the fastest growing major agency in the Federal Government. The article goes on to say that the Agency has invested vast sums of money in the technology of intelligence [and that numerous plots, including assassination and other subversive activities, had been uncovered]. There were also revelations about . . . surveillance of American citizens . . .

"The CIA conducted extensive domestic spying during the 1960s and early 1970s under the pretext of gathering foreign intelligence information." [*2415th meeting, paras. 30-44.*]

106. In general the United States accuses Libya of intervening in the affairs of its neighbours. As Mr. Treiki said,

> "even if we assumed that differences actually existed between Libya and its neighbours . . . instead of working for pacification and calling upon neighbours to come to agreement, it has resorted to the policy of creating discord and provocation" [*ibid., para. 46*].

107. As for Libya, I should like to quote from what is said against it in American circles. On 17 May 1981, the *Daily News* of New York said that the Reagan Administration has secret plans to use Egypt and other Arabic countries to overthrow the Qaddafi régime. It stated that "the American officials describe Qaddafi as a cancer that had to be removed". The paper also stated that a high-ranking official in the State Department said the efforts to achieve that end do not include assassination. The newspaper also quoted a high State Department official as saying that "Secretary of State Alexander Haig considers Qaddafi in the same light as Castro because his course was counter to the national interests of the United States of America". *The Christian Science Monitor* of 29 July 1981 stated that "contrary to what is known there were reports that William Casey, the Director of the CIA, had not allowed that Agency to overthrow the Qaddafi Government." The newspaper went on to say that according to these reports President Sadat had on many occasions expressed the wish that he might have a friendly

neighbour as a leader for Libya. Another article, this time in *The Washington Post* of 31 July 1981 by the famous journalist Joseph Kraft, stated that "the differences in Congress about William Casey are centered on the plan he sanctioned to launch a *coup d'état* in Libya and assassinate its strongman Muammar Qaddafi."

108. On 3 August 1981, *African News* mentioned that CIA efforts to overthrow the Libyan Government would in no way surprise any of those who followed the statements of the Reagan Administration since January and quoted Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as saying before the Senate a month ago that "Libyan diplomacy is an unprecedented obstacle to American interests and aims" and pledged to provide assistance to those régimes that oppose Libyan aggression, as he called it. *African News* added that *Newsweek* magazine had mentioned, in July 1981, that it had learned that the CIA had a broad, multi-stage and very costly plan to overthrow Qaddafi and that that plan included a campaign against the reputation of the Libyan leader and the establishment of a resistance and para-military activity against him. *African News* added that *Newsweek* had inadvertently corroborated the reports that the CIA was financing a campaign against Qaddafi and that the funds for that campaign were wasted. The magazine had published a picture of Qaddafi surrounded by oil wells and Arabs carrying guns, with the caption "The most dangerous man in the world".

109. I could cite many more examples, but I do not wish to make a lengthy speech. The representative of the United States has tried to criticize the Soviet Union and its relations with Libya. We would simply like to say that the Soviet Union is a friend of peoples struggling for self-determination. It is a friend to national liberation movements, the same movements that the United States calls "terrorist movements". It is sheer coincidence that the interests of oppressed States are in line with the interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not ask to set up military bases in Libya; it did not try to take over our natural resources. Our relations with the Soviet Union are based on mutual respect. We thank the Soviet Union for all the assistance provided to us.

110. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the United States has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call on him.

111. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): I beg your indulgence, Sir, and that of my colleagues for a few moments only. I would not want to let the occasion pass without commending our friend, the representative of the Soviet Union, for a fascinating, exhaustive and extremely revealing scholarly analysis of certain texts which have recently appeared from the independent and autonomous institutions of American *academia*. I am always astonished and filled with awe at the perfect way in which the representative of the Soviet Union always imposes on the practices of pluralistic democracy the plots and schemes and systematic designs of what, I imagine, is the only system he knows well, that of authoritarian totalitarianism. But then, I suppose, all of us are the captives of our experience in this regard.

112. I must also make it perfectly clear to the members of the Council that we in the United States delegation, and, indeed, we in the Government of the United States, in no way hold Georgetown University responsible for the views and the activities of Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick. We only thank Georgetown University for giving her the opportunity to develop and practise her considerable scholarly talents.

113. May I say to the representatives of both the Soviet Union and Libya that I stand by every fact and every piece of incontrovertible, concrete evidence that I presented in my statement earlier this evening, including the careful and even loving choice of adjectives.

114. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I invite him to make his statement.

115. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): If a so-called pluralist democracy gives rise to such foul plans against third-world countries, then shame on such a democracy. If a pluralist democracy puts people who work out such plans in Government posts so that they may carry out those plans, then shame on such a democracy.

116. I note that the representative of the United States has not refuted the essence of those vile schemes directed against third-world countries.

The meeting rose at 9.05 p.m.

NOTE

[1] Resolution 36/103 of 9 December 1981, annex.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى: الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—October 1991—2,050